Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2407 (2018)

    Note by the President of the Security Council


In paragraph 2 of resolution 2407 (2018), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to provide a final report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel of Experts (see annex).

Annex

    Letter dated 21 February 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council


The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2407 (2018), the final report on its work.*

*   Yvonne Yew, the eighth member of the Panel of Experts, was appointed by the Secretary-General on 18 January 2019 and took up her official functions in New York on 28 January 2019.
The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and its enclosure were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
(Signed) Olaf Andrieu
Expert
(Signed) Dmitry Kiku
Expert
(Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert
(Signed) Maiko Takeuchi
Expert
(Signed) Yvonne Yew
(Signed) Jong Kwon Youn
Expert
(Signed) Jiahu Zong
Expert


Enclosure

    Letter dated 1 February 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)


The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2407 (2018), the final report on its work.
The Panel would appreciate it if this letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

(Signed) Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
(Signed) Olaf Andrieu
Expert
(Signed) Dmitry Kiku
Expert
(Signed) Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Expert
(Signed) Maiko Takeuchi
Expert
(Signed) Yvonne Yew
(Signed) Jong Kwon Youn
Expert
(Signed) Jiahu Zong
Expert


Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)

Summary
The nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remain intact and the country continues to defy Security Council resolutions through a massive increase in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products and coal. These violations render the latest United Nations sanctions ineffective by flouting the caps on the import of petroleum products and crude oil by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well as the coal ban, imposed in 2017 by the Security Council in response to the country’s unprecedented nuclear and ballistic missile testing. In addition to information provided to the Panel by several Member States on ship-to-ship transfers, one Member State indicated, while queried by another, that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had already procured over 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products in 2018. Global banks and insurance companies continue to unwittingly facilitate payments and provide coverage for vessels involved in ever-larger, multi-million-dollar, illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products, as well as an increasing number of ship-to-ship coal transfers and attempted transshipments.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues to violate the arms embargo and has attempted to supply small arms and light weapons and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen, as well as to Libya and the Sudan, via foreign intermediaries, including Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali in the case of the Houthi rebels. The Panel continued investigations into designated entities and individuals in Asia who clandestinely procured centrifuges for the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and attempted to sell a wide range of military equipment to armed groups and Governments in the Middle East and Africa. The Panel investigated the involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the construction of a military camp in Sierra Leone and the sale of fishing rights in the waters surrounding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as activities of designated entities and other prohibited activities around the world. The Panel also investigated the acquisition by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of leading luxury brand goods, such as Rolls-Royce, Mercedes-Benz and Lexus vehicles. The world’s largest container shipping line continued to unwittingly transport prohibited items later seized by Member States.
Financial sanctions remain some of the most poorly implemented and actively evaded measures of the sanctions regime. Individuals empowered to act as extensions of financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operate in at least five countries with seeming impunity. The Reconnaissance General Bureau continues its international financial operations by transferring funds from accounts closed in the European Union to those held at financial institutions in Asia. The global operations of Glocom and the Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies (MKP) continue despite the Panel’s past reporting on their illicit activities and show the ongoing use of overseas companies and individuals to obfuscate income-generating activities for the regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel also investigated companies acting as possible cooperative entities or joint ventures, some of which are officially registered as joint ventures and others that more actively conceal the nature of their collaboration with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A number of these entities have also violated other provisions of the resolutions, including by maintaining links to designated entities. The Panel also investigated the sophisticated cyberattacks carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against multiple Member States to evade financial sanctions.
Ship-to-ship transfers involve increasingly advanced evasion techniques. The disguising of vessels through ship identity theft and false Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmissions is not being taken into account by most global and regional commodity trading companies, banks and insurers, whose due diligence efforts fall extremely short. The manipulation of vessel AIS transmissions remains an overarching feature of illegal transfers, contrary to International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations governing safety of life at sea, which require that AIS be in operation at all times. This highlights weak monitoring by flag States. In addition, insurers do not monitor the AIS of the vessels for which they provide coverage and services. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the use of small, unregistered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and the use of additional vessels for transshipment. In addition to evading sanctions, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its maritime fleet are systematically violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, routinely engaging in double-flagging and providing safe harbour for hijacked ships. The Panel inspected seized vessels engaged in prohibited coal trades, documenting ship identity laundering, whereby the owners had deceived IMO into providing new vessel identity numbers to avoid repeat detection. The Panel found that ports and airports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were being used for rampant violations of the resolutions, ranging from illegal oil imports and coal exports to the smuggling of bulk cash by nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the Panel found that the country was using civilian facilities, including airports, for ballistic missile assembly and testing with the goal of effectively preventing “decapitation” strikes.
Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to play a key role in sanctions evasion. While some Member States have limited the number of bank accounts of the country’s embassies and diplomats as required by the resolutions, the latter are evading this provision by controlling accounts in multiple countries, including those to which they are not accredited. Diplomats and representatives of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also circumvent the assets freeze and the limit on the number of diplomatic bank accounts by holding accounts in the name of family members and front companies and by establishing accounts in multiple jurisdictions. Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue to travel under false accreditation in their passports and have also facilitated the country’s efforts to illegally export large quantities of coal through transshipment to disguise the origin.
Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption provisions in the resolutions and the Committee’s efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience difficulties in meeting critical life-saving needs of vulnerable populations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The present report offers a series of recommendations for designation and other practical measures to assist Member States and the Security Council in addressing implementation challenges and shortcomings.


Contents
Page
I. Introduction 7
II. Sectoral and maritime sanctions 7
III. Embargoes, designated entities and individuals 30
IV. Finance 48
V. Recent activities related to nuclear and ballistic missile programmes 65
VI. Unintended impact of sanctions 66
VII. National implementation reports 67
Annexes*

*   The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.


I. Introduction

  1. In paragraph 2 of resolution 2407 (2018), the Security Council requested the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to provide to the Committee a final report with findings and recommendations. The present report covers the period from 2 February 2018 to 1 February 2019. II. Sectoral and maritime sanctions
  2. Ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products by foreign-flagged vessels using flags of convenience are a primary method of sanctions evasion by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These transfers have increased in scope, scale and sophistication, with more than 50 vessels and 160 associated companies under investigation. Reports to the Panel by Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the Panel’s own investigations show that illegal ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products greatly accelerated in 2018. On 30 March, the Committee designated 27 vessels and 21 entities, mainly for ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum. On 16 October, the Committee designated an additional three vessels.
  3. On 6 July 2018, the United States informed the Panel that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had breached the petroleum cap stipulated in resolution 2397 (2017), stating that between 1 January and 30 May 2018, tankers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had called at ports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at least 89 times, likely to deliver refined petroleum products illegally procured via ship-to-ship transfers and that “these sales must be halted given that, in our estimation, the UNSCR 2397 quota has been breached”. On 30 July 2018, the Panel received a note verbale from the Russian Federation in which it sought clarification on the projection provided by the United States. The Russian Federation also informed the Panel that the cap had not been officially reached according to the numbers reported to the Committee and therefore there were no grounds for suspension of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On 17 September 2018, the United States informed the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) that “at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through to August 18 bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers”. The United States provided some imagery (see figure IX) and three scenarios to the Committee that “make clear that the DPRK has obtained far more than the 500,000 barrels it is authorized to procure in 2018” (see annex 2). In a communication to the Committee dated 21 September, the Russian Federation stated that “the fragmentary information provided by the US regarding the cases of alleged illegal ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to DPRK vessels as well as the result of the US computer modelling are insufficient for the Committee’s decision to completely cease refined petroleum export to the DPRK before the end of the year … a full investigation and corresponding conclusions of the Panel of Experts of the Committee of 1718 are required” (see annex 3).
  4. While the Panel lacks the definitive evidence to conclude that the cap has been breached, since September 2018, it has nevertheless obtained evidence of the increasing frequency of ship-to-ship transfers and of one unprecedented prohibited petroleum product transfer comprising 57,623.491 barrels alone, worth $5,730,886. The Panel’s investigation of this transfer reveals the most sophisticated case of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related vessel identity fraud to date, highlighting new sanction evasion techniques that defeated the due diligence efforts of the region’s leading commodity trader, as well as the United States and Singaporean banks that facilitated the fuel payments and a leading United Kingdom insurer that provided protection and indemnity cover to one of the vessels involved. The case also underlines, once again, the extremely poor reporting, oversight, monitoring and control over the vessels exercised by the flag-of-convenience States under whose jurisdiction they apparently sail. These failures further demonstrate how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the transnational criminal networks with which they partner may operate freely within global logistics supply chains and were able to hide in plain sight in international waters for more than eight months after the owner of one of the vessels was designated for an assets freeze and travel ban. Panama imposter
  5. On 11 November 2018, a Member State reported a suspected illegal ship-to-ship transfer on 28 October 2018 involving the Yuk Tung (IMO No. 9030591), designated for a global port entry ban and deflagging on 30 March 2018, and the Ocean Explorer (IMO No. 9388792) (see figure I).  
    Figure I
    Yuk Tung and Ocean Explorer on 28 October 2018

Source: Member State.

  1. The Panel’s investigation found that beginning on at least 22 May 2018 in the East China Sea, the Yuk Tung engaged in vessel “spoofing”, falsely transmitting its identity via its AIS as a supposedly Panama-flagged vessel named Maika using IMO number 9033969, as well as altering its course and destination. At the same time, the vessel legally authorized and registered with IMO number 9033969, the Comoros-flagged Hika, remained anchored off Lome, in the Gulf of Guinea, more than 7,000 miles away (see figure II).

    Figure II
    Yuk Tung, a.k.a. Maika, begins spoofing Hika, a.k.a. Mahika Source: Windward.
  2. Commercial maritime intelligence platforms, ship radar, specialized maritime databases and vessel-scrapping information show that the deception continued throughout the months of June to November 2018. While the Yuk Tung was operating under a falsely broadcast IMO number before and during the October ship-to-ship transfer, the vessel that it was impersonating, the Hika, made its final voyage from the Gulf of Guinea to the Chittagong scrapping yards in Bangladesh, where it was beached for scrap on 9 October 2018 (see figure III).

    Figure III
    False AIS broadcasting by the Yuk Tung from August to October; on 28 and 29 October 2018; final voyage of the Hika from 24 July to 9 October 2018 to Chittagong (left to right clockwise) Sources: Sea Searcher, the Panel, Windward.
  3. The above images show how the Yuk Tung transmitted an AIS signal, the disablement of which has been documented in previous Panel reports as a risk indicator of illegal ship-to-ship transfers and maritime-related activity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This more sophisticated subterfuge succeeded, as the Yuk Tung’s false broadcasting of the IMO number of the Hika triggered no alerts on the part of flag States, commercial maritime intelligence platforms or other maritime service providers. Physical disguise and false documentation
  4. The final element of the deception operation was physical disguise and false documentation. This activity appears to have been carefully pre-planned as the Yuk Tung and the Hika were unique in appearance: identical twin sister ships built in the same year by the same manufacturer according to the same design specifications with the exact same profile, tonnage and equipment. Imagery analysis provided by another Member State shows that after its designation in March 2018, the Yuk Tung was physically disguised with the abbreviation “YT” removed from the painted circle on the vessel’s stack and the name and IMO number of the vessel’s stern changed to that of the Maika (see figure IV). The Yuk Tung also obtained a false or fake Equatorial Guinean certificate of registry (figure V). The false registration papers and fake AIS transmissions, coupled with the physical deceptions employed by the vessel, provided the cover necessary to deceive any of the current, few due diligence and active compliance measures deployed by most global and regional commodity traders. These deceptive measures triggered no alerts on the part of the global and regional banks that unwittingly facilitated the multiple financial transactions associated with this transfer or of the insurers and reinsurers that provided protection and indemnity and hull insurance. Figure IV Yuk Tung imagery analysis

Source: Member State.


Figure V
False certificate of registry for the Maika, a.k.a. Yuk Tung

Source: The Panel.


    Yuk Tung commodity and brokering chains
  1. The commodity trading and brokering chains involved in the $5,700,000 transfer to the Yuk Tung are similar to the multi-million-dollar deals documented in previous Panel reports. The region’s leading oil and petroleum trader, Hin Leong, agreed to supply petroleum products to another known customer, Yuantai Fuel Trading, also registered in Singapore. Yuantai had been approached by individuals claiming to act on behalf of Golden Luxury Corporation, a Belize-registered entity that was apparently located in Taiwan Province of China. Golden Luxury later provided Yuantai documentation suggesting that its client for the transfer was a United Arab Emirates-based entity, Zeeshan Building Materials Trading LLC. These papers have not been verified and no supporting banking records or other credible or independent documentation have been provided to verify actual end-use delivery of the cargo. The Panel wrote to Golden Luxury Corporation but received no response (see annex 5). Hin Leong and Yuantai have since cooperated with the Panel by providing full transparency. On 10 December 2018, Hin Leong stated that they “have ceased STS operations and withdrawn our vessels from the East China Sea” as well as another affected area.

    Sanctions implications for “free-on-board” contracts
  2. Such incidents are likely to continue to occur for two reasons. The deception measures deployed by the Yuk Tung defeated all of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related sanctions compliance mechanisms adopted by commodity traders as well as their associated banks, insurers and vessels. Secondly, the essence of the legal definition of “free-on-board” contracts in East Asian markets is that liability for the cargo transfers from the seller to the buyer when the product is pumped via pipe from the guardrails of one vessel to the other during the ship-to-ship transfer. However, the designations by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) of vessels for global port bans and deregistration, coupled with the designation of some of those vessel owners, mean that liability for illegal transfers does not end with their product crossing the guardrail, if the Committee or Member States determine that such transfers violated sanctions. Such free-on-board contracts specific to the East Asian market may lose their legality and the concept behind “free on board” no longer holds if the party transferring the cargo is judged to have violated the measures contained within the resolutions. For example, both the Yuk Tung and its owners were designated in March 2018 following a January transfer to the Rye Song Gang 1. While Hin Leong has demonstrated that it was an unwitting party through its full and transparent disclosure, the Panel notes that Hin Leong did not implement the Panel’s suggested end-user delivery verification clause “best practices” outlined in a letter to the company on 10 May 2018 (see annex 7). The investigation continues. Recommendations
  3. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the free-on-board market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes effective end-use delivery verification.
  4. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and those segments of the affected free-on-board markets assess the AIS history of all the vessels that they intend to supply with products banned under the resolutions. Frequency of illegal ship-to-ship transfers: a 66-day period snapshot
  5. On 30 November 2018, a Member State provided imagery to the Panel showing that Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged and foreign-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers within a 66-day period between 2 June and 9 August 2018, including images of some vessels conducting illegal activities on consecutive days. Identified vessels included the Ji Song 6, the Myong Ryu 1, the An San 1, the Yu Phyong 5, the Sam Jong 2 and the Nam San 8. In a number of cases, the transfers involved smaller, unknown vessels in the East China Sea (see figure VI).  
    Figure VI
    Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with unknown vessels, June to August 2018

Source: Member State.

  1. Three documented transfers took place involving larger, foreign-flagged vessels, the Shang Yuan Bao (IMO No. 8126070), the New Regent (IMO No. 8312497) and the Xing Ming Yang 888 (IMO No. 8410847) (see figure VII).

Figure VII
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with foreign-flagged vessels

Source: Member State.


    Flag-of-convenience registries
  1. The Shang Yuan Bao had already been subject to Panel inquiries regarding a previous ship-to-ship transfer involving vessel identity fraud with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tanker Paek Ma on 18 May 2018 (see annex 13, para. 4). In August 2018, the Panel wrote to Panama, as the flag-of-convenience State for the Shang Yuan Bao during the transfers on 18 May and 2 June 2018 and for the New Regent on 7 June 2018. In its reply of 2 November 2018, Panama stated that the Shang Yuan Bao was “removed from the Panamanian merchant registry on 6 September” and that for the New Regent, “the process of removal” began “on 4 September” (see annex 9). On 16 August 2018, the Panel wrote to Sierra Leone, the flag-of-convenience State for the Xing Ming Yang 888. Sierra Leone has not replied to multiple inquiries from the Panel. Owners, operators and managers
  2. The Panel investigated the owners, operators and managers of the vessels. Regarding the ship-to-ship transfer on 18 May 2018 involving the Shang Yuan Bao, Jui Zong Shipping Management of Taiwan Province of China replied, stating that the first transfer was “a big misunderstanding” and that its vessel was providing drinking water through hoses used to transfer petroleum products (see annex 10). In its response of 15 October 2018 regarding the second ship-to-ship transfer of 2 June 2018, Jui Zong did not provide any requested documentation, simply stating that “the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is investigating this case, we believe they shall give back our innocence” (see annex 11). With regard to the New Regent, neither the vessel’s operator, registered owner nor manager have replied to the Panel’s inquiries. Regarding the Xing Ming Yang 888, Hongkong Qi Hang International Shipping Management Co. Ltd replied on behalf of the Hong Kong-named owner and operator, providing the same rationale as that used by the Jui Zong Shipping Management Co. for the Shang Yuan Bao (see annex 12). The Panel reminded them of the prohibition on all ship-to-ship transfers with Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels under resolution 2375 (2017). Vessel profiles
  3. The Shang Yuan Bao, Xing Ming Yang 888 and New Regent share a profile similar to most foreign-flagged vessels involved in illegal ship-to-ship transfers or ships from which fuel has ultimately been transferred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This vessel profile consists of coastal, product and general-purpose tankers operating out of ports within 600 nautical miles of previously identified zones in the East China Sea. These vessels typically sail under the jurisdiction of flag-of-convenience States with non-existent or poor sanctions compliance standards that were frequently used by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-controlled vessels during the period from 2011 to 2017. They are typically older ships that score poorly in port State control safety inspections or have otherwise been fined for pollution by port or coastal States. They have been insured or reinsured by protection and indemnity companies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia. Maritime industry practices that have traditionally shielded beneficial owners from potential environmental and taxation liabilities contribute to obscuring the identity of the foreign nationals who may have ultimately profited from prohibited transfers of fuel to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, brokering networks of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and foreign-flagged vessels
  4. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was using approximately 23 of its tanker vessels for prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum products. The Member State named the following six vessels as among the most active, accounting for 50 per cent of all transfers: the An San 1, the Chon Ma San, the Sam Jong 2, the Yu Son (Yuson), the Kum Un San and the Saebyol (Chong Rim 2). In a separate submission to the Committee dated 4 October 2018, the Member State provided imagery of two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers, the Sam Jong 2 and the Ji Song 6, engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers with unknown vessels on 12 September and 24 May 2018, respectively (see figure VIII). Figure VIII Ji Song 6 (above) and Sam Jong 2 (below) engaged in illegal ship-to-ship transfers on 12 September and 24 May 2018 Source: Member State.
  5. Other Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers documented in ship-to-ship transfers include the Myong Ryu 1, the Yu Phyong 5, the Nam San 8 (see paras. 14–17 and figures VI-VII), the Yu Jong 2, the Rye Song Gang 1 and the Paek Ma (see annex 13). In addition to acts of non-compliance, these vessels routinely engage in identity fraud and other activities contrary to both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and IMO regulations. Brokering networks of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  6. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the overseas bank representative offices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea arrange ship-to-ship transfer deals with help from third-country brokers. According to the Member State, one known individual is Ko Il Hwan (고일환), a representative of the designated Korea Daesong Bank based in Shenyang, China. The Panel previously investigated the Korea Daesong Bank’s representative office in Shenyang , and Ko Il Hwan in particular, for processing payments on behalf of Daedong Credit Bank. Korea Daesong Bank has used at least two false names to disguise its identity in its shipping-related activities: 조선녹색산업무역 (朝鲜绿色产业贸易) and 조선신용투자회사 (朝鲜信用投资公司 or 朝鲜信用投资会社).
  7. The Member State named a number of companies that are known and used by such brokers. One of these is Gudzon Shipping Company LLC, a company based in the Russian Federation. On 22 June and 18 November 2018, the Panel wrote to Gudzon and its affiliated company, Primorye Maritime Logistics Co. Ltd, relating to a ship-to-ship transfer of petroleum products from their vessel, the Patriot, to the Wan Heng 11 (see annexes 13–14) as well as two 22 August 2018 reported ship-to-ship transfers to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged tankers Chong Rim 2 and Chon Ma San. In its letters, the Panel requested information on the brokers involved in these shipments (see annex 14). It has yet to receive a reply. Communications methods for ship-to-ship transfers
  8. The Panel’s investigations showed that WeChat, a messaging, social media and mobile payment application, is the primary means of communication for ship-to-ship transfers in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea and that various techniques are used on that platform to obscure activities. In at least one case investigated by the Panel, the geographic coordinates were communicated in lieu of the identity of a vessel. Furthermore, the receiver vessel transferred to a supply ship a photograph via WeChat showing the last four digits of a renminbi banknote to authenticate the receiver vessel prior to fuel transfer. A foreign oil supplier and vessel owner involved in an attempted Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related ship-to-ship transfer in 2018 informed the Panel that brokers on WeChat had requested him to switch off his vessel’s AIS on at least two occasions in 2017. The brokers were acting on behalf of fishing fleet tanker vessels seeking to avoid possible detection of illegal fishing in Chinese fishery protection zones. These attempts at secrecy are not limited to the WeChat platform, but they complicate efforts to investigate and trace brokers acting on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: hubs for illegal activities
  9. A Member State provided imagery of certain ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in particular Nampo, as hubs for suspected illegal activity. In addition to imagery highlighting the consistent use of Nampo port for loading prohibited exports of coal from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see paras. 31–34 and annex 15), a Member State provided imagery demonstrating the widespread use of the Marine Import Terminal at Nampo by tankers documented as engaged in illegal ship-to-ship transfers. The imagery shows how underwater pipelines attached to offloading buoys are used to transfer fuel from vessels to the terminals in the Nampo port complex (see figure IX).
    Figure IX
    Marine Import Terminal at Nampo port: a hub for illegal ship-to-ship transfer offloading

Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.

    Study visit to Singapore by port officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  1. Blatant violations such as these can occur only with the full knowledge and cooperation of Nampo port officials. On 12 October 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that “there may have been a sanction violation in Singapore” relating to a scientific or technical training project between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Singapore that included a study visit to Singapore’s port by Nampo port officials. In its letter to Singapore, the Panel noted the systemic violations of the resolutions taking place at Nampo and also noted that according to a number of the Panel’s previous reports, the port was also the site for the export or import of a variety of shipping containers seized by Member States and found to be containing items from or destined for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that violated the provisions of the resolutions, including the measures aimed at stemming nuclear, ballistic missile and other arms-related materials.
  2. Singapore replied to the Panel on 4 December 2018, confirming that Kang Jong Gwan, the Minister of Land and Maritime Transport of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who oversees the country’s port, shipping and vessel operations, headed a delegation to Singapore. Previous Panel reports have noted that designated entities such as Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd are under the control of the Ministry of Land and Maritime Transport. In its reply, Singapore stated that it “had verified that the delegation members were not individuals designated by the UN”. The investigations into the activities at ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their senior managers continue.
  3. In addition to commanding vessels engaged in prohibited activities, at least one vessel captain from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been reported as having been arrested following disembarkation from a vessel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for carrying undeclared bulk cash in October 2018 (see figure X). In response to the Panel’s letter, the Russian Federation replied that on 2 October 2018, a citizen of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Kwang Il, was detained at the Pervomaisky customs post and “a large amount of cash was seized from him”. The Russian Federation noted that “a criminal case has been filed against this individual under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation article 200.1, section 2 (a) for non-declaration of cash in the amount of 179,900 USD”. In its reply, the Russian Federation stated that the investigation was continuing and that “the involvement of North Korean individuals whose names are included in the consolidated United Nations Security Council List has not been established”. Figure X Bulk cash seized from a vessel captain of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Source: http://dvtu.customs.ru.

    Blockchain platform for vessel transactions: Marine Chain
  1. In October 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that “a start-up company in the process of establishing itself as a Hong Kong-registered blockchain platform named Marine Chain has at least one DPRK individual behind it”. The Member State expressed concern that “the platform could be used to generate money for the regime and as a potential means of evading sanctions on shipping by creating a new method of obscuring the ownership of a vessel”.
  2. The Panel investigated Marine Chain’s Chief Executive Officer, Singaporean national “Captain” Jonathan Foong, on suspicion of violating paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Panel requested information on a suspected national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who had been presenting himself as a Marine Chain adviser.
  3. In his replies to the Panel, Foong provided contradictory information and documentation that did not meet the Panel’s evidentiary standards. He claimed that Marine Chain had been shut down, stating that “the biz was closed because the owner/investor is not paying his bill”. On the whereabouts of and his communications with the “owner/investor”, he stated that “although I have informed the owner to foot all outstanding bills (Owning (sic) close to 500K US$) he remained silent and we lost communication shortly thereafter”. For information on the use by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of cyberactivity in evasion of sanctions, see paragraphs 109 to 115. Ship-to-ship coal transfers
  4. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has switched most of its maritime-related coal trade to illegal ship-to-ship transfers as the primary means of circumventing paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017). Such illegal deliveries became regularized and systemic in 2018 (see annex 15), with some of the largest vessels in the fleet of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea documented as continuing to load coal at ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on a monthly basis before engaging in illegal ship-to-ship transfers, predominately in the Gulf of Tonkin (see figure XI). Figure XI Ship-to-ship transfers of coal in the Gulf of Tonkin Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.
  5. In other cases, satellite imagery shows that previously foreign-flagged vessels, such as the Hua Fu (IMO No. 9020003) designated for a global port entry ban and deflagging on 30 March 2018, continued to engage in multiple illegal ship-to-ship transfers in August and September 2018 (see figure XII). Figure XII Hua Fu engaging in illegal coal transfers in August and September 2018 Source: Member State; Map: The Panel.
  6. Other unknown foreign-flagged or now stateless vessels such as the former Panama-flagged Forever Lucky (IMO No. 9003653), the former Togo-flagged Lucky Star ((IMO No. 7942843) and the former Comoros-flagged Oriental Treasure (IMO No. 9115028) (see figure XIII), have also been documented as aiding and abetting the illegal coal export operations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. No flag State, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has reported these new vessel flags to IMO. Figure XIII Forever Lucky, Lucky Star and Oriental Treasure engaging in illegal coal operations Source: Member State; Map: The Panel. False-flagging of coal vessels of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: the Wise Honest
  7. Vessels of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have transported large quantities of coal and other prohibited goods through deceptive practices such as “double-flagging” that have violated both the resolutions and provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, essentially rendering such vessels stateless and vulnerable to the right of visit. One example of this trend is the vessel Wise Honest (IMO No. 8905490), which was transporting 25,500 tons of coal when it was detained by Indonesia around 1 April 2018. The Panel wrote to Indonesia on 14 June and again on 27 August 2018 following information and imagery supplied by a Member State
    (see figure XIV). Indonesia reported on 12 September 2018 that the ship had been inspected and found to be registered under two jurisdictions, one set of registration and crew documents under the flag of Sierra Leone and the other under the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Common to all Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessels engaged in prohibited trade and contrary to IMO regulations, the vessel was reported as sailing with the AIS “turned off during the ship’s journey into Indonesian territorial waters” and that “no report was made to the destined port authority for proper ship clearance”. Indonesia informed the Panel on 29 November 2018 that the captain of the Wise Honest was subject to prosecution for “knowingly hoisting a false flag”.

Figure XIV
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea vessel Wise Honest at Nampo loading coal on 11 March (left) and at Balikpapan Port Facility on 9 April 2018 (right)

Source: Member State.


Figure XV
Likely route of the Wise Honest

Source: Member State.


    Coal originating in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: brokering 

and export chains

  1. The Panel’s investigations into coal brokering and export chains highlight the significant amounts of revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as well as profit for commodity traders seeking commissions or arbitrage from such deals. The Wise Honest shipment was worth $2,990,000, according to its contract (see annex 17). Regarding the shipment’s export documentation and brokering chain, Indonesia stated that it had recovered “cargo documents and clearance received from a Russian cargo ship intending to conduct an STS transfer around Balikpapan waters in East Kalimantan”. The Panel requested further clarification and/or documentation, which has not been received to date. Indonesia also named a company of the Republic of Korea, Enermax, as the “final destination/recipient of the coal upon the STS transfer of the coal in Balikpapan” (see annex 16). On 3 December 2018, Enermax informed the Panel that it had been investigated by its national authorities and that there was no import of coal. The contract for the shipment named the sellers as Hong Kong Nova International Trade Company, an entity selling cigarette-manufacturing machinery. The company informed the Panel that it “had no idea where the contract came from nor why it has our company’s seal” (see annex 18).
  2. The Panel identified a key figure in the coal shipment as Hamid Ali, an Indonesian commodity trader and broker who had regular meetings with diplomats at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Jakarta. These diplomats introduced Ali to Jong Song Ho, the president of the Jinmyong Trading Group and Jinmyong Joint Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in December 2017 (see annex 19) as part of “the establishment of a Korean Cultural Centre in West Java”. Ali met Jong again a month later and discussed the transshipment of coal; the cost of the service was $760,000, which Jong arranged through a transfer to Ali’s account via a company named Huitong Minerals (see ibid.). According to Ali, another broker, Eko Setyatmoko, then became involved in the transshipment. Setyatmoko, who received at least some of the Huitong Minerals payment and has liaised with the Wise Honest and its crew since its interdiction in April, has not responded to the Panel’s inquiries. The Panel informed Indonesia, Ali and Setyatmoko that the 25,500 tons of coal should be seized, according to the resolutions, and that the broker may not sell the coal. The Panel has yet to receive any confirmation that the coal has been offloaded from the vessel. The investigation continues.
  3. The Panel continued its investigation of prohibited coal exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2017 via transshipment through Russian Far Eastern ports, including Kholmsk. On 10 December 2018, the Republic of Korea indicted four of its nationals and five commodity trading companies for illegally importing coal and pig iron (see table 1). The motive reportedly cited by the Public Prosecutors’ Office was “profit from arbitrage, using the fact that the prices of North Korean coal and other materials are low due to their difficulty to be traded internationally”. Table 1 Prohibited commodity shipments subject to prosecution: type, volume and value

Commodity Volume (tons) Value (United States dollars)

Coal 29 843 4 610 000
Coal briquettes 8 275 (coal and coal briquettes)
Pig iron 2 010 971 000
Total value of prohibited imports 5 581 000a

a   In a reply to the Panel dated 7 January 2019, the Republic of Korea reported that according to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 29,843 tons of coal, 8,275 tons of coal briquettes and 2,010 tons of pig iron from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were “illegally transported to the ROK – these are provisional figures, pending final judgement by the judiciary”. 
  1. A Member State informed the Panel in September 2018 that the prohibited shipments listed above comprise only one element of much larger trades of commodities from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that involve unwitting international banks providing letters of credit to a wider, transnational trading network that operates through offshore jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands and in Hong Kong, China, as well as other locations. Vessel owners engaged in such trades have attempted to launder the identity of their ships, deceiving IMO into providing new IMO numbers for vessels later seized pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) (see annex 28). These investigations continue. Vessel hijacking and use of the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  2. The Panel continued its investigation of the Wan Heng 11 (IMO No. 8791667), a former Belize-flagged vessel, which was first detected engaging in an illegal ship-to-ship transfer with the tanker of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Rye Song Gang 1 (IMO No. 7389704) on13 February 2018. Although deregistered by Belize on 19 February 2018, the vessel continued to occasionally transmit as a Belize-registered vessel, including around the time of a ship-to-ship transfer on 10 April with the Patriot, a Russian Federation-registered vessel, and until 21 June 2018, when it switched identity to that of a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-flagged vessel, the Kum Jin Gang.
  3. Notably, this reregistration occurred without official notification to IMO and without the consent of the rightful owners of the ship, Zhejiang Wanheng Shipping Company. This company cooperated with the Panel, providing evidence that on 29 November 2017, the company signed a bareboat charter agreement with Hong Kong Cosnewvi International Shipping represented by Chen Chun-han, a national of Taiwan Province of China, who also holds a Travel Permit for Resident of Taiwan to Chinese Mainland. The bareboat charter agreement contained an “illegal trading clause”, which was activated on 19 February 2018 when the owners learned from the Belize authorities of the sanctions violation through their vessel’s deregistration notification. Subject to multiple investigations by the Chinese authorities, the rightful owner attempted to locate and reclaim their vessel, without success. According to the business registry, Hong Kong Cosnewvi International Shipping was dissolved on 24 August 2018. Chen Chun-han did not respond to the Panel.
  4. The case highlights a newly identified risk for larger shipowners in the region engaging in the frequent practice of bareboat chartering. The case shows that charterers that violate sanctions-related clauses do not return vessels following contract cancellations as a result of documented violations. Importantly, the effective 12-month hijack of the Wan Heng 11 illustrates how the flag registry and ports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea now provide safe harbour for such ships, both in terms of resupply of fuel and provisions as well as ensuring that United Nations-designated deregistration does not render such vessels stateless and thus more vulnerable to inspection for illegal activities under the rules governing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, the global port ban imposed on the Wan Heng 11 and other such vessels means that these ships cannot enter ports subject to commercial courts and other tribunal jurisdictions, which would provide the rightful owner with legal recourse. Due diligence and AIS monitoring by flag States, commodity traders, insurers and classification societies
  5. With regard to the above-mentioned evasion tactics and, in particular, the consistent switching off of AIS, the Panel conducted a survey in 2018, writing to all the flag-of-convenience States and protection and indemnity insurers that had registered or provided services to foreign-flagged vessels identified as involved in violations of paragraphs 11 and 14 of resolution 2375 (2017). As part of the survey, the Panel also wrote to the leading global commodity trading companies and oil refiners operating in the relevant region, including those whose product had already been illegally channelled to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, requesting information about any due diligence and risk mitigation measures taken to ensure that the relevant vessels and cargoes under their services or contracts were not diverted to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel suggested a best practice “AIS switch-off clause” in the letters as well as contractual clauses to ensure end-use delivery verification of petroleum products for global commodity traders, oil refiners and producers, which it further promoted during consultations with industry and Member States between February and June 2018.
  6. None of the flag-of-convenience States that replied to the Panel’s letters on AIS surveillance currently monitor the AIS of the vessels that sail under their jurisdiction and are therefore unable to ensure that these vessels comply with the AIS regulations contained within the relevant international treaties, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. The lack of AIS monitoring of at-risk vessels in international waters in North-East Asia means that these flag-of-convenience States are unable to detect future illegal ship-to-ship transfers signalled through an AIS switch-off or manipulation. Similarly, none of the responding Protection and Indemnity Club insurance and reinsurance companies indicated that they monitored the AIS of vessels whose cargo they insured.
  7. Several entities indicated that they had adopted some form of an AIS switch-off clause, including three of the largest global commodity trading companies and a smaller number of Asia-based oil traders and refiners. While only one major global commodity trading company has previously indicated to the Panel that it instituted a full end-use delivery verification supporting documentation requirement for contracts applied to specific Asian deliveries, two other major traders included a destination restriction clause in their contracts. A major global commodity trading company’s institution of both an AIS switch-off clause and the end-use delivery verification requirement demonstrates the ability of the private sector to enhance due diligence at a relatively low cost.
  8. If the above measures were adopted more widely, they might significantly reduce the number of charter vessels willing to switch off or otherwise manipulate their AIS to engage in illegal ship-to-ship transfer. If the relevant flag States adopted similar measures, ship captains might understand that AIS switch-off or manipulation for illegal ship-to-ship transfer could lead to vessel deregistration, the loss of insurance and the loss of earnings through the termination of chartering and transportation contracts.
  9. The Panel conducted another survey with all companies providing classification services to vessels involved in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum as well as exports and transshipments of coal banned under the resolutions. In most cases, the Panel found that such contracts had been withdrawn and the vessels had been “declassed”. While classification societies may inform the flag States and vessel owners of declassification, the reason (violation of the resolutions) is generally not given, making it possible that other such societies unwittingly provide services to the vessel or its owners. To ensure better information, coordination classification societies should inform the Committee, as well as flag States, vessel owners, relevant international and regional organizations and trade associations, when they declassify vessels based on violations of the resolutions. Prohibited fishing activities
  10. The Panel found that the prohibited transfer by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its fishing rights, as clarified in resolution 2397 (2017), continued throughout 2018, acting as a potential source of income for the country. The Panel analysed two Member State reports, noting that during the period from January to November 2018, they had inspected more than 15 Chinese fishing vessels that were found to be carrying fishing licences of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Inspections and reports detailed multiple areas of operation, including fishing grounds in the seas between Japan and China, the Korean Peninsula and the Russian Federation. One fisherman stated, during an interview with a Member State, that there were around 200 Chinese fishing boats operating in the “water of North Korea”. Another interviewee stated that the monthly cost of an individual fishing licence was 50,000 yuan (approximately $7,250 ). Observable evidence included fishing permit number plates attached to the boats’ bridge (see figure XVI) while in another image, the vessel flew the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (figure XVII). Figure XVI Fishing vessels displaying fishing permit number plates and the flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Source: Member State.
  11. The Panel noted two obfuscation techniques: fishing permits issued by authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used by foreign fishing boats and false-flagging. For example, a fishing permit issued by authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was found aboard a boat captained by a Chinese national (see figure XVII). In a separate case, the Panel is investigating media reports based on video footage of the Russian Federation Coastguard that highlights at least one Chinese fishing boat flying a flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, obfuscating its nationality (see figure XVII). Figure XVII Fishing licence (left) and flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the bow of the Chinese boat (right)

Source: Member State (left); YouTube (right).

  1. The Panel wrote to China and the Russian Federation to request information on its investigations. China informed the Panel that “China has always seriously implemented the Security Council resolutions related to the DPRK. After the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017), the Chinese competent authorities immediately published an announcement to prohibit procuring fishing rights from the DPRK, and the Chinese entities have stopped procuring fishing rights from the DPRK in accordance with the announcement. If any Chinese national or vessel is confirmed to illegally procure fishing rights from the DPRK or illegally go fishing in the DPRK sea areas without permission, China will deal with relevant issues in accordance with laws and regulations.” The Panel has not yet received a reply from the Russian Federation. Recommendations Recommendations to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)
  2. Designate the following vessels for illicit transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):
    Myong Ryu 1, IMO number: 8532413, flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
    Song Won, IMO number: 8613360, flag of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
    Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36), flag unknown
    Xing Ming Yang 888, IMO number: 8410847, Sierra Leone
  3. Include the provision in paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) in the vessel designation criteria and incorporate it into the existing lists of designated vessels as appropriate.
  4. Amend the delisting procedure to allow Member States to request delisting on behalf of a vessel owner (for the Panel’s proposal for an amended delisting procedure for vessels, see annex 20). Recommendations to Member States
  5. Flag States should inform the Committee and the Panel of vessels that they deregister.
  6. Flag States should monitor the AIS of their vessels to better ensure implementation of the resolutions.
  7. Members States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for protection and indemnity insurance and reinsurance companies to include AIS screening and an “AIS switch-off” clause in their contracts for at-risk vessels operating in the relevant regions.
  8. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for petroleum product trading, refining and producing companies to include end-use delivery verification measures and AIS screening as well as an “AIS switch-off” clause in their contracts.
  9. IMO member States IMO should consider measures to improve information-sharing and maritime regulation enforcement by flag States and other interested parties.
  10. Member States should consider introducing legislation to ensure that global and regional banks operating in their jurisdiction introduce AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments for global and regional commodity traders and brokers trading in oil and petroleum products in higher-risk free-on-board markets in the affected areas.
  11. In order to allow more effective due diligence by flag States, other Member States and the maritime-related industries, the Committee should consider consolidating the designated vessels in one document. Information provided on the vessels should include the measures obligated under the relevant resolutions, such as asset freeze, denial of port entry and cancellation of registration or vessel services. Incidents of deregistration reported to the Committee should also be reflected to prevent inadvertent reregistration. Imports and exports of commodities to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea according to trade data
  12. For detailed information on imports and exports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during the reporting period, see annex 21. III. Embargoes, designated entities and individuals Algeria
  13. In response to the Panel’s letter of 10 August 2017 on Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies, Algeria replied during 2018 that “there are no North Korean companies or entities on Security Council sanctions lists in Algeria”. However, Algeria also noted that one national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a company manager named Choe Song Il, “claimed to represent Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies”. He was officially the manager of “MOP Group Algeria LLC”, which was registered on 20 August 2015. The company specialized “in major public works, construction design, mining and the manufacture of furnishings”. Furthermore, Choe’s replacement, Kim Chol Jin, arrived in Algeria on 3 February 2017, the same day that Choe departed. The Panel notes that according to Algeria, the company was officially dissolved on 8 January 2018. Kim Chol Jin departed Algeria on 18 March 2018. Angola
  14. The Panel continued its investigation of a military advisory mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of approximately 80 individuals, which, according to a Member State, departed Angola for an unknown destination in January 2017. On 27 August 2018, Angola replied to the Panel, stating that “we are not aware of any movement or travel by military advisers from Angola to Mozambique in 2017”. Angola informed the Panel that Jon Chol Yong, a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited to Angola and working on behalf of Green Pine Associated Corporation, departed Angolan territory on 20 April 2017. Angola also noted that embassy staff of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been “drastically reduced from 12 diplomats in 2016–2017 to 6 diplomats currently” and provided the Panel with lists of accredited diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 22). Botswana
  15. Regarding the activity of Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Botswana, Botswana cooperated by replying in its letter dated 6 February 2018 that the Government had contracted Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies based in Windhoek in 2004. General manager Kang Hyo Song represented the company, which designed and built “three Dikgozi Monument”, and two workers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ri Ung Si and Sin Yong, had visited Botswana in the last stages of the project. Botswana further informed the Panel that in 2007, Kang Hyo Song had acquired a residence permit in Botswana and registered “Korean Art and Monument (Proprietary) Limited” in Gaborone, about which the Panel is now addressing its inquiries. In its implementation report submitted on 27 October 2017, Botswana noted that the three Dikgozi monument contract was the last engagement on record with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Cambodia
  16. Cambodia replied to a Panel inquiry by stating that Mansudae New Tech Corporation Ltd had been incorporated as an investment company by Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies as a subsidiary at the Council for the Development of Cambodia and the Ministry of Commerce and that it had “signed an agreement with the Royal Government of Cambodia to establish the Grand Angkor Panorama Museum in Siem Reap Province”. Cambodia provided the biodata of 12 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2 managers and 10 staff) who had worked for the company but has yet to reply to the Panel’s most recent letter. China Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-designated entities engaged in clandestine nuclear procurement
  17. The Panel continued its investigation into the designated entities Namchongang Trading Corporation, Namhung Trading Corporation and associated front companies and their representatives, including Kang Mun Kil, designated for nuclear procurement activities by resolution 2270 (2016). According to a Member State, Kang Mun Kil procured items used for nuclear programmes, including pressure transducers, prohibited under paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006). According to the documents obtained by the Member State, he had procured pressure transducers from a Chinese company, Shanghai Zhen Tai Instrument Corporation Limited (上海振太仪表有限公司, hereafter Shanghai Zhen Tai), at least twice in 2013 and 2016. Shanghai Zhen Tai has also been advertised as an exporter of vacuum equipment to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on a commercial website. According to the Member State and supporting documentation, Kang Mun Kil used a Hong Kong company, “Y Y Shun Limited” (億億順有限公司), for procurement activities. By September 2014, Kang Mun Kil had officially renamed Y Y Shun Limited as “Shunyi Limited”, and this company provided a Chinese bank account for transfers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Member State informed the Panel that Kang Mun Kil’s successor in China was Chong Won Ryol, a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who is the official trade representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Dalian in addition to working on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation. The Panel requested information from China on Shanghai Zhen Tai’s sales of vacuum equipment and end users, correspondence between YY Shun Limited and Shanghai Zhen Tai and catalogues of the company’s pressure transducers, relevant customs documents, immigration and visa record entries and exit information, and financial information. China replied to the Panel, stating that the “relevant authorities have made a comprehensive and serious investigation into this case” and that “Shanghai Zhen Tai Instrument Corporation Limited does not have the export qualification in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations. Zhen Tai has neither directly carried out any export trade nor entrusted trade agent companies to do export on behalf of it since establishment” and that “regarding the Hong Kong company Y Y Shun Company Ltd and Shunyi Limited, after an in-depth investigation by China there is no evidence proving that they are operating in China on behalf of Namchongang Trading Corporation”. China also informed the Panel that “the bank account opened by the above Hong Kong companies in a Chinese bank has been closed” and that “Kang Mun Kil left China in 2016 and is not in China now”.
  18. As a follow-up to this investigation, the Panel is currently surveying the world’s manufacturers of nuclear procurement “choke point” items such as pressure transducers to identify, determine and ultimately share good corporate internal screening systems and other examples of proactive end-use delivery verification. Democratic Republic of the Congo
  19. The Panel is investigating the involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel viewed letters from Medrara, a Kinshasa-registered gold mining company directed by a Lebanese citizen, Fouad Dakhlallah, A letter from Medrara dated 9 September 2017 was addressed to Kim Chol Su, a representative of the United Nations-designated entity Saeng P’il, a.k.a. Green Pine Associated Corporation. The letter outlined a proposed investment in a Medrara gold mine, noting that “the size of the territory is 16,000 hectares” and named Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali as the appointed intermediary, stating that “after your approval Mr. Hussein Al-Ali in Damascus will make all the arrangements for meeting in Beirut”. The letter, sent by Dakhlallah, provides Hussein al-Ali’s contact details. An earlier letter dated 15 October 2016 was addressed to “Chong Ryong”, assessed by the Member State as likely to be the Chongryong Technology Corporation previously identified as active on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Sudan, together with Hussein al-Ali. The letter, inviting a geologist team from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to visit, requested the names and passport numbers of the geologists. The Panel wrote to Dakhlallah, who also controls a forestry company, Compagnie d’exploitation de bois d’Afrique, to request information concerning both the involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in his businesses and that of their documented intermediary in Africa, Hussein al-Ali, but has received no reply.
  20. The Panel continued its investigation into military training by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the Presidential Guard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as its provision of 9-mm firearms to the Presidential Guard and special units of the police, some of which were deployed to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to respond to the Panel’s inquiries. Egypt
  21. The Panel continued its investigation of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea diplomat An Jong Hyok, who was certified as the general representative of the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the Middle East and Africa and authorized to act on behalf of Saeng Pi’l Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation. According to a Member State, An had travelled to Egypt in August 2016 in an attempt to negotiate the release of the vessel Jie Shun and its cargo of 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades seized by the Egyptian authorities and then inspected by the Panel in November 2016. Egypt cooperated with the Panel in April 2018, confirming that An Jong Hyok was still stationed at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Cairo as the Third Secretary. Egypt also informed the Panel on 13 July 2018 that An Jong Hyok was “no longer accredited North Korean Embassy in Egypt and has left Egypt permanently”. Egypt also replied to the Panel’s request for information on the activities of its Defence Office in Pyongyang, the existence of which was communicated to the Panel by a Member State by stating that “it has made it absolutely clear that there is no military cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Eritrea
  22. The Panel continued its investigation into Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national Kim Kwang Rim; it has previously reported on this individual as the Green Pine Associated Corporation representative in Eritrea. Eritrea has yet to reply to the Panel’s inquiries for his full biodata, activities and whereabouts. The Panel also continued its investigation into prohibited military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritech (E-tech), which operates under the authority or at the direction of the Eritrean Defence Forces, and its relationship with Glocom, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea provider of encrypted military communications equipment. Germany
  23. The Panel investigated a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ri Yun Thaek (a.k.a. Ri Yun Taek) who attempted to procure a multi-gas monitor, which, according to Germany, is a prohibited dual-use item that may be used in the production of chemical weapons, while based at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Berlin in 2012 and 2013. Germany informed the Panel that it had prevented the procurement attempt but had been unable to take any legal action against Ri owing to his diplomatic status. Germany subsequently expelled Ri and informed other European Union member States about his activities. As a result, he was refused accreditation at the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations in Vienna and at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Sofia. According to a Member State, Ri was then assigned to the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Moscow. The Panel has requested information from the Russian Federation on his status. Islamic Republic of Iran
  24. A Member State informed the Panel that the Islamic Republic of Iran was one of the two most lucrative markets for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea military-related cooperation and that both Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) and Green Pine Associated Corporation, a.k.a. Saeng Pi’l, offices in the Islamic Republic of Iran “are active”. The Member State also informed the Panel that one recently observed pattern was nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based in the Islamic Republic of Iran flying between Tehran and Dubai and boarding a return flight to Tehran within a few hours of their arrival in the United Arab Emirates. The Member State noted that this was indicative of cash couriers. The Panel wrote to the Islamic Republic of Iran requesting all information relating to activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the country. In the letter (see annex 23), the Panel noted previous correspondence with the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2015 and 2016 documenting more than 282 flights between Tehran and Dubai by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea diplomats Kim Yong Chol and Jang Jong Son, who were designated in March 2016 as KOMID representatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel also recalled airline information showing visits to Tehran by KOMID President Kang Myong Chol in 2013 and Green Pine Associated Corporation President Ri Hak Chol in 2014 and provided evidence of at least two passports for each of the designated individuals as well as additional aliases. The Panel recalled Member State information indicating that previously identified designated individuals and the representatives of designated entities were now travelling under false names or with different passports and renewed its 2017 request to the Islamic Republic of Iran for the names and passport numbers of all diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited in the country. The Panel also requested copies of passports and visa information on all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea registered with the Iranian authorities. The Islamic Republic of Iran replied to the Panel on 19 December 2018, stating that “there are no DPRK nationals residing in the Islamic Republic of Iran other than its diplomats”. It also stated that “DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have so far not been in contradiction with the provisions of relevant conventions or resolutions of the Security Council on DPRK” (see annex 24). Libya
  25. The Panel continued its investigations into multiple attempts at military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and various Libyan authorities, as well as designated entities and foreign nationals working on their behalf in Libya. According to a Member State, O Chol Su, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, sent a letter on 23 March 2015 to Khalifa al-Ghwail, the then Chief of the Supreme Council of Defence and deputy to the Prime Minister, which noted that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was “currently in the process of preparing the sales/purchase agreement for the required defence systems and ammunition needed to maintain stability of Libya” and further noted that “Green Pine Association, a commercial establishment belonging to our ministry” would provide the draft agreement and additional documentation. The letter also mentioned the role of Consulting Bureau for Marketing, a company belonging to a Hussein al-Ali, a Syrian national described as an arms trafficker for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Libya, the Sudan and Yemen. In a reply dated 5 April 2015, Khalifa al-Ghwail thanked O Chol Su and referred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s invitation to Libyan technical teams to visit the country. A subsequent document of the Libyan Ministry of Defence dated 20 May 2015 authorized power of attorney for Syrian national Hussein al-Ali “to negotiate, correspond, exchange information, receive documents and technical and financial proposals on our behalf in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. The Panel suspects a connection between the 2015 planned activities and meetings held later by the Ambassador of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to Libya with the Libyan Ministry of Defence to engage in military cooperation in March 2017. Neither Libya nor Khalifa al-Ghwail have replied to the Panel’s inquiries. Madagascar
  26. The Panel is investigating the activities of Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies in Madagascar. Madagascar replied to the Panel in its letter dated 20 November 2017 that no company named “Mansudae Overseas Project (MOP) Group of Companies” is conducting business in Madagascar and no “North Korean national” is registered in immigration databases. Malaysia
  27. On 22 February 2018, the United States announced that it had determined that “the Government of North Korea used the chemical warfare agent VX to assassinate Kim Jong Nam in Kuala Lumpur airport”. On 14 March, during the 87th meeting of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Government of Malaysia stated that it was “the use of VX nerve agent” that had “caused the death of one North Korean national, Mr. Kim Jong Nam”. Malaysia also noted that its law enforcement authorities were “still pursuing an investigation on the four North Korean suspects who fled Malaysia on the day of the killing”. During the court proceedings, a Malaysian police investigator identified Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nationals Ri Jae Nam with Hanamori, the suspect Hong Song Hac with Chang and Ri Ji Hyon as Y and stated that Ri Jae Nam was the mastermind behind the assassination. The Panel requested further information from Malaysia concerning a media report that equipment that could be used to make nerve agents had been found in the apartment of Ri Jong Chol, a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea first detained by Malaysia in the initial stages of the police investigation and subsequently expelled on 3 March 2017. Mozambique
  28. The Panel continued its investigation into six nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities and travelling to Mozambique. According to a letter of December 2017 from Mozambique, the six individuals (Kim Kwang Hyok, Kim Hyok Chan, Kim Song Chol, Ri Won Ho, Kim Sok Chol and Kim Jung Jong) travelled to Mozambique during the period from 2012 to 2017. Airline records show that while in Mozambique, these individuals travelled to remote civil-military airfields with nearby military bases. Mozambique has yet to respond to the Panel’s inquiries on the individuals’ activities. It also has not replied to a request for information on the status and travel movements of Ri Chang Su, a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea based in South Africa but stationed in Mozambique, who was identified as the representative of Haegeumgang Trading Corporation, which has been engaged in prohibited military activities in Mozambique.
  29. Regarding the prohibited fishing activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Mozambique, on 15 January 2018, Mozambique provided evidence that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-Mozambique joint fishing venture EMKIP had been dissolved. On 11 April, Mozambique informed the Panel that “on 25th March 2018, 22 members of the DPRK’s crew of the vessels operating under the flag of that country departed definitively from Mozambique to their country of origin” and provided the relevant tickets and passport information. Mozambique informed the Panel that “4 crew members plus a manager, all of them from DPRK [sic], still remain in Mozambique taking care of the vessels and should return to their country as soon as the necessary arrangements are concluded”. On 24 April 2018, Mozambique informed the Panel that the two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-crewed fishing vessels associated with EMKIP’s operations had been deregistered and reflagged to other Member States under the ownership of other companies. Myanmar
  30. The Panel continued its investigation into Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-prohibited activities in Myanmar. Myanmar informed the Panel in March that there “had been no military cooperation between Myanmar and the DPRK since October 2016” and that “no Myanmar technicians are stationed in the DPRK at present”. The Panel has not yet received a reply to its request of January 2018 for documentation of contracts relating to military cooperation, including ballistic missile cooperation since October 2006. The Panel also requested evidence of the return of all Myanmar technicians from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as the departure of all technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from Myanmar. Namibia
  31. Regarding the assets of the Mansudae Overseas Project Group in Namibia, the Government informed the Panel on 12 February 2018 that Mansudae Overseas Project had held a private auction on 26 June 2017 and sold off all the vehicles and equipment. Namibia provided a statement from an individual who had purchased one vehicle as evidence. The Panel notes that the payment and transfer of at least one bus was made a month following the designation of Mansudae. Namibia also stated in the above-mentioned letter that Mansudae’s four tipper trucks were on site at the Suiderhof Military Base, about which the Panel requested further information, in addition to the 23 Mansudae-owned vehicles and other heavy construction equipment. Netherlands
  32. In 2016, the Netherlands interdicted a shipment of four generator units (see figure XVIII) that were en route to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea via China. The investigation highlighted the role of a diplomatic representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a European Union member State, Kim Chol Yong (see para. 120), who had procured the items by informing the European Union exporter that he was a Chinese national and that the cargo was destined for China. The intercepted shipment was the third consignment of its kind arranged by Kim. Documents obtained by the Netherlands customs authorities showed that for all shipments, Kim had relied on unwitting Chinese logistics service providers, including a trading company located in Dalian, to send the items to a trading company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that has been associated with a designated entity, Office 39. The investigation also found that the payments for the three shipments had been made by four different entities mainly within the European Union that had played no apparent role in the actual export. This case highlights the role of diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in procuring items on behalf of entities working at the direction of designated entities and evasion techniques using a third country to ship these items to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Figure XVIII
    Interdicted generators Source: Member State. New Zealand
  33. Regarding the Panel’s investigation of the aircraft flown at Wonsan in 2016, on 29 May 2018, a New Zealand district court fined the aircraft manufacturer, Pacific Aerospace Ltd, 74,805 New Zealand dollars for indirectly exporting aircraft spare parts to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and 1,000 New Zealand dollars for making an “erroneous export entry”. The judgement stated that Pacific Aerospace had entered into a joint venture with Beijing General Aviation Company, to which it sold the corresponding aircraft in September 2015. That same month, Beijing General Aviation informed Pacific Aerospace that the aircraft had been onsold to Freesky Aviation Company Limited, which informed Pacific Aerospace that it intended to base the aircraft in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to be used for tourism, which Freesky did without changing its ownership. In an email of January 2016, Beijing General Aviation followed up with Pacific Aerospace regarding a spare part for the aircraft that had not yet been delivered, making clear that the aircraft was located in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which shows that Pacific Aerospace was aware of the final destination of the parts. As a result of this case, Pacific Aerospace has adopted new export control practices. The Panel has reported multiple times on the evasion pattern of onselling items through multiple entities as a way to obscure their final destination. Sierra Leone
  34. The Panel investigated reported involvement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a September 2018 military camp construction project in Freetown, an activity prohibited under paragraph 9 of resolution 2270 (2016). According to information provided by a European Member State, the topographic map and pilot study were led by workers from the Nam Nam Cooperative General Company, a.k.a. Namnamhupchochong Korea South-South Corporation (a.k.a. 조선남남협조총회사, Korea South-South Cooperation Corporation, Nam Nam General Corporation), designated by the United States Department of the Treasury. According to the information, this project involves Guicopres, a Guinean company. Guicopres replied to the Panel, stating that “while we commissioned the pilot study from the Koreans, the topographic mapping was carried out by Guinean and French engineers”. Guicopres further stated that “at no time, therefore, has there been any form of collaboration or partnership with Nam Nam on this project”. However, it admitted “that company [Nam Nam] was paid for a one-off service”. The company further stated that “we have taken steps to notify the cessation of all collaboration with that company” (see annex 25). The Panel wrote to Guicopres again on 12 December 2018 requesting detailed information and documentation regarding the company’s relations with Nam Nam and nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. On 20 December 2018, Guicopres replied, stating that “we only contacted the Korean workers during the preparation of the consultation file for the construction of the Freetown camp. We can confirm that they [the North Korean Nam Nam company] only worked with us for a few days in the context of the pre-feasibility studies, and then our surveyors and topographers took over.” (see ibid.). South Africa
  35. The Panel continued its investigation into the accreditation and movements of Ri Chang Su and Choe Kwang Su, nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reported as engaged in prohibited military cooperation in Mozambique and accredited in their diplomatic passport at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Pretoria. Choe Kwang Su, whose passport indicates that he is Third Secretary at the Embassy in Pretoria, has returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The passport of his successor in Mozambique, Ri Chang Su, also identifies him as the Third Economic and Commercial Secretary at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Pretoria. The Panel has reported on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s previous use of diplomats based at its Embassy in Pretoria for prohibited activities in neighbouring countries during the period from 2012 to 2014. In response to the Panel’s request for entry and exit records and financial information on these individuals, South Africa replied that “the Department of International Relations and Cooperation has gone through the archival record of the DPRK diplomatic staff establishment in South Africa and must emphasise that there is no mechanism for DPRK diplomats accredited in neighbouring countries to be also accredited to South Africa. Doing so is a misrepresentation by the DPRK as is the case of Mr. Chung Su Ri.” South Africa also stated that “as regards any bank accounts held in South Africa allegedly Mr. Kil Jong Hun, Mr. Kwang Yon, Mr. Ri Chang Su and Mr. Choe Kwang Su, this information will be verified with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC)”. The investigation continues. Sudan
  36. The Panel continued its investigations into military cooperation projects between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Sudan. During the reporting period, the Panel was provided with information on additional military cooperation activities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Sudan, including a letter dated 28 September 2016 between Syrian arms trafficker Hussein al-Ali and Chonryong Technology Trading Corporation citing future technology transfers for Fagot anti-tank and man-portable air defence systems for “military manufacturing in Sudan”. A Member State also informed the Panel that Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company, which is associated with the Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation, had contacts in 2009 with Choi Chan Han, a.k.a. Solomon Choi, an Australian businessman working on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who was arrested in Australia on 16 December 2017 for brokering missile components and coal. On 26 November 2018, the Sudan informed the Committee that “the Military Industry Cooperation (sic) MIC (Sudan) has never dealt with a company named “KOMID” and it has been dealing with a company named “Future Electronic Company” (FEC)”. The Sudan also informed the Committee that the “Military Industry Cooperation (sic) (MIC) Sudan has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries.” In response to the Panel’s reporting on KOMID representatives in the Sudan, Kim Song Chol and Son Jong Hyok, the Sudan stated that “Mr. Kim Song Chol entered Sudan in 2013 and 2016, using different names and left in May 2017. He has not entered Sudan since that time due to the travel ban placed on him by the competent authorities.” On the activities of Hussein al-Ali, the Sudan informed the Committee that “Mr. Hussein al-Ali had offered his services in 2008 to the MIC (Sudan) but MIC did not meet him or develop any cooperation with him.” The Panel requested the names and passport details of all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and others employed by Future Electronic Company in the Sudan whom the Sudan states it has expelled. The Panel also requested copies of contracts between Future Electronic Company and the Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation and Sudan Master Technology Engineering Corporation, as well as evidence of the cancellations of the projects. The Panel also requested all documentation associated with United Nations-designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or other entities that may have operated on their behalf in the Sudan, including KOMID, Tanchon Commercial Bank, Future Electronic Company, Chongryong Technology Trading Corporation and Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation, that were the subject of Panel requests to the Sudan from December 2015 until November 2018 (see annex 26).
  37. On 2 January 2019, the Sudan cooperated with the Panel and provided contracts and other requested evidence, stating that “a single framework agreement was signed between the companies SMT and FEC. Two executive contracts were then signed to provide parts for the project to develop 122mm [weapons] and aerial bombs.” Additionally, the contracts between Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology Engineering Company were for various other programmes and items “in the field of rehabilitation of eastern radars, air defense systems, tactical communication, maintenance and spare parts and training” (see annex 27). The Sudan also provided the Panel with cooperation regarding the KOMID front company Future Electronic Company and KOMID representatives. Regarding KOMID representative Kim Song Chol, the Sudan stated that “Mr. Kim Song Chol visited Sudan for the first time in 2013 to follow up implementation of the contracts regarding the development of 122mm [weapons].” He then visited for a second time to oversee some groups that were working to install P-12 and P-15 radars. The Sudan noted that Kim Song Chol then “visited the Sudan a third time in 2016 under a different name and a new passport in order to request certain financial dues”. The Sudan provided the Panel with documents prohibiting Kim Song Chol’s re-entry. Regarding the KOMID front company, Future Electronic Company, the contracts stated that the company was registered in a third country and that its representative was a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea passport-holder named Hong Man Bak. Syrian Arab Republic
  38. The Panel continued its multiple investigations into prohibited activities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic, the continuing travel by technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to and from the country and the presence of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the country, as well as Syrian arms brokers attempting to sell military equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in multiple Middle Eastern and African Member States.
  39. In 2018, a Member State informed the Panel of additional visits to the Syrian Arab Republic in 2016 and 2017 by technicians from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tied to prohibited activities who were working for Syrian defence factories (Maamal al-Difaa). These include three nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who departed the Syrian Arab Republic in the spring of 2017 (see table 2). Table 2 Information on technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea visiting the Syrian Arab Republic

Name Year of birth Passport number Year of issue

Yang Kyong Song 1961 83632010 2016
Kim Jong Gil 1971 927120306 2017
Kim Thae Hyon 1966 927120305 2017

  1. According to the Member State, three other experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see table 3) arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 3 May 2017 and were greeted by Colonel Samer Haydar, member of the air defence department of the Syrian armed forces. Table 3 Information on experts of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea visiting the Syrian Arab Republic

Name Year of birth Passport number Year of issue

Kim Yong Chol 1970 836238472 2016
Ko Jong Myong 1974 56343410 2013
Ri Song 1960 927220125 2017

  1. These three individuals were granted three-month visas issued by the Syrian embassy in Pyongyang. Their names and passport numbers differ from the groups of technicians of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engaged in ballistic missile and other prohibited activities who previously travelled to and returned from the Syrian Arab Republic in February 2011, August 2016, November 2016 and March 2017; this shows that the prohibited military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Syrian Arab Republic has continued unabated.
  2. In addition, Syrian nationals have been reported to the Panel as being engaged in arms brokering on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for attempted sales to a range of Middle Eastern and African States, reportedly offering conventional arms and, in some cases, ballistic missiles, to armed groups in Yemen and Libya. One individual described as a Syrian arms trafficker, Hussein al-Ali, has been identified by a Member State as engaging in prohibited military cooperation on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by having attempted arms sales in Libya (see para. 73), the Sudan (see para. 84) and Yemen (see para. 97). The Panel has yet to receive a reply from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the full extent of the activities of Al-Ali and his Damascus-based company “Consulting Bureau for Marketing” in these and other Member States in Africa and the Middle East. Nor has it received a reply to its request to Al-Ali for a full accounting of his past and ongoing relationship with the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Saeng Pi’l and other designated entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and their nationals working on their behalf.
  3. The Panel was informed by a Member State that Ryu Jin, designated as a representative of KOMID in the Syrian Arab Republic, had left that country. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide confirmation and inform the Panel whether the departure was an expulsion in accordance with paragraphs 13 or 14 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel was informed by a Member State that a number of designated individuals and other nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working on behalf of designated entities, including Choe Jin Myong , continue to reside in the Syrian Arab Republic.
  4. In November 2018, the Panel was informed that the Syrian Arab Republic was one of the two most lucrative markets of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for arms-related goods and services. According to the Member State, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is continuing its cooperation with both the Scientific Studies and Research Center and the Army Supply Bureau. The deputy head of KOMID in the Syrian Arab Republic is named Rim Yong Hyok, while Ryu Jin’s replacement as head representative in the Syrian Arab Republic is known as “Kim”. The Panel wrote to the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex 29) requesting information on all nationals and organizations of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that are active in the Syrian Arab Republic, attaching an earlier response from the country (see ibid.). The Syrian Arab Republic replied to previous Panel inquiries, stating that “existing relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are in harmony with international law and the Charter of the United Nations” as well as “diplomatic representation” between the two countries (see annex 31). Uganda
  5. The Panel wrote to Uganda on 10 December 2018 following a media report alleging that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had supplied small arms and light weapons to Uganda and had trained Ugandan special forces, as well as on the continued presence of KOMID in the country through the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Kampala. In the report, it was also stated that prohibited joint ventures, such as MKP, were continuing operations in the country under new names and that these entities and affiliates had links to both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Ugandan intelligence services. In its letter of 10 December 2018, the Panel requested copies of all contracts relating to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military and paramilitary training in Uganda, together with evidence of their cancellation and the departure of the personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel also requested the names and passport details of all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Uganda, including all military advisers. Uganda has yet to reply.
  6. The Panel continued its investigation into the presence and activities of KOMID in Uganda. According to a Member State, the decision by Uganda to expel two KOMID representatives “prevented KOMID from transferring a substantial amount of cash believed to be the proceeds from KOMID business in Uganda out of the country. Ri Kyong Hui, the spouse of Yu Kyong Jin, and Jo Su Yong, the spouse of Jong Kuk Chol, attempted to remove this cash from Uganda.” The Member State also informed the Panel: “Senior levels of Uganda’s Ministry of Defense may have been witting of the relationship with KOMID. The involvement of such officials in this activity is significant and warrants close scrutiny.” Uganda has yet to reply to the Panel’s request for information on the amount of cash seized or otherwise prevented from transfer from Uganda by the reported KOMID representatives or their spouses as well as information on the bank accounts used. United Arab Emirates
  7. Until at least May 2018, Prime Okryu Art Gallery in Abu Dhabi advertised the works of artists affiliated with Mansudae Art Studio on its website (see figure XIX) and sold artwork of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the gallery. It was also stated on the website that the gallery was affiliated with the Okryugwan restaurant group of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 32). Following the Panel’s letter to the United Arab Emirates of 9 May 2018, the restaurant and art gallery website pages became inaccessible. The Panel obtained photographs of a sign stating that “the gallery is temporarily closed for renovation, opening soon” on the door of the gallery taken in December 2018. On 2 January 2019, the United Arab Emirates replied to the Panel stating that “none of the employees of the Prime Okryu Art Gallery was a DPRK citizen (sic)” and “the Government of the United Arab Emirates has closed” the gallery. The investigation continues. Figure XIX Prime Okryu Gallery Source: RFA Korean Service, Jinkuk Kim. United Republic of Tanzania
  8. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of the Haegeumgang Trading Corporation (a.k.a. Haegumgang) in the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s repair and upgrade of the surface-to-air missile Pechora (S 125) systems and its P-12 air defence radar, reportedly worth €10.49 million. The United Republic of Tanzania has yet to respond to the Panel’s inquiries. Yemen
  9. The Panel investigated efforts by the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and KOMID to supply a wide array of conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthi group in Yemen through a known proxy, Syrian national Hussein al-Ali, and his Syrian-registered company Consulting Bureau for Marketing. The Panel was given access by a Member State to an invitation letter dated 13 July 2016 from Houthi leader Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami to the Ministry of Military Equipment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Tosong Technology Trading Corporation, a KOMID subsidiary, to meet in Damascus “to discuss the issue of the transfer of technology and other matters of mutual interest”. According to the Member State “a protocol of cooperation between Yemen and North Korea” was then negotiated involving “Naif Ahmad Al Qanis, Houthi ambassador in Damascus and Syrian arms broker Hussein Al Ali”. According to the Member State, this involved a “vast array of military equipment, including Kalahsnikov, PKC machine guns, RPG-7, RPG-29, Fagot missiles, Igla missiles, tanks, air defence systems, ballistic missiles”. The Panel has yet to receive replies from Major General Zakaria Yahya al-Shami, Naif Ahmad al Qanis and Hussein al-Ali to the Panel’s request for information on their role in these negotiations and attempts to broker and supply such weaponry from or on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Zimbabwe
  10. On 9 June 2018, Zimbabwe provided evidence of the deregistration of the Mansudae Boka Design Company and the closure of its bank accounts in response to the Panel’s inquiries about the activities of nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Mansudae-related companies in Zimbabwe. Implementation of the luxury goods ban Rolls-Royce Phantom
  11. The Panel investigated the first public appearance of a Rolls-Royce Phantom limousine in Pyongyang on 7 October 2018, an apparent violation of the luxury goods ban stipulated in paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 23 and annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013), prohibiting the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of luxury automobiles. In its letter to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd and its parent company Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW), the Panel noted a number of distinguishing features to assist the companies in their identification of the vehicle (see figure XX). Figure XX Rolls-Royce Phantom and distinguishing features observed in Pyongyang on 7 October 2018 Source: Voice of America.
  12. In its reply, Rolls-Royce informed the Panel that the vehicle appeared to be a seventh generation Phantom Extended Wheelbase series II manufactured between August 2012 and February 2017 at its Goodwood manufacturing facility. Rolls-Royce stressed the importance of the vehicle’s identification number in replying to the Panel’s inquiries. The investigation continues. Rolls-Royce Ghost
  13. The Panel continued to investigate the transfer of a falsely declared Rolls-Royce Ghost limousine to Bangladesh by a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seized by the Bangladesh Customs Intelligence in January 2017. The Panel requested Bangladesh to provide the location of the vehicle and its investigation report on the seizure. Bangladesh has yet to reply to multiple inquiries from the Panel. Mercedes-Benz limousines
  14. The Panel continued its investigation of the Mercedes-Benz limousines shipped to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as part of efforts to determine all their vehicle identification numbers and whether any had been altered. A number of these Mercedes-Benz were observed without licence plates during meetings in Singapore (see figure XXI), Beijing (see figure XXII) and Pyongyang and were utilized by at least one foreign head of State in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 2018 (see ibid.). The Panel wrote to Singapore and China to request the vehicle identification number records following the temporary transfers of these vehicles, or checks by the Presidential Security Service of the Republic of Korea, the head of which was reported as a passenger in one of the vehicles. Figure XXI Images of illicitly obtained Mercedes-Benz limousines without licence plates in Singapore, June 2018 Source: YouTube.  
    Figure XXII
    Images of illicitly obtained Mercedes-Benz limousines without licence plates in Beijing in June 2018 (left) and March 2018 (centre) and in Pyongyang in September 2018 (right) Source: Reuters, Pyongyang Press Corps/Pool via Reuters.
  15. In its letter of 4 December 2018, Singapore informed the Panel that “it had requested for the vehicles’ chassis and engine numbers, but the DPRK officials declined to reveal this information due to national security reasons”. Lexus LX 570
  16. The Panel investigated the appearance of a number of Lexus LX 570 all-wheel drive luxury vehicles bearing number plates of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the inter-Korean summit of September 2018 (see figure XXIII) in an apparent violation of paragraph 8 (a) (iii) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 23 and annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013). Toyota Motor Corporation informed the Panel that it was unable to identify the vehicle identification number and that “Toyota complies with applicable UN resolutions in relation to the DPRK and has no intention of the export of these motor vehicles to, or the manufacture of, motor vehicles in the DPRK. We can only assume that these vehicles come from back channels and are exchanged among individuals”. Toyota further cooperated with the Panel, stating that this generation of “LX 570 AWD were produced from January 2012 to July 2015”. Figure XXIII Lexus LX 570 vehicles observed at the inter-Korean summit of 18 to 20 September 2018, Pyongyang Source: YouTube. Vodka
  17. In July 2018, the Netherlands informed the Panel that it had temporarily seized a consignment of vodka suspected to be en route to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to the Netherlands, vodka (Harmonized System code 2208.60) is considered “luxury goods” under Council regulation (EU) 2017/2062. Shipping documents accompanying the seized vodka shipment showed that the vodka, manufactured in Belarus, was destined for Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding, the company investigated by the Panel as suspected of shipping Mercedes-Benz limousines to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The other company named in the documentation, Transit Prime International Logistics, had the same phone number and address as Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding. The Netherlands noted that Liaoning Danxing had been named in previous Panel reporting and, as a freight forwarder, would not be the final destination for the consignment. The Panel wrote to Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding, the website for which described the company as a container shipping line transporting goods to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel requested information on the final destination of the vodka.
  18. Two separately obtained contracts for the vodka shipments showed that the consignment was sold by its Belarus manufacturer to a Georgian entity named Noble House LLC, which was the buyer in both contracts. The Panel wrote to Noble House requesting all correspondence and financial transactions between Noble House, Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding Company and Transit Prime International Logistics Co. Ltd. Noble House did not provide the requested correspondence and financial transactions records but replied, stating that China was the final destination of the cargo and the vodka was to be sold “via the e-commerce channel”. Noble House provided the name of an individual, a private email address and telephone number it claimed was its “trading partner” in China. Neither this individual nor Transit Prime International Logistics nor Liaoning Danxing International Forwarding have replied to the Panel’s inquiries. IV. Finance
  19. Despite the strengthening of financial sanctions in 2017, their effectiveness is being systematically undermined by the deceptive practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the failure by Member States to recognize and prevent them. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea enjoys ongoing access to the international financial system, as its financial networks have quickly adapted to the latest sanctions, using evasive methods in ways that make it difficult to detect illicit activity. Member States also continue to fail to take measures required by the Security Council resolutions, including the assets freeze and the expulsion of bank representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operating abroad. Individuals empowered to act as extensions of financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abroad allow the country to evade sanctions measures such as the requirement for Member States to close all subsidiaries of these banks within their jurisdiction. Cyberattacks by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to illegally force the transfer of funds have become an important tool in the evasion of sanctions and have grown in sophistication and scale since 2016.
  20. The Panel’s financial investigations also show insufficient implementation by Member States of their obligation to freeze all assets controlled by designated entities or members of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that are engaged in violation or evasion of any of the sanctions measures. In several cases investigated by the Panel, Member States closed but did not freeze account balances of individuals acting on behalf of designated entitles, including the Reconnaissance General Bureau, and allowed them to transfer funds to banks in other countries. Global operations of Glocom and MKP continue despite past Panel reporting on their illicit activities and recommendations to both the Committee and to Member States to designate them and freeze their assets. While some Member States have moved to limit the number of accounts of the embassies and diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within their jurisdictions as required by the resolutions, the Panel found evidence that diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are evading this provision by opening and managing accounts in multiple countries, including in those to which they are not accredited, in order to engage in illicit business activities. Finally, the Panel investigated the existence of more than 200 potential cooperative entities and self-described joint ventures despite the requirement that Member States should have closed them by 9 January 2018 (i.e., within 120 days of the adoption of resolution 2375 (2017)). Furthermore, the Panel found information indicating that companies considered cooperative entities by the Panel may have also violated other provisions of the resolutions, including the prohibition in paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) on the use of diplomatic premises of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for non-diplomatic activity. The Panel also found that a company with links to designated entities, including Mansudae and the Reconnaissance General Bureau, has formed joint ventures in another country, where it is undertaking activities. Cyberattacks
  21. The Panel notes a trend in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s evasion of financial sanctions of using cyberattacks to illegally force the transfer of funds from financial institutions and cryptocurrency exchanges. According to a Member State, “cyberspace is used by the DPRK as an asymmetric means to carry out illicit and undercover operations in the field of cybercrime and sanctions evasion. These operations aim to acquire funds through a variety of measures in order to circumvent the sanctions.” (see annex 33). United States court documents, officials and Government statements and reports have attributed several cyberattacks by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which plays an overarching role in cyberattacks. In 2017, a third Member State informed the Panel that the Reconnaissance General Bureau supervised and conducted cyberattack operations not only for destroying infrastructure and intelligence-gathering but for the purposes of gaining foreign currency. A fourth Member State sent a letter to the Panel in 2018 in which cyberattacks attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau were mentioned and in which it was stated that reports suggest that “cyber-focused military units are directly tasked to generate income for the regime”.
  22. On 28 July 2016, the National Police Agency of the Republic of Korea attributed a cyberattack against the online shopping mall, Interpark, to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, stating that the attack was an attempted “criminal acquisition of foreign currency” (see annex 35) that would have circumvented the assets freeze. The Panel considers this case as an attempt by a designated entity to evade sanctions by using a cyberattack to force the transfer of $2.7 million.
  23. On 6 September 2018, the Government of the United States indicted Park Jin Hyok, a hacker from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who worked as a member of the hacking organization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea known as the Lazarus Group, for engaging in a “wide-ranging, multi-year conspiracy to conduct computer intrusions and commit wire fraud by co-conspirators working on behalf of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. According to the United States, Park “has travelled to China in the past and conducted legitimate IT work under the front company ‘Chosun Expo’ or the Korean Expo Joint Venture in addition to activities conducted on behalf of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau” (see annex 36). The Panel requested information from the Government of China on the activities of Chosun Expo and possible continued operation as a joint venture or cooperative entity prohibited pursuant to resolution 2375 (2017). China stated that “China has conducted an investigation based on the information provided by the Panel. Up until now, China has not found any company registered as Chosun Expo Joint Venture, and currently does not have information regarding Park Jin Hyok.”
  24. According to the United States, Park Jin Hyok and his co-conspirators also “targeted and then executed the fraudulent transfer of $81 million from Bangladesh Bank […] and engaged in computer intrusions and cyber-heists at many more financial services victims in the United States, and in other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, and South America in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, with attempted losses well over $1 billion”. The $81,000,000 was successfully transferred using the SWIFT system from Bangladesh Bank’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York to accounts in the Philippines, where it was “subsequently laundered through multiple bank accounts, a money remitting business, and casino junkets”. The Philippines has provided the Panel with internal audit documents, bank correspondence, CCTV footage and other information relevant to the tracing of the stolen funds, the majority of which have not been recovered to date. The Panel continues its investigation of the case.
  25. The Panel investigated two additional cases of financially motivated cyberattacks in which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted to illegally force the transfer of over $20 million. In May 2018, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cyberattack by an advanced persistent threat group resulted in $10 million being transferred from Banco de Chile mainly to accounts in Hong Kong via unauthorized transactions using SWIFT. Using IP addresses and other details published by the United States Department of Justice, open-source technical analysis has linked the perpetrators with Lab 110, which according to the United States is part of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Then, in August 2018, about $13.5 million was withdrawn from Cosmos Bank in India in more than 14,000 simultaneous automatic teller machine (ATM) withdrawals in 28 countries as well as in additional transfers to an account belonging to a Hong Kong-based company using SWIFT. On 2 October 2018, the United States responded to these ATM withdrawal attacks by issuing a “FASTCash Campaign” alert for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These more recent attacks show how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has become an increasingly sophisticated actor in cyberattacks for financial gain, with tools and tactics steadily improving. The Cosmos attack was a more advanced, well-planned and highly coordinated operation that bypassed three main layers of defence contained in International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) banking/ATM attack mitigation guidance. Not only were the actors able to compromise the SWIFT network in the Cosmos case to transfer the funds to other accounts, but they simultaneously compromised internal bank processes to bypass transaction verification procedures and order worldwide transfers to almost 30 countries where funds were physically withdrawn by individuals in more than 10,000 separate transactions over a weekend.
  26. The Panel notes that in addition to attacks on fiat currency, cyberattacks involving cryptocurrencies provide the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with more ways to evade sanctions given that they are harder to trace, can be laundered many times and are independent from government regulation. In the 2017 WannaCry attack by the Reconnaissance General Bureau, the ransom demand was made in cryptocurrency. According to one estimate, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea carried out at least five successful attacks against cryptocurrency exchanges in Asia between January 2017 and September 2018, resulting in a total loss of $571 million (see annex 39).
  27. In its most recent final report, the Panel included information showing that the Reconnaissance General Bureau agents (and family members) responsible for illegal financial activities in Europe, including large bank transfers to accounts in the European Union and Asia, were both highly trained and skilled in the field of information technology and that one of them, Kim Su Gwang, managed to obtain a position with significant responsibility for the organization’s information systems. Recommendations
  28. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future financial sanctions measures, take account of cyberattacks carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  29. Member States should enhance their ability to facilitate robust information exchange on the cyberattacks by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with other Governments and with their own financial institutions, to detect and prevent attempts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to employ its cybercapabilities for sanctions evasion.
  30. Information about cyberattacks conducted by the Reconnaissance General Bureau as a means to evade financial sanctions and to gain foreign currency should be added to the Reconnaissance General Bureau’s entry on the 1718 sanctions list. Financial activities of diplomatic personnel of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
  31. The Panel investigated a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea formerly posted to Malaysia, Kim Jong Chol (a.k.a. Ri Jong Chol), who operated on behalf of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corporation, which according to documents obtained by the Panel is associated with Korea Kumgang Bank. Owing to space constraints, information in this case is contained in annex 40. That an individual of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited as a diplomat at the embassy in Kuala Lumpur did business on behalf of entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and on behalf of financial institutions reflects patterns previously reported by the Panel.
  32. The Panel investigated the banking practices of another diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea accredited in a European Union country, Kim Chol Yong, who had helped to arrange an attempted shipment of four generator units to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea via China in 2016, which was interdicted by the Netherlands (see para. 80). Kim Chol Yong used more than a dozen bank accounts in European Union financial institutions to do business in the Netherlands and at least three other European Union member States.
  33. In the establishment and use of his bank accounts, Kim used many of the same evasion tactics previously noted by the Panel. These included: opening accounts using several addresses; opening accounts in the name of a front company; opening multiple accounts in the name of family members, in particular his wife and son; and opening accounts in the name of the diplomatic mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He also used various renderings of his own name or those of his co-signors when opening bank accounts (e.g., Kim Chol, Kim Chol Yong, Kim Cholyong, Chol Yong Kim). Furthermore, Kim and his wife were the long-term owners of life insurance savings accounts (also called “cash value life insurance”), which they were able to cash in for a credit of more than a million euros in late 2017, more than a year after the interdicted shipment attempt.
  34. The Panel has previously recommended that Member States include all embassy personnel within the scope of paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) and that they ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in the names of family members or front companies. Relevant authorities should also verify that bank accounts are closed when a diplomat ends their tour in the country.
  35. The Panel also investigated cases of evasion of the provision in paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016) in which when diplomats’ accounts were closed, they transferred funds to financial institutions in other countries to which they were not accredited. In the light of this, as well as the ongoing practice of diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea residing in one country while engaging in business in other countries, the Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance whereby one bank is chosen to serve as the only bank that may hold accounts for the embassy and diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and all other banks are advised not to open accounts for any diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or their family members. The Panel notes that the practice of diplomats holding multiple accounts in different currencies is prohibited under paragraph 16 of resolution 2321 (2016). Bank representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abroad
  36. The Panel continued its investigation into more than 30 representatives of financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operating abroad, including from the Tanchon Commercial Bank, Korea Kumgang Bank, Foreign Trade Bank, Cheil Credit Bank, Daesong Bank, Ilsim International Bank, Bank of East Land, Daedong Credit Bank, Unification Development Bank and Ryugyong Commercial Bank. The Panel found these banks to be operating through representatives in China, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates (see annexes 41–42). The Panel notes that payment methods previously used by bank representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to evade sanctions were used in 2018 to process payments for ship-to-ship transfers (see annex 43). The Panel notes that all of the above-mentioned Member States must expel all individuals acting on behalf of a financial institution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in accordance with paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016).
  37. In its reply to the Panel, the Russian Federation informed the Panel that “Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor’s Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status. The banking licence of the bank, Agrosoyuz, which Mr. Han Jang Su allegedly used to carry out activities linked to the FTB […] has been revoked by the Central Bank.” The Panel notes that as resolution 2371 (2017) lists Han Jang Su as “Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank”, Member States are required under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016) to expel him. The Panel also notes that the registered office of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Moscow lists its director as “Han Zan Su” (Хан Зан Су) according to the Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities, RAFP (see annex 44). This case appears to be part of a pattern identified by the Panel whereby diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea use their status and embassies to violate the resolutions. Financial operations of the Reconnaissance General Bureau
  38. With regard to the financial activities and assets of Reconnaissance General Bureau agents Kim Yong Nam and Kim Su Gwang and their family members, Belarus informed the Panel that Kim Su Gwang had been accredited as Deputy Trade Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from 24 September 2015. He lived with members of his family until they departed on 16 December 2017 in a diplomatic vehicle, exiting at the Belarus-Ukraine border. Belarus stated that Kim had spent most of his time outside of the country and that his wife had purchased items in neighbouring countries for shipment back to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, using the name of a Chinese company based in Beijing and by transferring funds for the purchases through an account at a Chinese bank in Shanghai, which is consistent with the Panel’s previous reporting on cash withdrawals in Beijing and Shanghai by the Reconnaissance General Bureau from accounts controlled by Kim Su Gwang. Furthermore, when the accounts of both Kim Su Gwang and Kim Yong Nam (the latter including joint accounts with his wife, Kim (Djang) Tcheul (Hy)) were closed by another Member State, funds from one of the accounts were transferred to an account in the name of Kim Yong Nam’s wife at the same Shanghai bank branch. In its reply to the Panel about this bank account, China stated that “China has not found any account opened by the [RGB] in Chinese financial institutions.” The Panel notes that Member States are obligated to freeze the assets of all individuals operating on behalf of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, which includes bank accounts by Reconnaissance General Bureau agents established in the name of family members to evade sanctions. Malaysia-Korea Partners Group of Companies
  39. The Panel continued its investigation into MKP, a major joint venture of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea established in Malaysia, which the Panel has determined to have links with the Reconnaissance General Bureau, Mansudae Overseas Project Group of Companies and financial institutions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  40. Zambia launched an investigation into the MKP network and cooperated with the Panel. Documents it provided show that Han Hun Il (the founder of MKP and a Reconnaissance General Bureau agent) made at least two trips to Zambia in 2017 using his service passport, No. 8361348791 (expiration 9 March 2021; see annex 45), violating the travel ban. This travel also further calls into question earlier claims to the Panel by MKP Malaysia that Zambia operations were run independently. For the Panel’s updated findings on its investigations of MKP activities in Zambia, see annex 46; in Malaysia, see annex 47; and in Uganda, see paragraphs 155 and 156 and annex 74.
  41. Only one of the 13 MKP-linked companies in Zambia, the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (a.k.a. GENCO, a.k.a. KOGEN), lists exclusively nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as directors. From the information provided by Zambia and further investigation conducted by the Panel, it is clear that GENCO/KOGEN, like MKP, has links to Mansudae Overseas Project Group. Both GENCO/KOGEN and MKP claim to have constructed several of the same sites in the past, using labour from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annexes 46–51). Indeed, Mansudae, MKP and GENCO/KOGEN have all, in some combination, claimed to have worked on the same projects. Furthermore, according to a KOGEN brochure, its management team in Zambia comprises 11 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in addition to Han Hun Il, Ho Un Ran and Yon Il, whom Zambia claims are connected to KOGEN through a director relationship with Yazid Merzouk (see annex 52). KOGEN directors in Zambia also registered an additional company, Chammae Construction Limited, with the same address, email contact details and directors aside from an additional director, a Zambian businessman named Sam Maurice Mbewe (National Registration Card No. 296387 /7 4/1). The company was incorporated on the same date as KOGEN/GENCO, 15 June 2012 (see annex 59).
  42. Analysis of GENCO/KOGEN bank accounts in Zambia, in dollars and in local currency, showed regular cash and cheque activity and high account turnover. The accounts demonstrated similar patterns of cheque deposits, followed by incoming transfers, followed by regular cheque withdrawals. These patterns were also seen in the case of the bank accounts of MKP TMS Hospital and in the banking practices of Glocom and Reconnaissance General Bureau agents in Europe and Asia.
  43. MKP corporate accounts in two banks in Zambia were opened in the name of two individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ri Kwang Song (리광송) and Han Chan Ho. Open-source information indicates that a person with the name Kwang Song Ri previously served as a Counsellor (参赞) at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Beijing in 2013 (李光先) (see
    annexes 53–54). Other open-source material indicates that Kwang Song Ri has used 리광송 and the aliases Ri Kwang-Son and Ri Kwangson, with the latter two transcribed in Korean as리광선 (see annex 53). Further open-source information shows that a person with the same name Ri Kwang Song (리광송) served as a diplomat at the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Cairo until at least November 2017 (see annexes 55–56). The Panel notes that using a diplomat of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to open these bank accounts fits with past patterns of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in establishing overseas bank accounts.
  44. The Panel’s ongoing investigation into GENCO/KOGEN showed that in addition to Zambia, the company has a large reach and extensive network in several countries in the Middle East, Africa and Eurasia, where it utilizes labourers, prohibited cooperative entities and joint ventures of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and earns significant revenue. According to a Member State, GENCO/KOGEN “has worked to supply North Korean laborers in the Middle East for the purpose of earning hard currency for [the] North Korea [n government]”. The Panel’s investigations found evidence of KOGEN activity by a joint venture with a company of the United Arab Emirates. The Panel is continuing to investigate the company (see annexes 57–58).
  45. The presence of GENCO/KOGEN in Africa covers Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea. In Nigeria, it is registered as “Korea General Company for External Construction GENCO (Nigeria)” (see annex 60) and lists “Korea General Co. for External Construction Genco” as the majority shareholder and Kim Yong Sik and Kim Yong Hwan as minority shareholders. In Côte d’Ivoire, “Korea General Construction SL (KOGEN GE SL)” was registered in 2012. The website of the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources lists KOGEN GE S.L. as its implementing partner for a project funded by Equatorial Guinea set to conclude in 2019 (see annex 61). KOGEN was separately reported as a contractor for the Rebola Municipal Stadium, completed in 2016, which documents suggest earned KOGEN approximately $30.5 million (see annex 62). Local news claims that KOGEN opened a new, large national headquarters in Equatorial Guinea the same year. The Panel has not received a reply from these Governments on its inquiries.
  46. According to corporate registration documents, GENCO is the partial owner of a construction cooperative entity or joint venture company in the Russian Federation, LLC “SAKORENMA” , with majority ownership belonging to a Russian national (see paras. 150–151 and annexes 76–78). This cooperative entity or joint venture maintains an account with a Russian bank (see annex 79). Furthermore, the company shares addresses, contact information and shareholders with three other companies, all of which engage in construction-related activities (see annexes 63–64). In addition, corporate registry documents show that GENCO operates two official representative offices in the Russian Federation, one in Vladivostok and one in Khasan, that together formally employ 17 foreign nationals (see annex 65).
  47. In addition to these companies, the Panel also wrote to the Russian Federation with regard to four companies registered in the country that use GENCO’s name in Russian, “ZENKO” (in Cyrillic script: ЗЕНКО), the same name used by GENCO’s official representations in the Russian Federation owned by nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annexes 66–68), and that were authorized in 2018 to employ a combined total of 301 labourers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (see annex 68). Figure XXIV GENCO network Source: The Panel.
  48. The Panel reiterates its recommendation for the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han) and also recommends the designation of Yong Kok Yeap and Yazid Merzouk of MKP Malaysia and MKP Zambia. Financial operations of Glocom
  49. The Panel continued its investigation into Glocom, which has used an extensive network of individuals, companies and offshore bank accounts to procure, market and sell arms and related materiel for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including individuals, companies and bank accounts in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Middle East, including through an attempted shipment of military equipment to Eritrea in 2016. Unlike most front companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which tend to close and reappear with a new guise after being publicly investigated, Glocom has continued to actively use its brand despite previous Panel recommendations that Member States freeze bank accounts and other assets owned by all individuals and entities acting on behalf of Pan Systems or Glocom. To the Panel’s knowledge, no such action has been taken.
  50. Glocom reinforced its online presence in 2018 with a website redesign and descriptions of an array of new products. It describes itself as a technology-oriented company undertaking research and development, manufacturing and servicing military communications equipment and systems. Glocom uploaded a new set of marketing videos to YouTube in 2018 and created and used social media presences on platforms such as Pinterest (see annex 70), LinkedIn and Instagram. On Twitter, Glocom (@GlocomSupport) advertises multiple products, with posts up through the drafting of the present report, as well as various software packages for military applications (see annex 69). Glocom similarly unveiled an Android app for customers in 2018. It claims that its production capacity for secure personal radios is 10,000 sets a year and for Manpack radios, mass production is 6,000 sets a year. An open-source report in August 2018 linked Glocom’s IP address through a second high-tech front company to restaurants of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Viet Nam. Furthermore, in mid-2018, Glocom sought to further expand its reach by forming relationships with radio technology distribution companies in Malaysia and Indonesia. In some cases, the products advertised by these entities used other branding, including the brand “FACOM”.
  51. Although its activities constitute activities prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its Pyongyang operations were run by a Reconnaissance General Bureau agent (Ryang Su Nyo), Glocom has not been designated, despite the Panel’s previous recommendation for such action. The Panel therefore reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services and International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.

Name: Pan Systems Pte Ltd (Pyongyang branch)
A.k.a: Wonbang Trading Co., Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System
Address: Room 818, Pothonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong, Pyongchon district, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Director: Ryang Su Nyo
Employees: Pyon Won Gun, Pae Won Chol, Ri Sin Song, Kim Sung Su, Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Pyong Chol
Telephone: +850-218-111 (ext. 8636)

  1. The Panel continued its investigation into the activities of designated financial institutions, including Korea Daesong Bank, Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and DCB Finance Limited. It previously reported on Li Zhengang (李振刚), a Chinese national who, since 2011, has owned a 70 per cent foreign equity share in DCB, with the remaining 30 per cent owned by the designated Korea Daesong Bank. In its 2017 midterm report (S/2017/742), the Panel also mentioned Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd (丹东中瑞石油化工有限公司) as one of two companies controlled by Li Zhengang (李振刚) and his family member Li Shengda (李胜达). Since that time, the Panel has obtained new open-source information, according to which Li Zhengang’s company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd, is part of a large and currently active network of Chinese companies with a history of doing business with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that share contact details, buildings, office space (i.e., the same room), employees and contact persons.
  2. In particular, the Panel’s investigation found that Li Zhengang’s company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd, shares addresses with an individual and entity previously identified by the Panel as associated with shipping activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that have violated the resolutions (see annex 71). The individual is Pan Weichao (潘衛朝), previously identified in a Panel report as being associated with shipping activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated the resolutions by acting as an emergency contact for K-Brothers, the Marshall Islands-based operator of the Jie Shun (IMO No. 8518780). Another designated entity shares the same address with Pan Weichao’s company, the Hong Kong-based Chang An Shipping & Technology Ltd (長安海運技術有限公司). In reply to the Panel’s inquiries on Li Zhengang (李振刚) and his connections with above-mentioned entities and individuals, China stated “China has conducted an in-depth investigation on this case. Through on-site investigation to Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co. Ltd, China found that it is a very small company, which has only four staff members and a business volume of 300,000 USD in the past two years. Li Zhengang had stopped doing business with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since the year of 2018. China does not have relevant information on the connection between Dandong Zhongrui Co. Ltd and other three companies mentioned in the letter – Dandong Jing’ao Trading Co. Ltd, Hong Kong-registered company Jing’ao Dalin Trading Co. Ltd and Chang An Shipping and Technology Co. Ltd.” OCN Singapore and T Specialist Singapore
  3. The Panel continued its investigation into the financial activities of OCN (Singapore) Pte Ltd and T Specialist International (Singapore) Pte Ltd. On 19 July 2018, the director of both companies, Ng “Leo” Kheng Wah, was charged in a Singaporean court with 80 sanctions-related charges and 80 charges of cheating and conspiracy, including cheating banks out of more than $95 million and supplying luxury goods worth about $6 million to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In particular, Ng is accused of “engaging in a conspiracy” with Wang Zhi Guo (王志国) and T Specialist International to falsify invoices for multiple trade financing loans, resulting in payments from banks in Singapore and Malaysia to Wang Zhi Guo’s company, Pinnacle Offshore Trading. The trial, however, has been delayed four times.
  4. The Panel continued its investigation into these companies (see annex 72). Democratic People’s Republic of Korea national Li Ik (a.k.a. Ri Ik) had worked for OCN (Singapore) until January 2018 when his employment pass was revoked, and Wang Zhi Guo, a Singaporean resident and Chinese national, is still living in Singapore but had his Chinese passport confiscated (see annex 73). Li Ik’s phone records showed a wide network of global contacts across four continents and the use of evasion tactics in his communications. Using three phone numbers associated with two accounts, he made 1,840 calls to 72 unique numbers in Australia, China, the Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Liberia, Malaysia, Namibia, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom between 15 February 2014 and 19 April 2016. At least 76 calls were made from one of Li Ik’s phones to the number of the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Bank of East Land. Li Ik’s phone bills were paid by credit cards with credit limits of 1 million Singapore dollars ($729,927 United States dollars) from a major Singaporean bank that requires an annual income of 500,000 Singapore dollars or 3 million Singapore dollars in controlled assets in the bank. Ownership of multiple bank credit cards with high capital/income requirements by a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engaged in the above-mentioned activities constitutes evasion of the financial sanctions. A summary of further findings on this case since the Panel’s most recent final report (S/2018/171) are contained in annex 72. Ryugyong Commercial Bank and Koryo Commercial Bank
  5. While OCN Singapore claimed to the Panel that it had no interests in either Ryugyong Commercial Bank or Koryo Commercial Bank, it admitted that Ri Ik, its long-time employee, had the authority to enter into agreement to sell Ryugyong Commercial Bank and that to this end, he received three transfers of $499,970 each which were made into the T Specialist account in Singapore by Wang Zhi Guo’s company, Pinnacle International, in addition to a transfer from Mars Rock International for $499,935 (totalling $1,999,845) for the purchase of shares in Ryugyong Commercial Bank. OCN also admitted knowledge of the business promotions for Ryugyong Commercial Bank at the Pyongyang Bugsae stores using the “OCN” brand (Ri Ik printed the promotional posters in Singapore). China indicated that Wang Zhi Guo last departed China in 2017 and Singapore has confirmed that he is a permanent resident.
  6. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to designate Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo and Ri Ho Nam. Cooperative entities and joint ventures
  7. The Panel investigated companies acting as possible cooperative entities or joint ventures in Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zambia. The Panel wrote to all of the above-mentioned countries with lists containing information on possible cooperative entities or joint ventures in their jurisdictions and requested information on the entities. Of the above Member States, Argentina, Japan and Singapore were able to demonstrate that the entities investigated were either non-existent, non-operational or had no ties with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Replies on the entities and measures being taken in their regard were received from Argentina, Australia, China, Japan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zambia. Cambodia, Malaysia and Malta have not replied to the Panel’s inquiries (see annex 74). Australia
  8. In response to the Panel’s request for information on Sonbong Kost J.V. Company (a.k.a Samhung Kost J.V. Company and Sam Hung KOAST Joint Venture Pyongyang, 선봉코스트합영회사), Australia cooperated with the Panel by providing detailed information on the company. China
  9. China informed the Panel of the following: “The Ministry of Commerce and former State Administration for Industry and Commerce of China issued an Announcement on September 28th, 2017 to require the closure of China-DPRK joint ventures and cooperative enterprises in accordance with the requirement of the Security Council resolution. So far, all the China-invested cooperative enterprises in the DPRK that were approved and put on records by Chinese competent authorities have been closed. All the DPRK-invested enterprises that registered in China have completed the closure and stopped business. Any China-DPRK joint venture and cooperative enterprise that is in operation now violates the Announcement issued by the relevant Chinese authorities.” Poland
  10. Poland replied to the Panel that Korean-Poland Shipping Co. Ltd (Chopol) had been closed on 19 June 2018. With regard to Wonye Ltd, Poland confirmed that the two main shareholders as well as members of the board were nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, one of whom had left the country. Nine nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been granted temporary residence and work permits valid until 31 August 2019. In an inspection carried out at the company in 2018, inspectors found irregularities, including civil contracts instead of employment contracts and the lack of required authorization for an employment agency. With regard to the company, Redshield Ltd, Poland confirmed that it had two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea serving as the main shareholders and board members. An inspection in 2018 found 42 nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea employed at Redshield, 20 of whom were granted European Union long-term residency status and 20 of whom were granted residency and the ability to work in Poland. At least one of the entities listed above constitutes a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). Russian Federation
  11. The Russian Federation informed the Panel that “the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the [DPRK], such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the [DPRK] by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) or under current Russian law.” (annex 74). The Russian Federation also informed the Panel on 21 January 2019 that “joint ventures (in Russian law, no such form of legal person exists)”. The Panel’s investigations during the reporting period have shown that beyond violating the ban on cooperative entities contained in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), Member States hosting cooperative entities may have violated other provisions of the resolutions. On 13 August 2018, the Panel wrote to the Russian Federation requesting information on a company in the Russian official business registry that listed the owner as a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the director as a Russian national. According to the document, the address of this entity is the same as that of the Consulate General of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Vladivostok, which moved to the city in April 2016. According to official business records, it is engaging in multiple economic activities, including “renting and operating of own or leased non-residential real estate”; “construction of residential and non-residential buildings”; and “operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships” (see annex 75). The Panel considers that this collaborative activity with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). This also constitutes a violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) unless the company moved out before its adoption. The Panel continues its investigation.
  12. With regard to ties between cooperative entities and possible joint ventures and designated entities, the Panel’s investigations also found that the construction company of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO or KOGEN), with ties to Mansudae and Han Hun Il (Reconnaissance General Bureau) in Zambia (see paras. 126–135), is the co-owner (along with a Russian national), of a joint venture construction company in Sakhalin Oblast, Russian Federation, LLC “SAKORENMA” (ООО “САКОРЕНМА”) (see annexes 76–79). According to official Russian records, it bid on and won supply contracts for Russian State agencies in June 2018 (see annex 78). .
  13. According to the company’s official registration documents, it has had Government contracts in the past year. Another joint venture co-owned by two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and directed by a Russian national in Krasnoyarsk is registered under the Russian name for GENCO and engages in the same business (construction). While the majority of companies considered by the Panel as cooperative entities in the Russian Federation are owned or co-owned by individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (with Russian co-owners and/or directors also in the paperwork), the following companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (in addition to GENCO) are owners of cooperative entities on the territory of the Russian Federation and therefore in violation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017): Korea Kumgang General Corporation, the Ministry of Forestry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Academy of Medical Sciences of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pugang Pharmaceutical Company, “Eighth of March” Korean Trading Company, Korea Aprokgang Technology Company and Korea Paekma Trading Corporation.
  14. The Panel recommends that all Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that the use of property of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for any purposes prohibited under paragraph 18 of resolution 2321 (2016) be terminated and all related registrations or leases cancelled and that all cooperative entities or joint ventures involving nationals or entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be dissolved in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017). Given the Panel’s findings regarding GENCO’s operation across multiple countries in multiple continents, it recommends that Member States encourage their corporate service providers to exercise vigilance to ensure that these companies cannot operate in other countries in violation of the resolutions. Thailand
  15. In its reply to the Panel’s letter regarding five joint ventures, Thailand said that its authorities were seeking further details on Pyongyang Haemaji Restaurant and Mokran Korean Restaurant. It also informed the Panel that Pyongyang Okryu Restaurant was operated by “Golden Pioneer Entertainment Company Limited”, which is “entirely own by Thai citizens” (see annex 74). Uganda
  16. The Government of Uganda replied on 6 July 2018 to the Panel’s request for further information on MKP operations in Uganda. It acknowledged having formed a joint venture between the National Housing and Construction Company and MKP Builders SDN BHD, called NH-MKP Builders Limited. As part of one project, the National Housing and Construction Company paid out $3,627,762 as an advance payment to MKP Builders. Uganda claims that this business relationship ceased at the beginning of 2014, when it became clear that MKP Builders SDN BHD was unable to complete the construction contract. The Government has since been involved in a series of ongoing lawsuits with MKP and its insurance companies to recover the payment and insists that it cannot dissolve MKP Builders SDN BHD or MKP Capital Berhad while litigation continues.
  17. In its reply, Uganda also included information about Vidas Engineering Services Company Limited, which it acknowledged as having been contracted for several Government-funded projects. However, it firmly denied any relationship between the firm and MKP, citing Vidas’s company incorporation documents. Uganda and Vidas did not provide an explanation for the appearance of the firm’s mailing address, registered office address, email address and trading name on the corporate registry documents for MKP Capital and MKP Builders in Uganda. The Panel notes that in order to mask connections with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, companies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea commonly use foreign national facilitators to avoid putting its own nationals on incorporation paperwork, leverages business contacts to facilitate the establishment of in-country presences and embeds within foreign firms. Uganda did not respond to the Panel’s inquiries pertaining to its recent promotion of foreign investment opportunities in a high-value MKP Holdings project at the Moroto Marble Mine (see ibid.). Viet Nam
  18. In December 2017, Viet Nam replied to the Panel that with regard to entities of the businesses and restaurants of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea operating in Viet Nam, in Hanoi, there were three entities and two restaurants, including Binh Nhuong Restaurant and Koryo Restaurant. In Ho Chi Minh City, there were seven entities and a Koryo Restaurant (formerly called Ryu Gong Restaurant). There was one entity in Hai Phong. Zambia
  19. Information on cooperative entities and joint ventures in Zambia can be found in annex 46. Recommendations To the Committee
  20. The Panel recommends the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han), Yong Kok Yeap (MKP Malaysia) and Yazid Merzouk (MKP Zambia), as well as Pan Systems, and the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services and International Global System).
  21. The Panel recommends that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities contained in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).
    To Member States
  22. Given the pervasive use of accounts in the names of family members to evade sanctions, the Panel recommends that Governments provide their financial institutions with a list not only of accredited diplomats, but of their family members, to ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in their names.
  23. The Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance for a single bank to be identified as the only bank that may hold accounts for the embassy and diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and that all others be advised not to hold accounts for diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or their family members.
  24. The Panel recommends that Member States advise their financial institutions not to open accounts for diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who are not accredited to their country and to share information on the financial activities of diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with other Member States where records show that there has been financial activity, to avoid cross-border circumvention of sanctions.
  25. Member States should advise their financial institutions that only closing bank accounts (as opposed to freezing) does not meet the requirements of the resolutions, which stipulate that they must freeze all assets controlled by designated individuals or entities and those operating on their behalf, as well as of any members of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that are engaged in violating or evading any of the provisions of the resolutions.
  26. Member States should offer technical assistance to other Member States to help them to strengthen their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions, as appropriate and in line with Article 49 of the Charter of the United Nations.
  27. As part of their implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), Member States should request their corporate registries to extract the details of all companies with a national director or shareholders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, bearing in mind that the registration of such companies may de facto violate the ban.
  28. Given that joint ventures have violated other provisions of the resolutions in addition to paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), the names of those directors and shareholders should be shared with investigation agencies, financial intelligence units and financial institutions.
  29. The Panel recommends that Member States clarify with their national agencies that insurance providers are financial institutions and therefore subject to all of the relevant financial provisions in the resolutions, including the need to freeze assets under the resolutions. V. Recent activities related to the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes Nuclear
  30. The Yongbyon nuclear complex remained active. The 5 MW (e) reactor has been in operation since December 2015 and, according to a Member State, while operations were suspended for a few days in February, March and April 2018, each period was insufficient to shut down for discharge and was likely for maintenance operations. In November 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the reactor’s operation had been suspended from September to October 2018 and that the discharge of spent fuel rods could have taken place during those two months. Satellite imagery from February to November 2018 shows the excavation of water channels. The imagery also captures the construction of a building near the reactors’ water discharge facilities. A Member State observed the discharge of water through the newly built structure in
    mid-June 2018. The Panel also observed a new building on the west side of the light water reactor (see annex 80).
  31. Satellite imagery indicates possible operation of the radiochemical laboratory and associated steam plant. Plumes of smoke and fluctuating amounts of coal reserves were seen between 27 April and 8 May 2018 (see annex 81), which was likely for maintenance work. In November 2018, a Member State reported to the Panel that it had detected a heat change within the building.
  32. On 24 May 2018, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea held a ceremony for the dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, followed by a statement by its Nuclear Weapons Institute. Satellite imagery indicates several changes in the above-ground infrastructure as a result of the “dismantling” in May. The Panel observed the removal of stockpiled materials in November 2018 (see annex 82).
  33. The Panel continues monitoring uranium concentration plants and mining sites. The Panel observed the removal of spoil piles in Pyongsan in 2018, which indicates that mining may be ongoing (see annex 83). The Panel observed no significant change around the possible uranium enrichment facility in Kangson during the reporting period, except for the periodic movement of oversize trucks. Use of civilian infrastructure for ballistic missile assembly and launches
  34. In April 2018, a Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was repeatedly using civilian factories and other non-military facilities as part of a strategy to prevent any possible “decapitation” strike on the country’s smaller number of identified nuclear and ballistic missile assembly and manufacturing sites. The Member State noted that these sites have all the necessary rail links, road and other infrastructure for the transport, assembly and testing of the weapons systems. One example provided to the Panel was the intercontinental ballistic missile Hwasong-15 assembly at the Pyongsong truck factory, also known as the March 16th Automotive Plant (see figure XXV), and its subsequent launch site. In November 2018, the Member State informed the Panel that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was developing intercontinental ballistic missile bases close to its northern border. Figure XXV Member State example of use of civilian facilities for ballistic missile assembly (left); Chairman Kim Jong Un visiting the truck factory three weeks prior to launch (4 November 2017) (right) Sources: Member State, Korean Central News Agency.
  35. The Panel surveyed, confirmed and reported ballistic missile activity sites and found evidence of a consistent trend on the part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to disperse its assembly, storage and testing locations. In addition to the use of civilian facilities, the Panel found that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used previously idle or sprawling military-industrial sites as launch locations. These may be situated close by, up to 10 km from the assembly or storage sites. Examples of this trend include the test launch sites for the Hwasong-14 intercontinental launch of 4 July (Panghyon aircraft factory) and 28 July 2017 (Mupyong-ni). Pyongyang Sunan International Airport, the country’s largest civil-military airfield, was used for the intermediate range Hwasong-12 launches of 29 August and 15 September 2017. See annex 84 for satellite and ballistic missile-related imagery. VI. Unintended impact of sanctions
  36. In order to strengthen the humanitarian exemption mechanism, on 6 August 2018, the Committee adopted “Implementation Assistance Notice No.7: Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK”. From January 2018 to January 2019, the Committee received 25 humanitarian exemption requests made by Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations. As at the time of writing, the Committee had granted 16 approvals, while seven requests remain under consideration by the Committee (two requests were withdrawn).
  37. Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption clauses and the Committee’s efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience unintended consequences on their humanitarian programmes that make it impossible to operate normally in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The six main areas of concern communicated to the Panel are: delays in receiving exemptions; the collapse of the banking channel; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in willing foreign suppliers; the increased cost of humanitarian-related items and operations; and diminished funding for operations (see annexes 85–87). These are negatively affecting their ability to implement humanitarian-related programmes. In particular, the sectoral sanctions are affecting the delivery of a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see ibid.). For the Panel’s assessment of adverse humanitarian consequences of sanctions for the civilian population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, see annex 85. Recommendations
  38. The Panel recommends that discussions in the Committee on humanitarian exemption requests be time-bound and that focus groups within the Committee meet on a regular basis to examine humanitarian issues with a view to expediting the processing of such requests.
  39. To alleviate unnecessary burdens on Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Committee should publish a whitelist of certain non-sensitive items used in humanitarian operations that fall under the broad categories of items subject to the sectoral sanctions in paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring an exemption for humanitarian shipment into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  40. The Committee should continue to seek feedback from Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations applying for exemptions under the terms of the Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 guidelines and work to streamline and simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved and the frequency of requests and submissions.
  41. The Secretary-General should request the Secretariat to carry out an assessment of the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. VII. National implementation reports
  42. As at January 2019, 68 Member States had submitted reports on their implementation of resolution 2397 (2017); 83 Member States on resolution 2375 (2017); 84 Member States on resolution 2371 (2017); 102 Member States on resolution 2321 (2016) and 111 Member States on resolution 2270 (2016). Despite the increase in overall reporting, the Panel notes that the number of non-reporting States (124, 6 of which served as non-permanent members of the Security Council in 2018) for resolution 2397 (2017) remains significant (see annex 88).
  43. The Panel recalls that Member States are to submit their reports in a timely manner in accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 2397 (2017).
  44. For a consolidated list of recommendations, see annex 89.
    Annex 1 : Information provided to the Panel by the United States, 6 July 2018

The United States stated that if each of the below 89 port calls delivered only one third of each vessel’s capacity, the associated volume would exceed the annual cap for 2018 by 30 May 2018. Fully loaded, the DPRK tankers could have exceeded the cap nearly three times over with an estimated total of 1,367,628 barrels (figure 1).

Figure 1

Figure 2: DPRK tanker deliveries to DPRK ports

Port Ship Name
Designated Dead Weight Tonnage Arrival Month 2018 Delivery Volume 33% Laden Delivery Volume 50% Laden Delivery Volume 90% Laden Nampo Ji Song 6 1,250.00 January 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Sam Jong 1* 1,665.00 January 555.00 832.50 1,498.50
Nampo Kum Un San 3 3,279.00 January 1,093.00 1,639.50 2,951.10
Nampo An San 1* 3,003.00 January 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Najin Kum Un San 2,070.00 January 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1,966.00 January 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Yu Son (Y Chun)* 3,398.00 January 1,132.67 1,699.00 3,058.20
Nampo Chon Ma San* 2,750.00 January 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Paek Ma* 2,250.00 January 750.00 1,125.00 2,025.00
Nampo Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)* 1,150.00 January 383.33 575.00 1,035.00
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2,507.00 January 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Wonsan Kum Un San 3 3,279.00 January 1,093.00 1,639.50 2,951.10
Nampo Rye Song Gang 1 3,003.00 January 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Najin Kum Un San 2,070.00 January 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Wonsan Sam Ma 2* 1,731.00 January 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1,250.00 February 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Sam Jong 1* 1,665.00 February 555.00 832.50 1,498.50
Wonsan Kum Un San 2,070.00 February 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Wonsan Kum Un San 3 3,279.00 February 1,093.00 1,639.50 2,951.10
Nampo Chon Ma San* 2,750.00 February 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1,966.00 February 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)* 1,150.00 February 383.33 575.00 1,035.00
Nampo An San 1* 3,003.00 February 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2,507.00 February 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Nampo Rye Song Gang 1 3,003.00 February 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Sam Jong 1* 1,665.00 February 555.00 832.50 1,498.50
Nampo Yu Son (Y Chun)* 3,398.00 February 1,132.67 1,699.00 3,058.20
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1,966.00 February 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Yu Jong 2* 1,206.00 March 402.00 603.00 1,085.40
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1,250.00 March 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2,507.00 March 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1,250.00 March 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Chongjin Un Pha 2, ex Kum Gang 3 1,205.00 March 401.67 602.50 1,084.50
Nampo An San 1* 3,003.00 March 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Paek Ma* 2,250.00 March 750.00 1,125.00 2,025.00
Nampo Rye Song Gang 1 3,003.00 March 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Sam Jong 1* 1,665.00 March 555.00 832.50 1,498.50
Nampo Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)* 1,150.00 March 383.33 575.00 1,035.00
Nampo Kum Un San 3 3,279.00 March 1,093.00 1,639.50 2,951.10
Nampo Yu Son (Y Chun)* 3,398.00 March 1,132.67 1,699.00 3,058.20
Nampo Wan Heng 11* 4,983.00 March 1,661.00 2,491.50 4,484.70
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2,507.00 March 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Hamhung Sam Ma 2* 1,731.00 March 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Nampo Chon Ma San* 2,750.00 March 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1,250.00 March 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Yu Jong 2* 1,206.00 March 402.00 603.00 1,085.40
Nampo Kum Un San 2,070.00 March 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Nampo Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)* 1,150.00 March 383.33 575.00 1,035.00
Nampo An San 1* 3,003.00 March 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1,966.00 March 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Chon Ma San* 2,750.00 April 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1,250.00 April 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Kum Pit 1 1,091.00 April 363.67 545.50 981.90
Nampo Kum Un San 3 3,279.00 April 1,093.00 1,639.50 2,951.10
Nampo Paek Ma* 2,250.00 April 750.00 1,125.00 2,025.00
Chongjin Sam Ma 2* 1,731.00 April 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Nampo Nam San 8* 3,150.00 April 1,050.00 1,575.00 2,835.00
Nampo Yu Son (Y Chun)* 3,398.00 April 1,132.67 1,699.00 3,058.20
Nampo Wan Heng 11* 4,983.00 April 1,661.00 2,491.50 4,484.70
Nampo Chon Ma San* 2,750.00 April 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2,507.00 April 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Hamhung Sam Ma 2* 1,731.00 April 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Wonsan Ma Du San 949.00 April 316.33 474.50 854.10
Chongji Sam Ma 2* 1731.00 April 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Najin Song Won 2101.00 April 700.33 1,050.50 1,890.90
Wonsan Kum Un San 2070.00 April 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Nampo An San 1* 3003.00 April 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Nampo Kum Jin Gang 2 2100.00 April 700.00 1,050.00 1,890.00
Nampo Paek Ma* 2250.00 May 750.00 1,125.00 2,025.00
Chongjin Sam Ma 2* 1731.00 May 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1250.00 May 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1966.00 May 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2507.00 May 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Wonsan Chon Myong 1* 2750.00 May 916.67 1,375.00 2,475.00
Nampo Myong Ryu 1 900.00 May 300.00 450.00 810.00
Nampo Sam Jong 1* 1665.00 May 555.00 832.50 1,498.50
Wonsan Kum Un San 2070.00 May 690.00 1,035.00 1,863.00
Nampo Saebyol (Chong Rim 2)* 1150.00 May 383.33 575.00 1,035.00
Nampo Nam San 8* 3150.00 May 1,050.00 1,575.00 2,835.00
Nampo An San 1* 3003.00 May 1,001.00 1,501.50 2,702.70
Hamhung Sam Ma 2* 1731.00 May 577.00 865.50 1,557.90
Nampo Yu Jong 2* 1206.00 May 402.00 603.00 1,085.40
Nampo Yu Phyong 5* 1966.00 May 655.33 983.00 1,769.40
Nampo Yu Son* 3398.00 May 1,132.67 1,699.00 3,058.20
Nampo Kum Jin Gang 2 2100.00 May 700.00 1,050.00 1,890.00
Nampo Ji Song 6* 1250.00 May 416.67 625.00 1,125.00
Nampo Paek Ma* 2250.00 May 750.00 1,125.00 2,025.00
Nampo Sam Jong 2* 2507.00 May 835.67 1,253.50 2,256.30
Nampo Myong Ryu 1 900.00 May 300.00 450.00 810.00
Percent Laden 33% 50% 90%
Total (Metric Tons) 65,782.99 98,674.50 177,614.10
Total (Barrels) 506,529.05 759,793.65 1,367,628.57

Source: Member State


Annex 2 : United States submission to the Committee of 17 September 2018

UNITED STATES NON-PAPER TO THE UN 1718 DPRK SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE: NORTH KOREA’S BREACH OF UNSCR 2397 REFINED
PETROLEUM CAP

• UNSCR 2397 operative paragraph 5 limits the DPRK’s import of refined petroleum products to 500,000 barrels per year beginning in 2018 if those transfers are a) fully reported to the Committee within 30 days, b) do not involve any individual or entity associated with the DPRK’s nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities, and c) are used to exclusively meet the livelihood needs of DPRK nationals and not used to generate revenue for the DPRK’s nuclear, ballistic missile, or other prohibited activities.

• UNSCR 2375 operative paragraph 11 prohibits ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with DPRK-flagged, owned, or operated vessels. UNSCR 2094 further makes clear that any individual or entity assisting in the evasion of sanctions are also liable for 1718 sanctions.

• These STS transfers are of great concern to the United States and in our view represent the most urgent area in need of more rigorous UN member state implementation.

• Since the United States last provided the UN 1718 Committee with a report on oil tanker deliveries to the DPRK on July 12, we have information revealing that these deliveries continue. The continuing arrival of these tankers in DPRK ports confirm that the DPRK maintains its imports of illicitly sourced refined petroleum products that expand the degree to which the DPRK is violating UNSCR 2397’s annual limitation on refined product imports. Further, the 1718 Committee has not received any reporting from the DPRK or other member states about these transfers in contravention of UNSCR 2397.

• We are providing updated information showing data on each of these port calls to supplement our previous reporting and to emphasize that this problem continues due to the inaction of the 1718 Committee and the objections raised by Russia and China.

• The table provided in Tab 1 lists each of the port calls by date and associated delivery volume scenarios from 1 January 2018 to 18 August 2018, which have grown substantially since our previous submission and, in aggregation, exceed the UNSCR 2397 annual quota for refined petroleum products.

• Since our last report in July summarizing transactions observed in January through May, at least an additional 59 tanker deliveries to the DPRK have occurred from June 1 through August 18, bringing the 2018 total to at least 148 deliveries, all of which involved deliveries to North Korean ports to unload refined petroleum products procured through UN-prohibited STS transfers.

• If each of these tankers was fully laden when it made its delivery, the DPRK has imported almost six times the allowable amount under UNSCR 2397. Even if these tankers were not fully laden upon delivery, the figure found in Tab 2 show the three scenarios for how much refined petroleum products the DPRK procured in 2018 from 1 January to 18 August. All three scenarios make clear that the DPRK has obtained far more than the 500,000 barrels it is authorized to procure in 2018.

• All further transfers of refined petroleum products must be halted, period, to prevent the DPRK from procuring any additional products in violation of UNSCR 2397.

• To further underscore our confidence in the updated data on tanker deliveries, we are also providing three images—one from each of the past three months in Tabs 3 through 5—that document several of these deliveries into a DPRK port outfitted with oil unloading and storage infrastructure as well as an image of the port infrastructure more broadly in Tab 6.

• The images of these tanker ships depict DPRK-flagged vessels that are outfitted for the transport of refined petroleum products and used exclusively for that purpose when moored—or anchored—at a single point offshore mooring system. The single point mooring system consists of mooring buoys, which keep the tankers anchored in place, and an offloading buoy that connects to an underwater pipeline allowing for the physical transfer of the refined petroleum products from the tankers to onshore infrastructure.

• Specifically, this pipeline transfers the refined petroleum products to the associated onshore infrastructure including refined petroleum storage tanks, pumping equipment, a rail transfer point, and tanker truck filling station, all of which are outfitted to facilitate the unloading, storage, and transporting of the refined products to areas where the products are consumed throughout North Korea, including by the regime and military.

o The first image in Tab 3 highlights this process by showing both marine import terminals in Nampo that are configured to import, store, and transport refined petroleum products through an offloading pier and single point mooring systems. As can be seen in the image, various DPRK tankers are at anchorage to cycle through offloading infrastructure to make individual deliveries of refined petroleum products before departing the port in search of additional, illicit STS transfer transactions.

o The second image in Tab 4 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T MU BONG 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on June 16, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

o The third image in Tab 5 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T YU JONG 2 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on July 21, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.

o The fourth image in Tab 6 shows the DPRK-flagged M/T AN SAN 1 anchored at an offloading buoy at the Nampo port facility in the Taedong River on August 17, 2018. The vessel is fully loaded and is in the process of delivering refined petroleum products procured via an illicit STS transfer.
• We are supplementing this imagery with three storyboards that demonstrate the entire process by which North Korean tankers depart North Korean ports, rendezvous with a foreign “feeder vessel” to engage in an illicit STS transfer, and return to a North Korean port to deliver refined petroleum products.

o The first storyboard in Tab 7 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MYONG RYU 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.

o The second storyboard in Tab 8 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged PAEK MA conducted an STS transfer with the Panama-flagged SHANG YUAN BAO.

o The third storyboard in Tab 9 shows the entire process in which the North Korea-flagged MU BONG 1 conducted an STS transfer with the Sierra Leone-flagged XING MING YANG 888.

• The United States has now provided two tables documenting 148 deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK and 10 images and storyboards clearly demonstrating the process by which this occurs to the 1718 Committee. This body of evidence should remove any remaining doubts that the DPRK has seriously violated the refined petroleum cap and that the Committee must urgently act to halt all refined petroleum product exports to the DPRK.

ATTACHMENTS

Tab 1: Table of DPRK tanker deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports
Tab 2: Figure of estimated volumes of refined petroleum product deliveries to DPRK
Tab 3: Image of Nampo Port marine import terminals for refined petroleum products
Tab 4: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 5: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 6: M/T Mu Bong 1 delivery at Nampo Port
Tab 7: Storyboard of Myong Ryu 1 STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao
Tab 8: Storyboard of Paek Ma STS transfer with Shang Yuan Bao
Tab 9: Storyboard of Mu Bong 1 STS transfer with Xing Ming Yang 888

Source: Member State

Annex 3 : Communication of the Russian Federation to the Committee of 21
September 2018
Source: Member State 
Annex 4 : Address location provided by Golden Luxury Corporation to Yuantai

Source: The Panel

Annex 5 : Panel letter to Golden Luxury Corporation and their associates



Annex I. Images showing the Ocean Explorer conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with a UN designated vessel controlled by UN designated entity
Source: Member State


Annex 6 : Vanguard correspondence

From: vanguard(汎德船舶) [email protected]
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2018 2:08 PM
To: Hugh Griffiths
Cc: ‘van.guard’
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard
Dear Mr.Hugh Griffiths,
Good day.
We have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner’s cargo operation and finance. our company only responsible for the regulation of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974) Appendix IX and Chapter X1-2 issued by International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Our company is not responsible for the management of trade operation and crew management of this Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594), nor involved in matters such as ownership and chartering of the ship to which this company belongs and trade operation and crew management.
So we don’t know the following information from Virtue Base Developments Limited (IMO No.5893594).
names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.
Our company was entrusted by Mr.Lai (phone number +886978882693) at the end of May 2017, by our employee Penny to assist the applicant company IMO number, but soon after, We also cannot contact this Mr.Lai.
Hope above mention will help your investigation.
Best Regards.
汎德船舶安全管理顧問有限公司
VANGUARD SHIPPING SAFETY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT COMPANY LIMITED.
From: Hugh Griffiths [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 8:27 PM
To: van.guard
Subject: Re: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard

Dear Vanguard,
Thank you for your email.
Is this Penny Lee李沛瑀(Ms.) that is replying to the United Nations?
Or another employee?
I would be grateful if you could identify yourself and provide information on an important case.
Virtue Base Developments (see attachment)
This is an entity registered in the Seychelles for which you submitted an IMO number request in 2017.
Please supply the names, addresses, email addresses, fax numbers and other records for the individuals responsible for Virtue Base Developments.
I am basing this request on the attached Equatorial Guinea registry certificate.
Virtue Base Developments are shielding their identity.
However, your company, Vanguard is named as a “care of” address with a UN international organisation for Virtue Base Developments.
Please provide us with the information on the individuals behind Virtue Base Development within 24 hours.
Best regards,
Hugh Griffiths


From: van.guard [email protected]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2018 9:56 AM
To: DPA-POE1874
Cc: ”Vanguard(汎德公司)”; Hugh Griffiths
Subject: RE: Outgoing Communication # 367 from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Vanguard
Dear Mr.HUGH GRIFFITHS,
Good day.
At beginning, we have to affirm that Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultant Co. Ltd never involved in the owner’s cargo operation and finance. We only pay attention to ship’s safety. It’s most management company done at Kaohsiung. Besides, we have never received the Panel’s previous notice S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.1151 of 19 December 2017, only received S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.367 on 7 December 2018.
You said our company was associated with 5 ships engaged in prohibited ship-to-ship transfers. We would like to clarify as following:

  1. Lighthouse Winmore (IMO number: 9635987) ─ She belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen, which was never under our management. If she holds our company’s DOC, then it must be a fake certificate and please provide your evidence in hand. It’s easy to find out from her SMC.
  2. Billions No. 18 (IMO number: 8711021) ─ She also belongs to Mr. Hsih-Shien Chen. It changes ship’s name to “SUN CROWN”. And then it was sold to other people.
  3. Jin Hye (IMO number: 8518572) ─ In December 2017, we were informed by Investigation Bureau about the vessel was involved with illegal transfers. Then we broke the agreement with the owner immediately and accepted Investigation Bureau and prosecutor’s investigation. You may check with them. The owner was in litigation now and we are clear from the investigation. After breaking the agreement, we have delivered the deletion certificate to the owner from Flag State. The ship has left us and we didn’t get further information from her.
  4. Wan Heng 11 (IMO number: 8688717) ─ This vessel was never under our management. Please provide the evidence for us to report to Investigation Bureau.
  5. Heng Xing (IMO number: 8669589) on 7 May 2018 ─ Please check your Annex 2 and amplify stern part of the small ship, you will clearly indicate port registration of two Chinese words “舟山”(ZHOUSHAN) that is a Chinese ship. (Please see the red column)
    Source: The Panel

    Annex 7 : Panel letter to Hin Leong 10 May 2018  

    Hin Leong responses to best practice clauses and Panel letter  
    Source: The Panel

Annex 8 : Hika scrapping documentation

Source: The Panel


Annex 9 : Panama’s reply to the Panel


Annex 10 : Jui Zong’s reply to the Panel

Source: The Panel

Annex 11 : Jui Zong correspondence to the Panel

Source: The Panel

Annex 12 : Qihang International Shipping Management’s reply to the Panel

Source: The Panel

Annex 13 : Ship-to-ship transfers and coal vessels

  1. Unsurprisingly, the transfers have continued to occur in international waters where there is weak or nonexistent monitoring by flag states, insurers and most traders. In the context of these transfers, the Panel notes the use of increasingly sophisticated evasion in addition to AIS manipulation which remains an overarching feature of the transfers. Other methods of evasion include physical disguise of DPRK tankers, the use of small, un-registered vessels, illegal name-changing and other forms of identity fraud, night transfers and use of other vessels for transshipment. The below text and figures show examples of each type of evasion.
  2. The DPRK has been disguising tankers as cargo ships through the construction of fake cargo hatches (see
    figure I) and the false reporting of these ships as cargo ships when AIS is switched on.

Figure I: Fake cargo hatches
Source: Member State

  1. The below figures show the use of small, nondescript vessels not requiring an IMO number, making nationality and identity more difficult to determine, especially when the vessels obscure or paint false names (see figure II -IV for examples).

Figure II: Small ship transfer to tanker Yu Phyong 5 of 19 June 2018
Source: Member State

Figure III: Small ship transfer to Ji Song of 19 May 2018

Source: Member State
Figure IV: Small ship transfer to Yu Jong 2 of 16 February 2018

Source: Member State

Vessel identity fraud

  1. Larger, internationally-registered, foreign-flagged vessels are also engaging in name falsification and other forms of identity fraud along with their DPRK counterparts. On 18 May 2018, the Panama-flagged Shang Yuan Bao (IMO number: 8126070) obscured the name on its bow and stern before engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer with the designated DPRK tanker Paek Ma (IMO number: 9066978) as the “Puma” which was painted on the vessel’s bow. (see figure V). The vessel also engaged in the now-common practice of switching off its AIS. (figure VI)

Figure V: Shang Yuan Bao ship-to-ship transfer and disguise of name

Source: Member State


Figure VI: Shang Yuan Bao AIS transmission record

Source: Windward

  1. Taking advantage of the lack of monitoring, oversight and regulation by flag of convenience states, DPRK vessels have falsified their ports of registry and name to give the impression of being under a non-DPRK jurisdiction. This was seen when on 29 June the DPRK tanker An San 1 disguised itself as the “Hope Sea”, of Freetown, Sierra Leone (figure VII).

Figure VII: An San 1 disguised as “Hope Sea” during 29 June illicit transfer

Source: Member State

  1. In a new technique involving only non-DPRK-flagged vessels, one of which was later used to deliver petroleum to the DPRK, the former Belize-registered designated tanker Wan Heng 11 (IMO number: 8791667) conducted a daytime ship-to-ship transfer on 10 April with the Patriot (IMO number: 9003550) a Russian Federation-flagged vessel.

Figure VIII: Ship-to-ship transfer between Wan Heng 11 and Patriot

Source: Member State

  1. Both vessels’ AIS transponders appeared to be switched off at the time of the transfer although the Patriot’s AIS appeared later that day, registering a draft change which indicated that a cargo had been discharged. (see figure IX)

Figure IX: Patriot AIS transmission record

Source: Windward

  1. While the Wan Heng 11 kept its AIS transponder off following the transfer, the vessel was observed delivering cargo to Nampo, DPRK, on 15 April (figure X).

Figure X: Wan Heng 11 in Nampo, 15 April

Source: Member State, Map: Panel

  1. The Panel notes that while the Wan Heng 11 violated paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Patriot did not violate either this provision or paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Wan Heng 11 was designated for de-registration and a port call ban (and not for ship-to-ship transfer). In this context, the Panel recommends that the Committee incorporate paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the designation list in order to prohibit designated vessels from conducting ship-to-ship transfers with other foreign-flagged vessels.
  2. Since 30 May 2018, Member States have continued to report further transfers. For example, a Member State reported that the designated DPRK vessel Chon Ma San (IMO 8660313) engaged in ship-to-ship transfers with and received fuel from the Myong Ryu 1 and the Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36) (figure II), both of unknown nationality, on 4 June and 25 June 2018, respectively. On 29 June, the designated An San 1 received product from another tanker of unknown nationality in the same area.

Figure XI: Jin Yang 36 transfer to the Chon Ma San on 25 June 2018

Source: Member State

Coal vessel identity fraud and AIS manipulation

  1. In 2018, the DPRK continued to violate the ban on coal exports through vessel identity fraud in order to deliver coal to Chinese ports as well as numerous, large-scale transfers of coal in international waters to small, unidentified vessels. These new strategies seem to be a response to the relatively successful curbing of the sale of coal by China and Vietnam following the adoption of resolution 2371 (2017).
  2. The DPRK vessel Kal Ma (IMO number: 8503228) loaded coal at Nampo on 19 May and eight days later loitered off the Chinese port of Xiongyuo where it discharged its cargo before returning empty to Nampo on 9 June (figure I).  
    FigureXII: Kal Ma observed through satellite imagery May-June 2018
    Source: Member State, Map: Panel
  3. In so doing the Kal Ma concealed its identity and manipulated its AIS to portray itself as the “K Ma” and later the “KM” both falsely broadcast as Cambodia registered. Under its false identity the Kal Ma indicated that its final destination was the port of Bayuquan, China, before it diverted to Xiongyuo (figures II and III). China informed the Panel that “based on the disguised name KM and the fictitious IMO number 9603128 of the vessel indicted by the Panel, the Chinese authority cannot find the record data of the vessel as well as any information showing the vessel discharging cargoes in the relevant sea area in China between 27 May and 1 June 2018. China also stated that the “Chinese Customs authority has not found any entry or exit border information for this vessel after 1 January 2018 or any record information on the vessel with the disguised IMO number. China will closely monitor the vessel Kal Ma, and prevent the vessel from conducting activities violating the Security Council resolutions in China.”

    Figure XIII: Kal Ma reports false identity in AIS transmission on entering Chinese waters

Source: Windward

Annex 14 : Panel letters to Primorye/Gudzon


Annex 15 : Vessels documented through imagery as loading and transporting
DPRK coal

Date Location Vessel Status

1 10 December 2017 Taean, DPRK Forever Lucky
IMO: 9003653
Current flag: unknown
Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017 Loading coal
2 30 September 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Forever Lucky
IMO: 9003653
Current flag: unknown
Former flag: Panama until 11 December 2017 At anchor
3 1 February 2018 Near Qinzhou, China Hua Fu
IMO: 9020003
Current flag: unknown
Former flag: Panama until May 2017 At pier
4 22 August 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Hua Fu
IMO: 9020003
Current flag: unknown
Former flag: Panama until May 2017 Conducting STS transfer
of coal
5 24 April 2018 Nampo, DPRK Jang Un
IMO: 8822260
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
6 22 May 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Jang Un
IMO: 8822260
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
7 24 July 2018 Nampo, DPRK Jang Un
IMO: 8822260
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
8 5 September 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Jang Un
IMO: 8822260
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
9 15 August 2018 Nampo, DPRK Ka Rim Chon
IMO: 8314811
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
10 21 September 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Ka Rim Chon
IMO: 8314811
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
11 21 September 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Pho Phyong
IMO: 8314811
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
12 25 May 2018 Nampo, DPRK Nam Dae Chon
IMO:9138680
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
13 10 June 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Nam Dae Chon
IMO:9138680
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
14 24 July 2018 Nampo, DPRK Nam Dae Chon
IMO:9138680
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
15 2 August 2018 Posan Ni, DPRK Paek Yang San
IMO: 9020534
Current flag: DPRK Loading
bagged coal
16 5 September 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Hua Fu
IMO: 9020003
Current flag: unknown Paek Yang San
IMO: 9020534
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
17 27 October 2018 Songnim, DPRK Lucky Star (formerly Asia Bridge 3)
IMO: 9015278
Flag: Togo Loading coal
18 20 November 2018 Near Dao Bach Long Vi Island, Vietnam Lucky Star (formerly Asia Bridge 3)
IMO: 9015278
Flag: Togo At anchor
19 16 December 2017 Nampo, DPRK Oriental Treasure (renamed Dong Pang)
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros Loading coal
20 6 December 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Oriental Treasure (renamed Dong Pang)
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: unknown / Former flag: Comoros Conducting STS transfer
of coal
21 27 March 2018 Nampo, DPRK Tae Yang
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
22 18 April 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Tae Yang
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
23 27 August 2018 Songnim, DPRK Tae Yang
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: DPRK Loading coal
24 25 October 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Tae Yang
IMO: 9115028
Current flag: DPRK Conducting STS transfer
of coal
25 6 December 2018 Gulf of Tonkin Ho Chon Gang
IMO: 8415287
Current flag: DPRK At anchor

Source: Member State

Annex 16 : Indonesia’s reply to the Panel


Annex 17 : Contract for coal aboard the Wise Honest

Source: The Panel
Annex 18 : Correspondence with Novatobacco

Source: The Panel

Annex 19 : Panel correspondence with Hamid Ali


Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali
Source: The Panel

Email attachment provided by Mr. Hamid Ali


Source: The Panel

Annex 20 : The Panel’s proposal for an amended delisting procedure for vessels

Paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) encourages Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded). Six months after such vessels were frozen (impounded), the Committee may decide upon request of a flag State to release the vessel if adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions. However, once the vessel has been de-registered by a flag State in compliance with the resolutions (and therefore no longer under its jurisdiction), and since it would be a violation for flag States to re-register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State, it is unlikely that a flag State will submit a request to the Committee to re-register the vessel and then submit a request for a seized or impounded vessel to be released.

To resolve this conundrum and to lessen the burden on Member States seizing or impounding a vessel in compliance with the resolutions, the Panel recommends that the Committee introduce a procedure whereby:
1) After a six-month period the vessel owner may be permitted to make representation to the Committee for approval to have the vessel de-listed and released, provided that:
a) proof of ownership of the vessel is provided; and
b) adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the resolutions.
2) If approved, the vessel is then de-listed from the Committee’s list of designated vessels and the re-registration of the vessel approved.
3) Once a period of six months has elapsed and no request for de-listing has been tendered within 31 days from that date, the Member State may approach the Committee for approval to submit the vessel for public auction to defray costs incurred.

In addition, this procedure should be published on the Committee’s website under “Procedures for delisting” at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/materials.


Annex 21 : Imports from and exports to the DPRK of commodities according to trade data

Table 1
States importing zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
(United States dollars)
Importing State October 2017 November 2017 December 2017 January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

India 20 950 7 901 28 851
Total 20 950 7 901 28 851

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

  1. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $28,851 in zinc and articles thereof and zinc ores and concentrates (HS codes 79 and 26) to India in October and November 2017. All exports constituted violations of paragraph 28 of resolution 2321 (2016).
    Imports from the DPRK of commodities with exemption provisions (iron and steel and articles of iron and steel, textiles, food and agricultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia, and wood)
    Table 2
    States importing iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
    (United States dollars)

Importing State October 2017 November 2017 December 2017 January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

China 1 796 752 2 411 042 2 725 465 2 393 996 1 839 505 1 846 788 13 013 548
El Salvador 7 507 18 994 26 501
Ghana 20 868 9 532 283 146 313 546
India 65 189 3 194 68 383
Nicaragua 12 405 64 873 38 890 8 611 107 920 47 250 279 949
Serbia 3 186 29 981 33 167
Thailand 25 143 9 083 34 226
Total 1 898 400 2 509 090 2 781 394 2 729 890 1 956 508 1 894 038 13 769 320

Source: Global Trade Atlas.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violated paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017) by exporting a total of $13,769,320 in iron and steel and articles of iron and steel (HS codes 72 and 73) to China, El Salvador, Ghana, India, Nicaragua, Serbia and Thailand from October 2017 to March 2018. China replied to the Panel that the “relevant data don’t indicate the commodities under the items of HS code 7201”, and that, under Chinese law and regulations, only items with HS codes 7201 are considered as constituting iron and steel and articles of iron and steel prohibited by the relevant resolutions.
    Table 3
    States importing textiles (HS codes 50–63) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
    (United States dollars)

Importing State October 2017 November 2017 December 2017 January 2018 February 2018 Total

Chinaa 47 105 525 40 825 592 12 780 948 16 799 100 728 864
Ghana 14 173 85 040 64 985 164 198
India 234 163 15 497 5 929 255 589
Mexico 15 438 15 438
Russian Federationb 76 537 11 815 88 352
Thailand 26 617 3 486 30 103
Total 47 339 688 40 973 854 12 883 732 81 784 3 486 101 282 544

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In a note verbale to the Committee dated 12 January 2018, China stipulated that the total value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of textiles from 11 September 2017 to 10 December 2017 was $5,139,300.
b In a note verbale to the Committee dated 6 December 2017, the Russian Federation stated that, on 18 October 2017, 14,340 items of men’s apparel were imported from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in fulfilment of two contracts.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea violated the textiles import ban stipulated in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017) by exporting a total of $101,282,544 in textiles (HS codes 50–63) to China, Ghana, India, Mexico and Thailand. from October 2017 to February 2018. Only China and the Russian Federation reported to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to China, the figure reported by China to the Committee of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is lower than indicated in Global Trade Atlas trade data, by $95,589,564. In order to benefit from the reporting exemption in paragraph 16 of resolution 2375 (2017), these two figures should have been comparable. In addition to its reporting of $5,139,300 worth of textiles imported during the period, China further replied to the Panel that all its imports “went through the customs formalities within 90 days” from the adoption of resolution 2375 (2017). With regard to the Russian Federation, the Panel notes that the unit of measurement (items of textile) is different from that reflected in table 3 (United States dollars) and recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee. Table 4 States importing food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Importing State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 10 158 965 10 158 965
Total 10 158 965 10 158 965

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In a note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of food and agricultural products from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $16,872,600 (14,900 tons).

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $10,158,965 in food and agricultural products (HS codes 07, 08 and 12) to China in January 2018. China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports “went through the customs formalities within 30 days” from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017). Table 5 States importing machinery (HS code 84) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Importing State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 11 736 1 296 13 032
Chinaa 29 395 29 395
Costa Rica 21 053 5 017 26 070
El Salvador 73 711 1 444 75 155
India 12 961 12 961
Malaysiac 16 387 16 387
Total 165 243 7 757 173 000

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports of machinery from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $43,000.
b Malaysia replied to the Panel that “based on the statistics from Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM), there is no product under the HS codes of 84–85 being imported by Malaysia from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from January 2018 to February 2018”.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $173,000 in machinery (HS code 84) to Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, India and Malaysia in January and February 2018. All exports by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee, and China further replied to the Panel that all of its imports “went through the customs formalities within 30 days” from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017). Table 6 States importing electrical equipment (HS code 85) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Importing State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5 045 6 489 11 534
Chinaa 990 919 990 919
Thailand 17 584 7 596 25 180
Total 1 013 548 14 085 1 027 633

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of electrical equipment from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $1,346,300.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $1,027,633 in electrical equipment (HS code 85) to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, China and Thailand in January and February 2018. All exports after 21 January 2018 without notification to the Committee of those imports by 5 February 2018 violated paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017). Of the above-mentioned Member States, only China provided notification to the Committee in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017). Table 7 States importing earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Importing State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 10 070 444 10 070 444
Total 10 070 444 10 070 444

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $10,434,800 (106,700 tons).

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $10,070,444 in earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports “went through the customs formalities within 30 days” of the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017). Table 8 States importing wood (HS code 44) from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Importing State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 2 405 718 2 405 718
Total 2 405 718 2 405 718

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a In its note verbale to the Committee dated 5 February 2018, China stipulated that the value of its imports from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of wood from 22 December 2017 to 21 January 2018 was $2,858,500 (16,200 tons).

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exported a total of $2,405,718 in wood (HS code 44) to China in January 2018. China provided notification to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017), and further replied to the Panel that all of its imports “went through the customs formalities within 30 days” from the adoption of resolution 2397 (2017). Table 9 States exporting iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018 (United States dollars)

Exporting State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 1 889 683 28 791 1 918 474
Honduras 11 461 11 461
Malaysia 93 407 93 407
Total 1 983 090 40 252 2 023 342

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a China replied to the Panel that, while all of its exports in iron, steel and other metals, all industrial machinery and transportation vehicles had been processed and released before 6 January 2018, for technical reasons relating to its customs system, the clearance operations were completed when “means of transport actually left the Chinese territory”. China also replied that all exports after the date are “self-use materials for diplomatic mission in the DPRK or humanitarian aids to the DPRK”, for which their “export formalities are completed and in line with the requirement” of the relevant resolutions.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and Malaysia exported a total of $2,023,342 in iron, steel and other metals (HS codes 72–83) in January and February 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports during this period (see table 9, footnote a). Table 10 States exporting all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January–March 2018 (United States dollars)

Exporting State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 14 215 799 218 602 28 674 14 463 075
Honduras 38 254 16 322 54 576
India 19 412 19 412
Total 14 273 465 234 924 28 674 14 537 063

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a See table 9, footnote a.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China, Honduras and India exported a total of $14,537,063 in all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85) from January to March 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violatedparagraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports in this period (see table 9, footnote a).  
    Table 11
    States exporting transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, January to March 2018
    (United States dollars)

Exporting State January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 1 803 351 55 094 1 858 445
Thailand 9 176 9 176
Total 1 803 351 64 270 867 621

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a See table 9, footnote a.

  1. According to Global Trade Atlas data, China and Thailand exported a total of $1,867,621 in transportation vehicles (HS codes 86–89) between January and February 2018 to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea which violated paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017). China replied to the Panel on the precise nature of the exports for the period (see table 9, footnote a). Exports of commodities to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with exemptions (refined petroleum products and crude oil)

Table 12
States exporting petroleum (HS code 2710) to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
(United States dollars)

Exporting State October 2017 November 2017 December 2017 January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinaa 245 279 484 206 480 382 115 553 261 210 473 979 2 060 609
India 16 513 783 16 513 783
Russian Federationb 238 173 220 632 447 774 584 783 1 491 362
South Africa 275 639 66 852 138 306 480 797
Total 16 997 235 704 838 1 203 795 767 188 399 516 473 979 20 546 551

Source: Global Trade Atlas collated as of June 2018.
a In five notes verbales from 2 January to 30 April 2018, China notified the Committee of the transfer of 2,165.1 tons of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for October 2017; 497.6 tons for November 2017; 463.214 tons for December 2017; and the further transfer of 4,032.72 tons of such products from January to March 2018. The corresponding values in United States dollars of the transfers made each month have been reported as: 1,188,000 (October 2017), 527,000 (November 2017), 490,000 (December 2017), 130,300 (January 2018), 835,800 (February 2018), and 1,592,400 (March 2018).
b In three notes verbales from 27 December 2017 to 31 May 2018, the Russian Federation notified the Committee of its exports of 212.54 tons of petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for November 2017; 589.664 tons for December 2017; and 4,148.381 tons from January to March 2018.


Table 13
States exporting other petroleum (HS codes 2711–2713)a to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 2017 to March 2018
(United States dollars)

Exporting State October 2017 November 2017 December 2017 January 2018 February 2018 March 2018 Total

Chinab 1 174 266 453 852 228 645 672 618 814 742 1 318 450 4 662 573
Russian Federationc 184 286 216 129 400 415
Total 1 174 266 453 852 412 931 888 747 814 742 1 318 450 5 062 988

Source: Global Trade Atlas.
a China informed the Panel that it uses HS Codes 2710, 2712 and 2713 as HS Codes for refined petroleum products. China also informed the Panel that its Ministry of Commerce considers HS Code 2711.11 as “liquefied natural gas”, whereas the Panel uses HS Code 2711 as a part of “condensates and natural gas liquids”, prohibited by paragraph 13 of resolution 2375 (2017). The Panel has previously recommended that all Security Council resolutions on sectoral sanctions specify the HS codes (see S/2018/171, paras. 31 and 74).
b See table 12, footnote a.
c See table 12, footnote b.

  1. Based upon the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map, the Panel sent letters to South Africa (March-June 2018) and Turkey (March-July 2018) regarding the reported export of petroleum products (HS 2710) of 322,000 USD and 2.29 million USD respectively. Turkey clarified with supporting documentation to show that the export was made to the Republic of Korea. South Africa informed the Panel that “the letter has been forwarded to Pretoria for action.”
  2. The Panel sent a letter to the Republic of Korea regarding August media reports of a transfer of petroleum products to Kaesong for a planned inter-Korean liaison office. The ROK replied, “in the process of carrying out the [inter-Korean] projects, the ROK personnel used the petroleum products exclusively for the implementation of the projects, while ensuring that no transfer of economic values to the DPRK occurs.” The ROK explained that “among 338,737 kg of petroleum products used for the implementation of the joint projects from January 2018 to November 2018, 4,039 kg were unused and brought back to the ROK.” The Panel notes that the specific language of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring Member States to notify the Committee of any transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products is by territory as opposed to possession and does not differentiate between temporary and permanent transfers, or under whose control the items will be after transfer.
  3. According to Global Trade Atlas data, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea imported $20,946,917 of refined petroleum products during the last three months of 2017. Starting from 2018, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), all Member States are prohibited from supplying, selling or transferring refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea over 500,000 barrels in total. Since January 2018, China and the Russian Federation have notified to the Committee on their supply, sale or transfer of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although in paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) the cap was set using barrels as the unit of measurement, the unit to be used by Member States in their required notifications was not stipulated. The figures in table 14 from China after April are based solely on Member State reporting to the Committee.

Table 14
Data from Member States’ notifications to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 2397 (2017)
(Tons)

Month in 2018 China Russian Federation Total

January 201.380 368.240 569.620
February 1 392.350 1 882.562 3 274.912
March 2 438.990 1 897.579 4 336.569
April 437.460 4 293.472 4 730.932
May 1 451.410 1 286.138 2 737.548
June 1 507.900 1 570.444 3 078.344
July 903.870 576.126 1 479.996
August 2 725.810 1 369.497 4 095.307
September 1 814.600 1 859.283 3 673.883
October 1 886.890 3 777.731 5 664.621
November 2 928.870 3 377.243 6 306.113
December 1 510.870 – 1 510.870
Total 19 200.400 22 258.315 41 458.715

Source: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum,

Crude oil

  1. In Paragraph 4 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council decided that all Member States should prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of crude oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exceeding 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons, unless the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis for a 12-month period after the date of adoption of the resolution, 22 December 2017. Pursuant to the reporting clause contained therein, the Russian Federation reported that there were no declarations or exports of crude oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from January to June 2018, and China reported that the amount of the supply of crude oil by China to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was 150,500 tons from December 2017 to February 2018; 147,900 tons from March to May 2018; 108,500 tons from June to August 2018; and 118,100 tons from September to November 2018. Recommendation
  2. The Panel recommends that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for all refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in the resolutions.  
    Annex 22 : Angola’s reply to the Panel

Source: Member State

Annex 23 : The Panel’s letter to Iran

Excellency,

I have the honour to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

According to a Member State, the DPRK has its most lucrative arms-related trade with the Syrian Arab Republic and Iran. The Member State has informed the Panel that two United Nations designated entities, the Korea Mining Development Technology Corporation and Saeng Pi’l (aka Green Pine Associated Corporation) maintain offices in Iran and that these offices are active.

In addition, the Member State informed the Panel that one pattern recently observed is of DPRK nationals on flights between Tehran and Dubai whereby these individuals return to Tehran within 24 hours. The assessment is that these individuals are cash couriers.

In this regard, the Panel recalls the evidence and information derived from airline companies, various Member States and the United Nations Security Council regarding KOMID officials Mr. Kim Yong Chol (passport number 472310168) and Mr. Jang Jong Son (passport number 563110024) (see Annex 1) resident in Iran and accredited as diplomats at the DPRK embassy in Tehran until their removal in 2016, and their frequent visits to Dubai as well as various locations in Pakistan. The Panel’s letter to Iran dated
25 November 2015 (S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.791) noted that these two individuals flew Tehran-Dubai more than 282 times between 21 October 2012 and 5 October 2015, a pattern that continued into 2016.

The Panel also notes as indications of previous cooperation between Iran and the designated entities KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation the visits by KOMID President Kang Myong Chol (see Annex 1 for passport) to Iran from Dubai from 16 to 25 December 2013 and Green Pine Association Corporation President Ri Hak Chol between 6 and 10 October 2014.

As a number of the individuals listed above and featured in Annex 1 together with other KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation representatives are known to have acquired new passports and/or false identities, the Panel:

• Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 31 October 2017
(ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918) (see Annex 2) requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;

• Kindly reiterates its request contained in its letter of 12 October 2017
(ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678) (see Annex 3) requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel;

• In light of the lack of a substantive response from Iran on the above matters for more than 12 months and in light of the recent information provided by a Member State, the Panel is now requesting copies of the relevant passport pages of all DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran;

• A full list of all other DPRK nationals residing in, or working in Iran, together with copies of their passports, and

• A full list of DPRK entities and companies operating in Iran, their contracts with Iranian military and/or civilian institutions and entities, para-statal companies and private institutions.

As the Panel intends to report on this case in its next report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter. The Panel may name your country in our reporting and would therefore appreciate a reply from your country in order to consider reflecting your views in our next report.

Should you wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [email protected]; telephone: +1 212-963-7206) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [email protected]; telephone: +1 917 367 3627).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Copies of multiple DPRK diplomatic passports previously used by KOMID and Green Pine Associated Corporation officials while accredited in Iran, travelling to Iran or travelling between Tehran and Dubai
Annex 2: Panel letter of 31 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.918), requesting names and passport numbers of DPRK diplomats accredited in Iran
Annex 3: Panel letter of 12 October 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.678), requesting immigration and visa checks and information on 78 DPRK nationals and others under investigation by the Panel.

Jang Yong Son: UN designated KOMID representative formerly accredited to DPRK Embassy in Tehran

Kang Myong Chol: KOMID President who visited Iran


Ri Hak Chol, Green Pine Associated Corporation President who visited Iran between 6-10 October 2014

Annex 24 : Iran’s reply to the Panel


Annex 25 : Guicopres correspondence

Source: The Panel 
Annex 26 : The Panel’s letter to Sudan

Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is requesting additional information and documentation from Sudan based on the information supplied by Sudan in its 26 November 2018 letter to the 1718 Committee (see Annex 1) and in its National Implementation Report to the Committee dated 27 June 2018 and published on 14 August 2018 (see Annex 2).

In your 26 November 2018 letter to the Committee you state that:

“The Military Industry Cooperation (sic) has never dealt with a company named “KOMID” and has been dealing with a company named “Future Electronic Company (FEC). All deals with the latter were signed and paid in Sudan. The Military Industry Cooperation (MIC) has never received any shipment from North Korea. All shipments were from other countries” (see Annex 1).

In your annex to your 27 June 2018 letter (National Implementation Report) you state:

“Further to inspection and verification, the Government of the Sudan has cancelled the contract between the Future Electronic Company and Sudan Master Technology and brought an end to the companies’ cooperation as of 15 July 2017.”

His Excellency
Mr. Omer Dahab Fadl Mohamed
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Sudan
to the United Nations
New York

In this regard, the Panel kindly requests the following documentation:

1) A copy of the contract(s) between the “Future Electronic Company” and “Sudan Master Technology” aka Sudan Master Technology Engineering Corporation;

2) A copy of the contract(s) between the “Future Electronic Company (FEC)” and the “Military Industrial Cooperation MIC Sudan” aka Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) of Sudan ;

3) A copy of the order(s)/decrees/correspondence nullifying the contract(s) with the above-mentioned Sudanese and DPRK entities;

4) A list of the staff of the” Future Electronic Company” that includes their names, all known aliases, passport numbers (all passport numbers used by each individual) and copies of their passports (all passports used by each individual together with departure evidence of these persons showing expulsion and final departure from the territory of Sudan ;

5) Details of the bank account(s) of Future Electronic Company in Sudan together with a list of transfers to and from that bank account for the period 2013 – 2018, including data on foreign account numbers to which funds were transferred;

6) All documentation associated with UN designated DPRK entities, or other entities that may have operated as front companies on their behalf, including: Korea Mining Trading Development Corporation (KOMID), Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB), Future Electronic Company, Chongryong Technology Trading Corporation and Chosun Keumcheong Technology General Trade Corporation that have been the subject of Panel requests to Sudan from December 2015 until November 2018 (see Annex 3);

7) Your 26 November 2018 letter states that regarding Future Electronic Corporation “Sudan never received shipments from North Korea. All shipments came from other countries.” The Panel notes that DPRK arms brokering activities, whether the arms originate from the DPRK or not, is prohibited under resolutions 1874 (2009) and clarified further in paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2270 (2016). The Panel kindly requests copies of all documentation for shipments of arms-related goods prohibited by the resolutions that were brokered or transferred to Sudan as part of contracts with Future Electronic Company (FEC) and any other DPRK-related entity irrespective of whether such goods originated from the DPRK or “other countries”.

Please note that the Panel is investigating all of the above in an effort to better identify the overseas DPRK-related networks that continue to violate the Security Council resolutions with regard to the DPRK in African and Middle Eastern Member States;

Thank you for clarifying the situation with regard to Mr. Hussein Al-Ali’s attempt to offer his services to Military Industry Corporation (MIC). His failed attempt is noted and your information on this individual will be reflected in our next report.

Regarding questions 1-7, as the Panel intends to report on these matters in its next final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: [email protected]; +1 212-963-7206).) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email: [email protected]; telephone: +1 917 367 3627).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018
Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report
Annex 3: Letters from the Panel to Sudan of

  • 13 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.140)
  • 2 January 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.01)
  • 17 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.324)
  • 11 November 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.950)
  • 29 September 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.852) and
  • 4 December 2015 (ref. S/AC.49/2015/PE/OC.815)

    Annex 1: Letter from Sudan to the 1718 Committee of 26 November 2018  
    Annex 2: Extract from Sudan National Implementation Report  
    Annex 27 : Sudan’s reply to the Panel  
    Translated from Arabic
    [Pages 1 and 2]
    Republic of the Sudan
    Permanent Mission to the United Nations
    New York
    Ref.: sin sin nun/56/21/1
    2 January 2019
    The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1817 (2006) concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and refers to its note S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.305 of 28 November 2018, by which the Committee requested information regarding the interactions of the Sudanese Military Industry Corporation (MIC) with the Future Electronic Company (FEC). The Permanent Mission of the Sudan wishes to provide the following information:
  1. A single framework agreement was signed between the companies SMT and FEC. Two executive contracts were then signed to provide parts for the project to develop 122mm [weapons] and aerial bombs. The contract and its effects were terminated on 15 June 2017. A copy of the contract is enclosed. There are no contracts between MIC and FEC.
  2. The Government of the Sudan wishes to state that all activities involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been suspended pursuant to an order issued by the President of the Republic of the Sudan on 31 May 2017 (see enclosure). In early June 2017 (see enclosure), MIC and the engineering company SMT issued administrative orders freezing all activities with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and cancelled all contracts concluded with that country. A letter giving a warning and notice of expulsion was sent to Mr. Kim Chol (see enclosure).
  3. On 29 May 2017, a national committee comprising the competent agencies in the Sudan was established with a view to following up implementation of the Sudanese Government’s obligations under the Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
  4. Mr. Kim Song Chol visited the Sudan for the first time in 2013 to follow up implementation of the contracts regarding the development of 122mm [weapons]. He then visited a second time to oversee some groups that were working to install Russian P12 and P15 radars. He visited the Sudan a third time in 2016 under a different name and a new passport in order to request certain financial dues. He left in May 2017 and has not entered the Sudan since; his name has been placed on a no-entry list.
  5. There have been no banking transactions, and no transfers have been processed, through bank accounts within or outside the Sudan. The financial transactions involving FEC consisted of direct payments made locally.
  6. SMT did not receive any shipments from ports in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The shipments received through regular clearance procedures consisted of components and production parts, not of complete products.
    The Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations takes this opportunity to convey to the Committee the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

    [Pages 8 and 9]
    Republic of the Sudan
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    The Under-Secretary
    Ref./waw-kha’/ta’-dal/public
    29 May 2018
    Order establishing a committee on implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
    Given that Security Council resolutions are binding on States Members of the United Nations, and in view of the Sudan’s position against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, a committee is hereby established with a view to following up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the Security Council resolutions concerning the sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Its composition shall be as follows:
  7. H.E. Umar Siddiq, Director-General for International Cooperation and International Affairs – chair.
  8. H.E. Muhammad Isa Idam, Director-General for American and European Affairs – member.
  9. H.E. Anas al-Tayyib, Director of the Department of International Law and Treaties – member.
  10. H.E. Siddiq Muhammad Abdullah, Director of the Department of American Affairs – member.
  11. H.E. Kamal Bashir, Director of the Department for International Organizations – member and rapporteur.
  12. The representative of the Ministry of Defence – member.
  13. The representative of the Ministry of Finance – member.
  14. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior – member.
  15. The representative of the Ministry of Commerce – member.
  16. The representative of the Ministry of Higher Education – member.
  17. The representative of the Ministry of Transport – member.
  18. The representative of the National Intelligence and Security Service– member.
  19. The representative of the Central Bank of the Sudan– member.
  20. The representative of the defence industry network – member.

(a) The committee shall follow up implementation of the obligations of the Sudan under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
(b) The committee shall prepare a national annual report for submission to the Security Council.
(c) The committee shall have the right to consult whomever it deems appropriate.
(d) The committee shall submit periodic reports to the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This order was issued and signed by me today, on 29 May A.D. 2018 (13 Ramadan A.H. 1439).

(Signed) Abdulghani al-Na‘im Awad al-Karim
Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Annex 28 : Panel’s vessel inspection: ship identity laundering to deceive the IMO

  1. The Panel investigated a case of ship identity laundering whereby a flag of convenience vessel previously identified by the Panel as having transported prohibited coal shipments removed all identifiers, was provided with new documentation and ships’ books for classification and inspection purposes and then applied for and obtained a new, legal vessel number from the International Maritime Organization. The ship in question is the Togo-flagged Talent Ace (IMO number: 8793873) which was previously the Xin Sheng Hai (IMO number: 9485617). It entered the port of Gunsan on 18 January 2018 and was subsequently detained by the Republic of Korea pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017).
  2. Inspection of the vessel revealed that a new IMO number had been inserted into the vessel’s super-structure (figure I) and a complete set of ship documents had been provided to allow the vessel to appear as a first-time applicant to legally obtain the number. The Talent Ace’s engine and generator serial numbers still matched those of the Xin Sheng Hai’s (figure II).

Figure I: New legal IMO number

Source: The Panel

Figure II: Engine serial number

Source: The Panel

  1. Inspection of the ship’s bow revealed that the name “Talent Ace” was painted over its former identity (figure III). When informed of the fraud, the International Maritime Organization cancelled the IMO number and merged the false identity with that of the Xin Sheng Hai.  
    Figure III: “Talent Ace” blacked out and painted over former names

Source: The Panel

  1. The Talent Ace’s operator Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping appears to be acting on behalf of the operator of the Xin Sheng Hai , Liberty Shipping. The Panel has identified Liberty Shipping as the operator of other designated vessels as well as DPRK-flagged ships, and was itself designated by the United States on 23 February 2018. The Panel found that the IMO registration address for the vessel’s owner, Wynn East Import & Export Trading Pte. Ltd., is the same as that of Wooheng (Hongkong) Shipping. The Panel is continuing its investigation.

Figure IV: Document recovered aboard the Talent Ace showing Wooheng using email address of Liberty Shipping, the operator of the Xin Shen Hai

Annex 29 : The Panel’s letter to the Syrian Arab Republic
Excellency,

I have the honor to write to you with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyze information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel is following up on its letter of 28 June 2018 (ref. S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172) (see Annex) to which it has received no reply to date. In addition, the Panel has received information from a Member State that:

• The DPRK is continuing prohibited cooperation with the Scientific Studies Research Centre (SSRC) and the Army Supply Bureau (ASB);

• The DPRK national who replaced Ryu Jin as KOMID representative in the Syrian Arab Republic is known as “Kim”. Mr. “Kim” has as his deputy a Mr. Rim Yong Hyok and both these individuals work together with Pak Kwang Il.

In addition, the Panel wishes to follow up on its letters of 1 September 2017
(ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016
(ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.117) as well as your response letter of 17 August 2017 (see Annex).

His Excellency
Mr. Bashar Ja’afari
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations
New York
The Panel wishes to reiterate its request for a full list of the activities undertaken by these individuals and all other DPRK nationals in the Syrian Arab Republic, their contracts with Syrian companies and institutions, together with copies of their passports, and other relevant information as requested in our previous communications.

The Panel would welcome any other information that you might consider relevant to its work as mandated by the Security Council. In addition, the Panel would like to assure you that any information you may consider confidential can be handled accordingly and used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

As the Panel intends to report on this matter in its next Final report to the Security Council, we would be most grateful for any information to be supplied within one month of the date of this letter.

Should you or your designated representative wish to discuss this request or any follow-up matters, please contact the Panel via Mr. Hugh Griffiths (email: XXXXXXX) and Mr. Olaf Andrieu (email:XXXXXXXXXXX).

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hugh Griffiths
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex:
Panel letters of 23 November 2018 (ref: S/AC.49/2018/PE/OC.172), 1 September 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.378), 5 July 2017 (ref. S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.308), 21 October 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.904 and 905), 9 June 2016 (ref. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.185) and 5 May 2016 (S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC/117) and Syrian Arab Republic letter of 17 August 2017

Annex 30 : Copy of the passport of Syrian arms trafficker Hussein Al-Ali


Annex 31 : Reply of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Panel

Annex 32 : Prime Okryu Gallery website

(1) Example of Mansudae Art Studio works advertised on the website (right: Ri Gyong Nam “Winter in thick forest”. left: An Chang Nam “Thick forest”) (top)

Source: https://www.okryugwan.net/artgallery (accessed on 3 May 2018)

(2) Contents showing the affiliation of the gallery (bottom)

Source: https://www.okryugwan.net/?lang=en (accessed on 3 May 2018)


Annex 33 : Information on DPRK cyberattacks provided to the Panel by a Member
State in November 2018 (excerpt)

• Cyberspace is used by the DPRK as an asymmetric means to carry out illicit and undercover operations in the field of cybercrime and sanctions evasion. These operations aim at to acquire funds through a variety of measures in order to circumvent the sanctions.
• • The illicit activities of the DPRK rely on a particular cyber composite ecosystem. Among these well identified illicit activities are online scams and the hacking of the global SWIFT messaging system. The DPRK relies on the expertise of at least four groups of hackers specialized in espionage and sabotage, who carry out, “Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)”.


Annex 34 : Excerpt on DPRK cyberwarfare capabilities from “Military and Security Developments involving the DPRK 2017”, a report to Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense

Source: https://fas.org/irp/world/dprk/dod-2017.pdf

Annex 35 : Republic of Korea National Police Agency News Release: Results of the Joint Investigation Team of the Republic of Korea Police and Government — Hacking of Consumer Information of Interpark determined to have be done by DPRK

[Unofficial translation (excerpt); Original follows]

The National Police Agency (Cyber Security Bureau) and the Government Joint Investigation Team, after an initial investigation on the recent hacking of customer information of InterPark and the blackmail to the company, state their assessment that the hacking was conducted by the DPRK’s Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).

As evidence, the joint team pointed out to three main factors:
1) the IP addressed used for hacking emails and hacking commands (systematically used before by the DPRK RGB)
2) the malware used in the attack (as well as decoding and methods to remove traces of the attack) were similar to those that the DPRK used in past cyber-attacks
3) DPRK- style expressions used in black mail/cyber threat emails

This incident shows that North Korea is going beyond attacking basic infrastructure and is now trying to steal national wealth through the criminal acquisition of foreign currency. Considering the seriousness of the issue, the Government of the ROK is closely monitoring the changes in the cyberattack tactics of the DPRK.

Source:http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1

Source:http://www.korea.kr/policy/pressReleaseView.do;jsessionid=gyhqXhbdjxKTGwcXCNCQ2BVbcCWKJfVBdKGLGhyMR1cQG4kYq9DB!-1655938029?newsId=156144599&pageIndex=1

Annex 36 : Wanted by the FBI, PARK JIN HYOK, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; Conspiracy to Commit Computer-Related Fraud (Computer Intrusion)
Source: https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/park-jin-hyok

Annex 37 : Open source technical analysis of DPRK state-sponsored cyber activity (FireEye, 3 October 2018)


Source: URL: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38


Annex 38 : Depiction of connection between advanced persistent threat (APT) group responsible for cyberattacks on Banco de Chile and Cosmos bank in India to the Reconnaissance General Bureau

Source: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38.

Annex 39 : Open source report on attacks on Crypto Exchanges, January 2017-
September 2018
Source: https://www.group-ib.com/media/gib-crypto-summary/

Annex 40 : Information on the Panel’s investigation of DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia and supporting documentation

  1. The Panel investigated a DPRK diplomat formerly posted to Malaysia, Kim Jong Chol (aka Ri Jong Chol), who operated on behalf of the Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, which according to documents obtained by the Panel is associated with Korea Kumgang Bank.
  2. The Panel obtained documentation showing that purchases made by PongHwa were being transferred to an account at Kumgang Bank in the name of the Korea General Insurance Company, an alias for the designated Korea National Insurance Company; and that payment for a shipment in 2016 was to be sent by Korea Ponghwa to the North East Asia Bank. The bills of lading for 14 shipments to Korea PongHwa General Trading Company in 2016 and 2017 indicated the shipper as Complant International Transport (Dalian) Co., Ltd, a company mentioned in previous Panel reports as the transhipper for attempted sales of luxury goods (i.e. S-class Mercedes automobiles) (see below). The company’s affiliation to Complant/Comtrans also links it to Hong Kong Complant International Trans, which previously owned the DPRK vessel, the Kum Sung.
  3. The Malaysian company with which Kim Jong Chol conducted some of his business on behalf of Korea PongHwa General Trading Company, provided the Panel with information showing that he operated under the alias Ri Jong Chol and was Deputy Director for another company, “Sinkwang Economic and Trading Group” (see below). That a DPRK individual accredited as a diplomat at the DPRK Embassy in Kuala Lumpur was doing business on behalf of at least two DPRK entities, one of which was affiliated with a DPRK financial institution, reflects patterns previously reported by the Panel. Kim/Ri’s daughter, Ri Yugyong, often served as Ri’s translator and another DPRK individual, Yu Song Chol (aka “Mr. Brighton”), started to make payments to the company by check on behalf of Korea Ponghwa in late 2016. The Panel notes that this practice helped to obscure in bank transaction records starting in late 2016 the origin of the funds, which had previously been transferred into the account by front companies in Hong Kong and China mainland through large, well-known banks.

    Business cards of Ri Jong Chol (aka Kim Jong Chol) and Yu Song Chol

Source: The Panel

Invitation letter by Malaysian Company to the President of Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp C-8 Company

Source: The Panel
Bills of Lading for shipments from Malaysia to Korea Ponghwa General Trading Corp via Complant International Transportation (Dalian) Co. Ltd

Source: The Panel

Source: The Panel

Source: The Panel  
Annex 41 : DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names Title and activities ** Location ** Passport number / expiry
UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U)
장범수 Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases
Syria 22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020
UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative in Syria” on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho’n Myo’ng-kuk,
Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상) Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.
Syria 25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020

Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo’M Hu’I-Pong) 렴희봉 Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行) Dubai, UAE 18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020)
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol)
리선철 (리성철) Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank

Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK Dubai, UAE 28 March 1964 PP No.:836132137

Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol)
곽정철 Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank
Dubai, UAE 1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533
Ro Il Gwang
노일광 Korea Kumgang Group Bank UAE 26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo’ng-il
김경일 Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque International Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China. Libya 1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029

Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy chief representative in Libya” on 22 December (KPi.067)
Choe, Un Hyok
최은혁
Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un’So’ng. Choe Un Hyok’s KUDB business card with his title of “Representative of KUDB, Moscow Russia” with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel’s 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251.
Russia replied in a letter of 25 January 2018 ,“We will inform you accordingly in case we receive additional information on the whereabouts of Choe Un Hyok.” The Panel has not received any additional information in reply to its two follow-up letters. . Moscow, Russia 19 October 1985
PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)

Chu Hyo’k (Aka Ju Hyok)
주혁 Foreign Trade Bank Representative

Russia replied Chu Hyo’k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below) 23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.065)
Ri U’n-so’ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song)
리은성 Korea Unification Development Bank representative
Russia replied that Ri U’n-so’ng is not currently residing in Russia. 23 July 1969
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.078)
Han Jang Su
(aka Chang-Su Han)
한장수 Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank
The Russian Federation replied, Mr. Han Jang Su is the Third Secretary of the Commercial Counsellor’s Section of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation and has been officially accredited by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He entered the Russian Federation on 23 June 2017 and is staying in the country legally. No information is available concerning activities that are inconsistent with his official status. Russian Federation 8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020
Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as “Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank”
Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo’ng)
구자형 Foreign Trade Bank Representative Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017) 8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 – used in July 2016)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB chief representative in Libya” on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)
Ch’oe So’k-min
최석민 Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch’oe So’k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas.
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Shenyang China 25 July 1978

Res 2397(2017) designated him as “overseas FTB Representative” on 22 December (KPi.064)
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch’o’l) 김동철 Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Shenyang, China 28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch’o’l-man) 고철만 Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Shenyang, China 30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo’ng-hwan)
문경환 Bank of East Land Representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Dandong, China 22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Bank of East Land representative” on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo’n-uk)
배원욱
Korea Daesong Bank Representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Beijing, China 22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Daesong Bank representative” on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka
Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam)
박봉남 Ilsim International Bank representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Shenyang, China 06 May 1969
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas Ilsim International Bank representative” on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il
박문일 Korea Daesong Bank Representative

China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Yanji, China DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018)

Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas official of Korea Daesong Bank” on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)
Ri Chun Hwan (Aka
Ri Ch’un-hwan) 리춘환 Foreign Trade Bank Representative
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Zhuhai, China 21 August 1957’ PP No: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018)
Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.074)
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch’un-so’ng)
리춘성 Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of “Secretary’s Delegate of the DPRK’s Mission to Tripoli” (closed on 22 August 2013.
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Beijing, China 30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (expires 11 March 2019)

Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas FTB representative” on 22 December (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He)
리성혁 Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Beijing, China 19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (expires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank” on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam)
방수남 Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Zhuhai, China 1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch’a Su’ng-chun)
차승준 Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company.
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Beijing, China 4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo’ng-hyo’k)
김경혁 Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Shanghai, China 5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)
Pak Ch’O’l-Nam
박철남

Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name “Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)”in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China”

China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Beijing, China 16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)

Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch’o’l-So’ng) 조철성
Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC)
Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as “Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)” and “Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)”, both registered in Hong Kong.
China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.” Dandong, China 25 September 1984
PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019)

Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.058)

Ho Young Il (Aka Ho’ Yo’ng-il)
허영일 Hana Bank Representative
In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB.
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Dandong China DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968

Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch’o’l)
김문철 Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including “Chongryu Technical Company” or “Kyong Un Trading Company”
China replied “that as a designated individual he has been blocked from entry and Chinese banks requested the freeze of his assets.
Dandong, China DOB 25 March 1957

Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Korea United Development Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.060)

Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch’oe Ch’un-yo’ng)
최천영 Ilsim International Bank Representative PP no: 654410078
Res 2371(2017) designated him as “Representative for Ilsim International Bank” on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi)
고태훈 (or 고대훈)
(aka 김명기) Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative

Transited 

China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan 25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018)
UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min
강민 Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts.
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Beijing, China 07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho
김상호
Representative, Korea Daesong Bank
As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China.
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Yanji, China 16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)

Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho’ng Man)
김정만 Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong.
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Zhuhai, China 16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo’k-Cho’l,
Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철 Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank

China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Zhuhai, China 9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam)
리호남 Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present)
China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.” Beijing, China DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019
Ms. Kim Su Gyong
김수경 Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187. Europe, also transited UAE and the Russian Federation DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374

Mun Cho’ng-Ch’o’l
문정철
Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB. Res 2094 (2013) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official” on 7 March (KPi.012)

Choe Song Nam
CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH’OE, So’ng-nam)
최성남
Representative of Daesong Bank DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018
Kim Chol
KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch’o’l)
김철 Representative of Korea United Development Bank

    DOB 27 Sep 1964

Paek Jong Sam
PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong-sam)
백종삼
Representative of Kumgang Bank DOB 17 Jan 1964; nationality Korea, North
Ko Il Hwan
KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan)
고일환
Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang. DOB 28 August 1967
Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022

Ri Myong Hun
RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo’ng-hun)
리명훈 Representative of Foreign Trade Bank DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport 381420089 expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung
김남웅

Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.  Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.        Passport no.: 654110043

Res 2371(2017) desigmated him as Representative for Ilsim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho’ng-Wo’n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)
The Russian Federation replied, Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018. DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents


Annex 42 : Information on DPRK financial institutions with overseas representatives

Names, alias, Korean and Chinese spelling HQ address / phone / fax/ SWIFT Security Council designations and information provided to Panel by Member States and United Nations resolutions
Bank of East Land
동방은행
aka: Haedong Bank (해동은행), Dongbang Bank, Tongbang U’Nhaeng, Tongbang Bank,
朝鲜)东方银行
BEL Building, Jonsung-Dong, Pyongyang
Tel: +850 2 18111
Fax: +850 2 3814410 Res 2087 (2013) on 22 January 2013 (KPe.013)
Info in UN Panel reports: S/2017/150; pp 76-77 and S/2017/742, para 61.
Facilitates weapons-related transactions for, and other support to, arms manufacturer and exporter Green Pine Associated Corporation. Has actively worked with Green Pine to transfer funds in a manner that circumvents sanctions.
Credit Bank of Korea
조선신용은행
aka Korea Credit Bank, International Credit Bank, 朝鲜信用银行

Munsu Street, Central District, Pyongyang

+850 2 3818285
+850 2 3817806

Daedong Credit Bank [JV]
대동신용은행
大同信用银行
Aka Taedong Credit Bank, Dae-Dong Credit Bank, DCB Finance Ltd, Perigrine-Daesong Development Bank
Suite 401, Potonggang Hotel, Ansan-Dong,
Pyongchon District, Pyongyang,
(b) Ansan-dong, Botonggang Hotel,
Pongchon, Pyongyang,
+850 2 3814866
SWIFT: DCBK KPPY Res 2270 (2016) on 2 March 2016 (KPe.023)
Representative offices and front companies in China according to Panel: S/2017/150, paras 225-230 and S/2017/742, paras 51-56.
Clients include: T Specialist International (Singapore) Ltd, OCN (Singapore) International Distribution Ptd Ltd; Pan Systems; Dalian Daxin Electron Co Ltd, Hongdae International, Yueda International Trading Co, Hing Heng, Korea Sinheung Trading Co, Hana Electronics.
Joint venture with Korea Daesong Bank; majority stake acquired by a Chinese company. See current report, paragraphs XX.
Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV]
대성신용개발은행
Koryo Credit Development Bank (고려글로벌신용은행), Koryo Global Trust Bank, Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Korea Credit Investment Company (조선신용투자회사) Daesong Credit Development Bank [Joint Venture]
+850 2 381 4100
+850 2 341 4013

First Eastern Bank Rason, DPRK Affiliated with Cetnral Bank and Unaforte (Italy, Hong Kong). See Panel report S/2017/150 para 221.
Foreign Trade Bank (FTB)
조선무역은행
朝鲜贸易银行
aka: Mooyokbank, Korea Trade Bank, Mooyokbank FTB Building, Jungsong dong, Central District, Pyongyang
Tel: +850 2 18111
Fax: +850 2 3814467
SWIFT/BIC FTBD KP PY Res 2371 (2017) on 5 Aug 2017 (KPe.047)
State-owned bank which acts as the DPRK’s primary foreign exchange bank and has provided key financial support to the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation.
See para X on registered office abroad.
International Consortium Bank (ICB)
국제합영은행
Hi-Fund Bank International Consortium Bank (ICB), Sungri Hi-Fund International Bank, Sungri Economic Group Sungri Exhibition Hall, Pyongyang
Panel reporting:
Koryo Bank
고려은행
高丽银行 Koryo Bank Building, Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Res 2356 (2017) on 2 June 2017 (KPe.045)
Associated with Office 38 and Office 39 of the KWP. Operated by Korea Myohyang Economic Group; joint venture partner in Koryo-Global Bank.
Koryo Credit Development Bank / Daesong Credit Development Bank [JV] (Aka. Koryo-Global Credit Bank, Koryo Global Trust Bank) 고려신용개발은행 대성신용개발은행 (aka고려글로벌신용은행) Yanggakdo International Hotel, Pyongyang
Tel: +850 2 381 4100
Fax: +850 2 341 4013 Res 2371 (2017) on 5 August 2017 (KPe.049)

Joint venture with Koryo Bank

Korea Daesong Bank
대성은행 / 조선 대성은행
大成银行
aka: Choson Taesong Unhaeng, Daesong Bank, Taesong Bank
According to a Member State, in 2018 the bank has used the following false names when processing transactions for ship-to-ship transfers: 조선녹색산업무역 (Chosun Noksaek Sanop Muyok, Korea Green Industry Trading Company/Corporation朝鲜绿色产业贸易 ) and 조선신용투자회사(Chosun Sinyong Tuja Hoesa, Korea Credit Investment Company/Corporation 朝鲜信用投资公司 or 朝鲜信用投资会社). Segori-dong, Gyongheung Street, Pyongyang
Tel +850 2 818221
Fax +850 2 814576
SWIFT/BIC:
KDBKKPPY Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.035)

Owned and controlled by Office 39 of the Korea Workers’ Party

According to a Member State, Ko Il Hwan engaged in transactions on behaof of Korea Daesong Bank from Shenyang for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018.

Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation
조선광선은행
朝鲜光鲜银行, Korea Kwangson Finance Company, 朝鲜 蔡鲜金金朝朝, Korea Kwangson Finance Company
Jungsong-dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang Res 2370 (2016) on 2 March 2016
Provides financial services in support to Tanchon Commercial Bank and Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation, a subordinate of the Korea Ryonbong General Corporation. Tanchon has used KKBC to facilitate funds transfers likely amounting to millions of dollars, including transfers involving KOMID-related funds. For more info see PoE report S/2017/150, p. 63.
Korea National Insurance Corporation
조선민족보험총회사
Korea Foreign Insurance Company, 朝鲜民族保险总会社
KNIC Building, Central District Pyongyang
+850 2 18111/222 Ext:3418024
+850 2 3814410
See current report paras XX.
Korea Joint Venture Bank
조선합영은행
Korea Joint Bank, Korea Joint Operation Bank, Chosun Joint Operation Bank, Habyong Bank, 朝鲜合营银行

KJB Building, Ryugyong 1 dong, Pothonggang District, Pyongyang

+850 2 381-8151, 850-2-18111-381-8151
+850 2 381-4410

Ryugyong Commerical Bank (RCB)
류경상업은행/류상은행
Ryusang Bank, 柳京商业银行, 柳商银行 Changgwang Hotel, 5th Floor; Beijing, China; Dandong, China Two ATMs at Pyongyang Airport and one in the lobby of Changgwang Inn.
Ryugyong Commercial Bank ATM lists an address in the Changgwang Foreign House, Suite #05-24
Joint Venture with OCN Pyongyang Office and Koryo Commerical Bank
Korea Unification (United) Development Bank
(조선) 통일발전은행
(朝鲜)统一发展银行
aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T’ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank KUDB Building, Pyongyang

SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November 2016 (KPe.033)
USA on 16 March 2016

See Panel of Experts report (S/2017/150, p 62)

Hana Banking Corporation
하나은행
aka Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank, ISB Building, Pyongyang; Haebangsan Hotel, Jungsong-Dong, Sungri Street, Central District, Pyongyang, Dandong, China
SWIFT/BIC BRBKKPPIXXX Partial Ownership by Central Bank. Overseas several Bank Card product lines for domestic use
Ilsim International Bank
일심국제은행
日心国际银行
aka. Korea Kumsong Bank, Kumsong Bank, Single-Minded International Bank, 日心国际银行 ISB Building, Pyongyang
Pyongyang, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
SWIFT: ILSIKPPY Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.034)
Affiliated with the DPRK military and has close relationship with Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) and has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.
First Credit Bank. (JV) or Cheil Credit Bank
제일신용은행
第一信用银行
aka: First Trust Bank Corporation, Jeil Credit Bank, Kyongyong Credit Bank a) 3-18 Pyongyang Information Center, Potonggang District (as of 2016). b) i Rakrang District, Jongbaek 1-dong Tel: +850 2 433-1575 (02-433-1575)
SWIFT: KYCBKPPYXXX Rakrang Tel: 961-3331, 961-0003 Belongs to Workers Party of Korea. It was established in 2008 as JV venture with Singapore’s Miracle Commerce Pte. Ltd., and its CEO William Toh (aka Toh Hwee Howe) who has been involved in trade with the DPRK using his other two companies, I-Tech Intelligence Resources and Sinsar Trading Ltd.
Koryo Commercial Bank
고려상업은행
高丽商业银行
aka Korea Commercial Bank KCB Building, Taedonggang District, Pyongyang; ; Beijing, China; Shenyang, China; SWIFT/BIC KCBKKPP1 Joint Venture with OCN and Ryugyong Commerical Bank

Tanchon Commercial Bank
단천상업은행
端川商业银行
AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행) Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003)

Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.
Korea United Development Bank (KUDB)
조선통일발전은행
(朝鲜)统一发展银行
aka: Myohyangsan Bank, Unification Development Bank, T’ongil Palchon Bank, Korea Tongil Paljon Bank, Korea Reunification Development Bank KUDB Building, Pyongyang

SWIFT/BIC: KUDBKPPY
Res 2321 (2016) on 30 November (KPe.033)

Information in UN POE report: S/2017/742, p. 22
Kumgang Group Bank / Kumgang Bank (KKG)
Korea Kumgang Bank
(조선) 금강은행
金刚银行 aka: Kumgang Export and Import Bank Kumgang Bank Building, Central District, Pyongyang (The North East Asia Bank building in Pyongyang became the KKG Bank building) Associated with Korea Ponghwa General Corporation (under External Economic Committee of the Cabinet) and Korea Pyongyang Trading Company

Kumgyo International Commercial Bank
금교국제상업은행

    Affiliated with Korean Chongsong Mining Company and Changgwang Shop. See Panel report S/2017/150 para 220.

Tanchon Commercial Bank
단천상업은행
端川商业银行
AKA: Changgwang Credit Bank, (창광신용은행) Korea Changgwang Credit Bank (조선창광신용은행); Yongaksan Bank (용악산은행), Lyongaksan Bank (룡악산은행) Saemul 1-Dong Pyongchon District, Pyongyang Designated by UN on 24 Apr. 2009 (KPe.003)

Main DPRK financial entity for sales of conventional arms, ballistic missiles, and goods related to the assembly and manufacture of such weapons. Under Second Economic Committee; financial arm of KOMID.

Source: The Panel, Member States, UN documents

Annex 43 : Payment process used in ship-to-ship transfers in 2018

First, foreign national brokers outside the DPRK arranged imports to be facilitated by ship-to-ship transfer. Once the deal was agreed, the DPRK end recipients of the imported products transferrred funds internally to a DPRK bank with representatives operating overseas. The bank then instructed one of its overseas representatives to use foreign bank accounts it controls (often attached to front companies), to pay relevant suppliers for the product and shipping costs. The balance between the DPRK bank and the foreign accounts debited was then rectified virtually by ledger. When the actual balance of the accounts at the DPRK bank and those of its overseas representatives diverges too substantially as a result of the regular use of the ledger system, cash couriers address the imbalance by carrying bulk cash across the DPRK border. The Panel notes that this method for processing payments is almost identical to the ledger system used by Glocom for its financial transactions (S/2017/150, para. 225) as well as other DPRK front companies.

Source: Member State
Annex 44 : Official registration documents for DPRK Foreign Trade Bank Official Representative Office in Moscow

Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/# (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).

Source: Russian Federation Federal Tax Service State Registry of Accredited Branches, Representative Offices of Foreign Legal Entities (RAFP), extracted from https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/# (The webportal can be searched by name, INN, or even just the Russian word for DPRK – КНДР and then scrolling to the FTB entry).

Summary of relevant information in English:
Name of Russian Branch in English and Russian; Tax ID No. (INN) Name of Branch English & Russian; Short Name(s) of Foreign Branch Location Address (English) Full Names of Associated Individuals; Date Accredited KPP #; NZA #; and Tax Organ ID Date of Initial Registration Document ID; Date of Document # Foreign Citizens Working
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE OF THE BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK

ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО БАНКА ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР
Tax ID: 9909086019 BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE DPRK

БАНК ВНЕШНЕЙ ТОРГОВЛИ КНДР Apartment 37, Building 2
31 Entuziastov Highway, Moscow, 111123 Han Zan Su
ХАН ЗАН СУ

2015-03-31
KPP: 774751001

NZA: 20150032826

Tax Organ ID: 7747 2008-06-26 Doc. ID: 90716

Date: 2018-10-17 2

Annex 45 : Biodata, passport and travel of Han Hun Il (Edward Han)

Name: Han Hun Il
DOB: 2 April 1957
Passport # 836134879
Expiry: 9 March 2021
A.k.a.: Edward Han
Family members Wife: Kim Mi-Kyong (김미경)
• DOB: 1959 2.15
Son: Han Kumryong (한금룡, a.k.a. “Han Song” (한 성), aka: “Harvard Han”
• DOB: 18 September 1984
• Worked at MKP Myanmar branch until 2013
Affiliations: • Sungri Economic Group (승리경제연합)
• Dispatched to Malaysia in 1995 to serve as Malaysia Representative of Mansudae Overseas Projects (MOP)
• Established a Mansudae branch, M.O.P. (S) Pte Ltd, in Singapore on 20 May 1994 until it was struck off the register on 30 September 2009.
• In 2006 his tenure with MOP expired and he was given the status of “operative “in the Reconnaissance General Bureau. He had previously served as representative of RGB in Africa before 1995.
• On 20 June 2006 he registered Malaysia Korea Partners (MKP) in Malaysia jointly with Yong Kok Yeap with each of them owning half the shares (175,000 Ringgit)
Former Address:

] MKP Capital LLC Berhd
Registered address: 24-B Jalan Landak Off Jalan Pudu KL
Business address: Lot 5, Jalan Satu
Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jaya
43200 Balakong; Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia
Travels Traveled to Zambia at least twice in 2017
Telephone:
Email
Website : Tel : 603 9076 9678; Fax : 603 9075 9678
[email protected]
www.mkpholdings.com.my

Travel Information:
Source: Member States

Annex 46 : Updated information on the Panel’s investigation into MKP activities in Zambia

The Zambian investigation into MKP confirmed that 13 companies incorporated in the country have been linked to MKP Holdings (see section below entitled, Information on MKP companies in Zambia). Information provided by Zambia showed that MKP relies on a semi-devolved corporate model outside of Malaysia; and makes widespread use of foreign facilitators in its corporate structures to create deniability of the control relationship between Han Hun Il and other MKP companies. In particular, an Algerian national, Mohamed Yazid Merzouk, served as a director in most of the MKP Zambia entities, playing a key central management role for the network alongside several Algerian nationals sharing his last name and a small number of Zambian nationals.

Although the Panel was unable to establish the amount being paid to each individual labourer of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, documents provided by Zambia showed that only 15 per cent of the total amount for each project was paid to the labourers for that project as a whole. MKP indicated to the Panel that, for its earlier projects overseas, labourers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were paid 300 dollars a month. Zambia provided the monetary values for a selection of KOGEN/GENCO projects from 2013 to 2015, valued at a total of $25 million. It did not provide a comprehensive list of the company’s activities, nor did it disclose KOGEN/ GENCO contracts post-2015.

Information on MKP companies in Zambia

(For further details and a network chart, see S/2018/171, page. 72. For the most up-to-date registration information, see the end of this Annex)

NHA – MKP ESTATES DEVELOPMENT
Registration number: 120050058683
Incorporated on 29 April 2005.
Registered address: 4668, Annex National Housing Authority
Ownership:

Name Sex Nationality Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk M Algerian Villa No. 3Millenium Village, Longacres, Lusaka
Donovan Webster Zyambo M Zambian Plot 9620, Churdleigh. Lusaka
Saviour Konie M Zambian Stand 7351, Nangwenya Rd, Rhodespark, Lusaka
National Housing Authority

Note: The Panel also notes that NHA-MKP Estate Development Ltd was still active in May 2018, when a court of appeals judge ruled on its lawsuit against the compensation board: http://www.judiciaryzambia.com/2018/05/16/appeal-no-44-2017-nha-mkp-estate-development-ltd-v-workers-compensation-fund-control-board-may-2018-justice-makunguja/ In March 2018, a newspaper article quoted a representative of the National Housing Authority as saying that more developments would be coming from MKP: https://www.dailynation.info/mkp-znbs-offloads-250-housing-units/

KOREA GENERAL COMPANY FOR EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION (KOGEN)
Incorporated 15 June 2012
Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.
Nature of business: construction services.
Directors:

Name Sex Nationality Address
Hang Chan Ho M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka

The management team of the company comprises eleven (ll) DPRK nationals nicluding:

  1. Mr. JIN H YOK RI – is on the Board of Directors of KOCEN. He has 10 years of experience in civil engineering.
  2. KUM JUN TAE holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNIVERSITY. He has more than 13 years’ experience in building industry
  3. KIM I SONG – holds a degree in structural engineering from PYONGYANG UNiVERSITY. He has more than 13 years’ experience in building industry
  4. HONG JONG SON and KIM HAK CHOL — the two hold degrees and diploma in structural design and construction from Pyongyang University
  5. JANG YONG NAM and CHA SUN CHOC — the duo hold degree in construction material engineering from Pyongyang University
  6. KIM SU JON’ RI RYONC HONG IN HO, KIM TAE HWAN they hold degrees in building and civil engineering from Pyongyang University with 1 6 years’ experience in building industry

The above-mentioned directors of Korean General Construction (Z) Ltd registered another company called CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED whose address and directors are the same as those in Korean General Construction (Z) Lid, with the addition of one director, Mr. Sam Maurice. The company, whose registration number is 1201 20102839 was also incorporated on 1 5 th June 2012.

CHAMMAE CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
Incorporated 15 June 2012
Address: Plot no. 6556, Mumana Road, Olympia, Lusaka.
Registration: 1201 20102839
Directors:

Name Sex Nationality Address
Hang Chan Ho M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Kwanga Song M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Ri Chun IL M Korean Plot No. 6556, Mumana road, Olympia, Lusaka
Mr. Sam Maurice M Zambian

MKP TMS HOSPITAL LTD
Incorporated 20 th April 2006
Address: Plot No. 05, Reed Buck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka
Registration: 120060062028
Chief Executive Officer is a Mr. Han Nun.
Directors:
Name Sex Nationality No. of shares Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk M Algerian 2,750 Villa No.3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Merzouk M Algerian Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Han Yong F Korean 1,500 Hse No. MC72, PHI Chainama, Lusaka
Ho Un Ran M Korean 500 Plot No. 5, off Reedbuck road, Kabulonga, Lusaka
Betty Mulongoti F Zambian 250 Plot 325, Independence avenue, Lusaka

MKP MOTORS ZAMB’A LTD
Company incorporated on 22 nd August 2002. Its registered business address is 2nd Floor Indeco House, Cairo Road, Lusaka. Directors of the company are in the following table:
Name Sex Nationality Address
Han Hun IL M Korean Malungushi Village, Kalundu
Siew KIN Wai M Malaysian Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Yong KOK Yeap M Malaysian Malungushi Village, Kalundu, Lusaka
Philip S.C Mumba M Zambian Plot No.377a?12B, Kabulonga, Lusaka

MKP HOLDINGS LTD
Address: Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road. Kaiundu
Registration: 12004005417
Nature of business: construction
Ownership:

Name Sex Nationality Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk M Algerian Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka
Yon IL M Korean Villa No. 3, Millenium village, Longacres, Lusaka

MKP MINING CORPORATION LTD
Incorporated: 16 August 2006
Registration: 1 20060063279
Address: Plot 7393 Chainda Place, South End, Cairo Road, Lusaka
Ownership:

Name Sex Nationality No. of shares Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk M Algerian 125,000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Stephen M Kambani M Zambian 125,000 A2 Handsworth UNZA, Lusaka
Derrick Munsele M Zambian 125,000 Plot No. 2, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe Road, Avondale, Lusaka
Charles Victor Holland M Zambian 125,000 Plot No. 4258 Mbeleshi, Northrise, Ndola Zambia

MKP SECURITY SYSTEMS LTD
Incorporated: 7th November 2006
Registration :1 20060000641 68
Address: Plot No. 7393, Chainda Place, “Jairo Road, Lusaka.
Ownership:
Name Sex Nationality No. of shares Address
Samson Sakala M Zambian 100,000 Godfrey Kangwa road, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka
Timothy Mazembe M Zambian 100,000 Plot 12243, Woodlands, Ext, Chalala, Lusaka
Ngonga Oswald M Goodson Bwalya M Zambian 100.000 Plot 16520/1080, Kamwala, South Lusaka

MKP BUILDERS ZAMBIA LTD
Address: plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka.
Directors:
Name Sex Nationality No. of Shares Address
Yazid Mohamed Merzouk M Algerian 99.750,000 Villa No.3, Millennium Village, Longacres, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Merzouk M Algerian 5,250,000 Plot No. 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka

MKP CAPITAL ZAMBIA LTD
Address is plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road Kaiundu, Lusaka
Incorporated: 4th February 2011.
Business: construction.
Directors:

Name Sex Nationality No. of Shares Address
Abdelghani Merzouk M Zambian 55,000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Abdeldjallil Mezouk M Algerian 11000000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk M Algerian 87250000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Farid Merzouk M Algerian 11000000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Timothy Kazembe M Zambian

MK IREHAB ZAMBIA LTD
Incorporated : 13 November 2011
Business: supplies of medical labs and pharmacy equipment
Adderss: Plot No. 5 Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga (address for MKP TMS Hospital)

Directors:
Name Sex Nationality No. of Shares Address
Abdeldjallil Merzouk M Algerian Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Mohamed Yazid Merzouk M Algerian 2550000 Plot 5591, Lusemfwa Road, Kalundu, Lusaka
Dr. Zelilah Binti Salleh Ghany M Zambian 2450000 Plot No. 5, Reed Buck Road, Kabulonga


OMEGA-MKP ZAMBIA LTD
Address: Stand No. 7241, Mukatasha road, industrial area, Lusaka.
Nature of busienss: security services
Directors:

Name Sex Address
Victor Etienne Janse Van Rensbur M Plot 7241, Mukatasha Road, Light Industrial Area, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe M 157 Ezra Road, Die Wilgers, Pretoria, South Africa
Philius Jacobus M Lynwoodridge,
Pretoria, South Afica, 301, Minesota street
Christoffel Smit M Faerie Glen Pretoria, South Africa
Timothy Jim Kazembe M No. Tl Los Ageles Road, Lusaka
Christoffel Ohhanes Roelosfe M 16520/1080, Kamwala South Lusaka

Motor vehicles registered in the names of Chang H Han and Korea General Company for External Construction (Z)

Owner Registration Mark Make
Korea General Company for External Construction ALK9605 DAF Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction ALK2843 Volvo Tipper
Korea General Company for External Construction ABF3391 Volvo
Korea General Company for External Construction AAX5978 Toyota Dyna
Korea General Company for External Construction ALJ1391 Toyota Regius
Korea General Company for External Construction ACH9579ZM Landcruiser Prado
Chan H Han ALE7996 Toyota Noah
Chan H Han ABE321 Toyota Camry
Chan H Han ABD1517 Toyota Lucida

Source: Member State

Updated information from Patents and Companies Registration Agency –December 2018

NHA-MKP Estates Development, #120050058683 is shown as registered and compliant.
Chammae Construction Limited, #120120102839: is shown as registered and compliant.
MKP TMS Hospital, #120060062028: is shown as registered and compliant.
MKP Motors (Zambia) Ltd, #120010047965: shown as registered, but has some issues with timely paperwork filing….
MKP Holdings Ltd, #120040054717: shown as registered, but doesn’t seem to have filed in a while.
MKP Mining Corporation, #120060063279: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Security Systems Zambia, #120060064168: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Capital Zambia, #120110090060: shown as registered, compliant.
MKP Builders Zambia, #120070068265: registered, partially compliant.
MKP-Irehab, #120110095546: still registered, partially compliant.
Omega-MKP Zambia, #120100086671: changed its name to Omega Risk Solutions Zambia. Still registered, compliant.

Source: Company Registry

Annex 47 : MKP companies in Malaysia as of November 2018

The Panel notes that while Han Hun Il’s name has been removed from the registration of one company and two other companies on which he served have been dissolved, many MKP companies appear to remain open and active in Malaysia despite the Panel’s previous determination that their activity was prohibited.

(This updates the previous table of “MKP companies in Malaysia as of 15 December 2017”, S/2018/171 pp. 229-232, Annex 67)
Company Name Corporate
Number Status Address Directors Shareholders Start Notes
M.K.P.
PROJECTS
SDN. BHD. 199448-D Dissolved Rm.1 1st. Floor,
Lee Rubber Bldg 145,
Jalan Tun H.S. Lee
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan Abdul kudus bin
datuk;
Lee Kung Wah;
Chong ah Kow @
Chong Ching Che;
Yong Kok Yeap; Abdul Kudus
Bin Datuk;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Chong Ah Kow
@ Chong
Ching Che;
Lee Kung Wah 15-Jun-90
MKP
BUILDERS
SDN. BHD 386207-P Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara
Klh Business Centre 2,
Jalan Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan
Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 cheras, selangor Han Hun Il;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap; Yong Kok Yeap, Fang Chee Peng 6-May-96 Han Hun Il no longer listed as shareholder (11 May 2018 registration documents listed him as shareholder)
MKP CAPITAL BERHAD 738326-V Winding Up 24-B, Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11, Batu 9
cheras, selangor Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap; Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il 20 June
2006
MKP CAPITAL
LLC BERHAD 980801-M Existing 24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap; Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il 2 March
2012
MKP
CORPORATION
BERHAD 619741-U Existing 24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur,
wilayah Persekutuan Lot 5,
Jalan 1 kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11batu 9 Cherasselangor Han Hun Il;
Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato’dr Amar
Singh; Yong Kok Yeap;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan, Dato’; Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il 26 June
2003 Previously listed as “winding up” (in 13 Nov 2017 documents)
MKP
DYNAMIC
ENGINEERING

SDN. BHD 735910

W Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan
Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,
wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato’dr Amar
Singh;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Muhammad Danial
Bin Osman; Karnail Singh
Nijhar Amar
Singh, Tansri
Dato’dr;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Soh Pui Hoon;
Han Hun Il;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan 31 May
2006
MKP
DYNAMIC

SDN. BHD 779980

A Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor), Menara
Klhbusiness Centre, 2, Jalan
Kasipillayoff Jalan Sultan
Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 cheras selangor Karnail Singh Nijhar
Tansri Dato’dr Amar
Singh;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan;
Muhammad Danial
Bin Osman @
Mddaud; Yong Kok
Yeap;
Soh Pui Hoon;
Ramanan
Ramakrishnan;
Karnail Singh
Nijhar Tansri
Dato’dr Amar
Singh 7 July
2012 Han Hun Il was never on the paperwork to begin
MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD 464492 – W Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw.
Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu
11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il; Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il 23 June
1998
MKP SUPPLIES

SDN. BHD 1210818

M Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap; Yong Kok
Yeap; Fang
Chee Peng 30
Nov
2016 Address change (11 Nov 2017 docs listed address in Puchong Selangor)
MKP -WUI LOONG SYSTEM SCAFFOLDS SDN. BHD 577418 – H Dissolved 24
-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan
Pudu Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutua
Lot 5 Jalan 1kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11 Batu 9 Cheras,
Selangor Kong Kam Wang;
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap;
So Yu Shing; Wui Loong
System
Scaffolds
Co.Ltd;
Mkp Holdings
Sdn. Bhd. 17 April
2002
Nekad Ziplem SDN. BHD 614359 – U Existing 52 a, Jalan Landak
off Jalan Pudu
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan
C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan
Perindustrian Cheras
Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras
Selangor) Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap; Jusoh Bin
Awang;
Yong Kok
Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Sumairi Bin
Hashim 7-May-03
ELEMENT FLASH (M) SDN. BHD. 658573 – V Existing 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 Jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan
Shahkuala Lumpur Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5 Jalan Satu kawasan
Perusahaan Cheras
Jayabalakong Selangor Yong Kok Yeap;
Chua Boon Lain;
Tee Eng Soon; Chua Boon
Lain; Yong Kok
Yeap; Tee Eng
Soon; Fang Chee Peng 6-Jul-04 Han was never on paperwork to begin; new Fang Chee Peng (added sometime after Nov 2018)
SOSIT SDN. BHD. 749341-K Dissolved 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara
Klh Business Centre 2 jalan
Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah
Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kaw.
Perusahaan Cheras Jaya Batu
11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il; Yong Kok
Yeap; Han Hun
Il 3-Oct-06
Source: Malaysian corporate registry

Annex 48 : Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO)’s page on the DPRK’s official online portal, Naenara, compared with MKP’s website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

Sources: https://archive.li/82wX1 and https://web.archive.org/web/20051119182017/http://www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24


Annex 49 : MKP website showing same completed projects (red boxes added to highlight construction projects claimed by both organizations)

Source: http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php accessed on 9 January 2019. Red box highlights the shared claim.

The building as it appears today can be found here: https://www.google.com/maps/@46.9593307,142.7397452,3a,52.2y,339.18h,93.1t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sMPp52K5bIsWFPlo1spmH7w!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

Source: www.mkphodings.com.my/construction.php


Annex 50 : Archived page for GENCO/KOGEN (originally in French; Google-translated) showing images of buildings which it claims to have constructed which are also listed on the MKP website as buildings which MKP claims to have constructed.

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20111116081011/http:/www.naenara.com.kp/en/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+1645+2011-01+47+3

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20070930050305/http:/www.kcckp.net/fr/periodic/f_trade/index.php?contents+234+2004-04+8+24
Annex 51 : MKP claim to a construction project which a Member State informed the Panel was constructed by KOGEN (Mulungushi International Convention Center)

Accessed at http://www.mkpholdings.com.my/construction.php on 9 January 2019

Annex 52 : List of DPRK workers working in Zambia, including Han Hun Il (RGB) and Yazid Merzouk (Algerian national)

Source: Member State

Annex 53 : Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as the DPRK Counsellor in China (리광선 aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Annex 54 : Open source information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a Counsellor (参赞) at the DPRK Embassy in Beijing under the name 李光先 (리광선aliases: RI, Kwang-Son, RI, Kwangson)

English translation

Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in China
Embassy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(Last updated: September 22, 2013)
Office and Residence: Ritan North Road, Jianguomenwai
Chancery and Residence: Ri Tan Bei Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai
Tel: 65321186 (on duty) 65321154 (Government Office)
65325018 (Economic Office) 65324308 (Business Office)

Counsellor Li Guangxian
Mrs. Li Guangxian (Lin Chengshun)
Mr. Ri Kwang Son, Counsellor
Mrs. Rim Song Sun

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China website http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//pds/fw/lbfw/zhwjgmd_lbfw/t527236.htm; archived version: https://archive.fo/CDCwJ). 
Annex 55 : Information showing that Kwang Song Ri served as a diplomat in Cairo, Egypt

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check

Source: Thomson Reuters World Check


Annex 56 : Information from a 26 January 2018 report by the Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification on key DPRK personnel figures (2018 북한 주요인사 인물정보) which includes DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide.

In a publication by the Republic of Korea on key DPRK personnel, pages 809-831 contain a list of DPRK diplomatic personnel worldwide. In the original Korean document, Kwang Song Ri’s name can be found under “Egypt” on page 814, item number 13, third line, first name (Egypt’s entire entry listed here in the original)

Entry in Korean:
(13) 이집트(에짚트)
대 사 마동희
참 사 관 박성도
1등서기관 리광송 최 강 최기영

Entry translated into English:

  1. Egypt
    a. Ambassador- Ma Dong Hee
    b. Councilor- Park Sung Do
    c. First Office- Ri Kwang Song, Choi Kang, Choi Gee Yong

Source: http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/pblictn/pblictnList.do?originCd=OC0003#

Annex 57 : UAE Company 1 Website on establishment of KOGEN UAE JV

Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 9 November 2018.

Annex 58 : Page from UAE Company 1 brochure outlining project work

Source: UAE Company 1 website, accessed 13 December 2018.

Annex 59 : Corporate information on Chammae Construction Limited

Source: Patents and Companies Registration Agency, Zambia 
Annex 60 : Corporate information on GENCO Nigeria

Source: Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission, http://publicsearch.cac.gov.ng/comsearch/index.php

Source: Nigerian corporate registry

Annex 61 : African Union’s InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources lists KOGEN GE S.L. as its implementing partner for a project

Source: Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources, African Union, http://www.au-ibar.org/2012-10-01-13-08-42/news/450-en/programmes-and-projects/current-programmes-and-projects/fish/inventory-projects/820-african-union-member-states-by-region

Annex 62 : Funding documentation for the Rebola Municipal Stadium in
Equatorial Guinea

Source: Ministry of Treasury, Economy, and Planning, http://www.minhacienda.gob.gq/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/LPGE_-2017.pdf

Source: Rombe Diary, GE Proyectos, http://www.diariorombe.es/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Lista-de-Obras-Primera-Parte.pdf

Annex 63 : Registry documents for LLC “VITAL”, LLC “PRESTIZHSTROI”, and LLC “SAKO KONTRAKSHN”

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru 
Annex 64 : Additional information linking LLC “SAKORENMA” to LLC “VITAL”, LLC “PRESTIZHSTROI”, and LLC “SAKO KONTRAKSHN”

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru
Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru

Source: Federal state information system of the Federal Service for Labor and Employment, https://trudvsem.ru

Annex 65 : Registry documents for two GENCO Representative Offices in the Russian Federation and relevant Court documents

  1. Registry documents for GENCO Repressentative office in Vladivostok

Source: State Register of Accredited Branches, Representations of Foreign Legal Entities, https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#

  1. Registry documents for GENCO Representative office in Khasan

Source: State Register of Accredited Branches, Representations of Foreign Legal Entities, https://service.nalog.ru/rafp/#

  1. Official court documents from the Russian Federation referencing the head of a a representative office for GENCO in Russia by the initials K.Y. These correspond to those of Ko Yongil, the registered director of GENCO’s representation in Vladivostok.

Source: Artemovski City Court of Primorski Krai, https://artemovsky–prm.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&name_op=case&_id=148809085&_deloId=1540006&_caseType=0&_new=0&srv_num=1

¬¬


Annex 66 : Company information for entities registered with the Russian translation for GENCO (‘ZENKO’) and are owned—in whole or in part—by DPRK nationals, and have received authorization to employ DPRK nationals
Company name Tax identification number Registered Address Associated individuals Contact information
LLC “ZENKO”
(ООО “ЗЕНКО”) 7204162965 24A ulitsa Svetlaya, Tyumen, Tyumenskaya Oblast, Russia Pak Gvan Min
(ПАК ГВАН МИН)

  • Role: director
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number: 723020846617
    Kim Gvan Ir
    (КИМ ГВАН ИР)
  • Role: owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown
    Kim Men Kho
    (КИМ МЕН ХО)
  • Role: contact on job posting
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number: unknown Telephone numbers

+7 (345) 2757212
+7 (345) 2297166
+7 (345) 2699249
+7 (982) 9477543

Email addresses

[email protected]
[email protected]
LLC “ZENKO-15”
(ООО “ЗЕНКО-15”) 2536133013 Office 411, 1 ulitsa Pionerskaya, Vladivostok, Primorski Krai, Russia Kim Sen Guk
(КИМ СЕН ГУК)

  • Role: director
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number: 253614442780
    Kim Tong O
    (КИМ ТОНГ О)
  • Role: owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown
    Pak Chen Sik
    (ПАК ЧЕН СИК)
  • Role: contact on job posting
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number unknown Telephone numbers

+7 (914) 7350156
+7 (423) 2762279
+7 (423) 2716707

Email addresses

[email protected]
[email protected]
LLC “ZENKO-39”
(ООО “ЗЕНКО-39”) 2308160794 2/1 ulitsa im Bogdana Khmelnitskogo, Krasndar, Krasnodarski Krai, Russia Ryu Chkhun Ren
(РЮ ЧХУН РЁН)

  • Role: director
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number: 231133389520
    Chan Chin Men
    (ЧАН ЧИН МЕН)
  • Role: co-owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown
    Chen Gen Cher
    (ЧЕН ГЕН ЧЕР)
  • Role: co-owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown Telephone numbers

+7 (861) 5866425
+7 (861) 8862992
+7 (905) 4953597
+7 (961) 5866425
+7 (918) 1383996

Email addresses

[email protected]
LLC “ZENKO-21”
(ООО “ЗЕНКО-21”) 2508064689 13A ulitsa Malinovskogo, Nakhodka, Primorski Krai, Russia Kan Sen Kho
(КАН СЕН ХО)

  • Role: director
  • Nationality: unknown
  • Tax identification number: 250821723134
    Kim Sen Khvan
    (КИМ СЕН ХВАН)
  • Role: co-owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown
    Kim Cher Min
    (КИМ ЧЕР МИН)
  • Role: co-owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown
    Li Syn Ir
    (ЛИ СЫН ИР)
  • Role: co-owner
  • Nationality: DPRK
  • Tax identification number: unknown Telephone numbers

+7 (423) 6642332
+7 (902) 0606907
+7 (4236) 712327

Email addresses

[email protected]
Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities; SPARK; Trudvsem

Annex 67 : Documents showing LLC “ZENKO”, LLC “ZENKO-15”, LLC
“ZENKO-39”, and LLC “ZENKO-21” to be owned by DPRK nationals

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Annex 68 : Authorizations to hire DPRK laborers awarded to LLC “ZENKO”, LLC “ZENKO-15”, LLC “ZENKO-39”, and LLC “ZENKO-21” in 2018

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

Source: Russian Ministry of Labor, https://rosmintrud.ru/docs/mintrud/orders/1330

Annex 69 : Online Glocom advertisements in 2018 (Twitter and Glocom website)

Tweet from 16 December 2018. Accessed on 10 January 2019 at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818
Archived version available at: https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1074529145629986818

Tweet from 7 September 2018. Accessed at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237 on 10 January 2019.
Archived version available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190110205253/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1038305737338847237

Accessed at http://www.glocom-corp.com/2018/ on 13 January 2019

Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504 on 10 January 2019. Archived version at https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1004600845034389504

Tweet from 6 June 2018. Accessed at https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800 on 10 January 2019. Archived version at https://web.archive.org/save/https://twitter.com/GlocomSupport/status/1007416970894028800

Source: @GlocomSupport twitter feed

Annex 70 : Advertisement for GR-611 Secure Personal Radio”, the “GR-8600M”

Source: Pinterest https://www.pinterest.ca/pin/594404850793634523/

Annex 71 : Information on shared addresses between Li Zhengang’s company, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd., an individual and an entity previously identified in association to DPRK shipping activities which have violated the resolutions

On Chinese business registry filings, Dandong Zhongrui Petrochemical Co., Ltd. lists the same registered address as a second Chinese company Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. (丹东京奥贸易有限公司). Until 14 March 2017, a Hong Kong-registered company Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd. (京奧達林貿易有限公司) used an identical English and Chinese name to Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd. The Hong Kong-registered company lists one and the same director and shareholder, Sun Chengguo (孫成國; simplified 孙成国), whose name is identical to that of the legal representative of Dandong Jingao Trading Co., Ltd.

On Hong Kong registry documents of Jingao Dalin Trading Co., Ltd, Sun Chengguo lists a residential address at Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China. Sun Chengguo’s residential address is nearly identical to that of at least one other Chinese national whom the Panel has previously identified in association with illicit DPRK shipping operations:

PAN WEICHAO (潘衛朝) lists Room 916, DL, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China, on the 2016 Annual Return for Pantech Shipping Limited (泛科海運有限公司). The Panel noted in S/2017/150 paragraph 67 footnote 74 that PAN WEICHAO acted as an emergency contact for K-Brothers—the Marshall Islands-based operator of the Jie Shun (IMO 8518780).

In addition, this same address: Room 916, DL1504, Youhao Building, 158 Youhao Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China is also the address listed for a United Nations designated entity, Chang An Shipping & Technology Ltd ((長安海運技術有限公司) in the Hong Kong business registry

Ship ownership records indicate that Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited was the ship manager, commercial manager, and registered owner of the Hua Fu
(IMO 90200003). The director of the company is GU BAOFU (顧寶富). Both Chang An Shipping & Technology Limited and the Hua Fu were designated by the 1718 Committee on 30 March 2018.

Source: Corporate Registry documents of Hong Kong and China mainland

Annex 72 : Panel findings in OCN / T Specialist case investigation since 2018 Panel final report (S/2018/171, paras 179-188)

OCN previously stated to the Panel that it stopped shipping products to the DPRK as of late 2012, shifting its business into China in 2013 through Wang Zhi Guo and his company, Pinnacle Offshore Trading. OCN also said that it shipped goods to Dalian as the destination port for distribution in China and had “no knowledge of the authenticity of the sale of goods in DPRK as included in your letter and no knowledge of how any such goods ended up in DPRK.” However, when pressed on the business justification for shifting its sales to China of the same goods previously sold in the DPRK (including Singapore-distributed items made by Yamaha, Seiko, Montblanc and the like, which all have distributors in China), OCN admitted prior knowledge that the DPRK was the ultimate destination of their goods, stating “ T Specialist International (S) Pte Ltd would sell the goods to China via the buyer of the goods, Longsheng Weida. The buyers in China at the Chinese customs will approve the goods before receiving them and allowing them to be transshipped to DPRK. Before the good were sent out, the Chinese parties will do the clearance of the goods. Our Client do not receive the receipts of the transactions between the Chinese parties to DPRK.”

The company provided the Panel with multiple invoices for sales to Tianjin Longshengweida Import & Export Co, Ltd and Changzhou Jesinson Trading Co., both of which appear to be international freight forwarding companies. The Panel also launched an investigation into the role of the German company Mülller + Partner in the provision of logistics for the above-mentioned companies, but still has not received answers to its inquiries dating from December 2017.

With regard to the T Specialist-owned and distributed brands, Fresh F and Watari, which have been on sale in the DPRK Bugsae / Pothonggang Ryugyong stores through at least July 2017, T Specialist stated: “It is prudent to note that the said products were originally also intended to be shipped and sold to Cyprus. However, these products were not saleable in Cyprus, hence, our Chinese counterparty suggested that we sell the products in DPRK.”

OCN-Pyongyang manager simultaneously employed by OCN Singapore

OCN Singapore’s relationship with Ri Ik dates back to his first visit to Singapore in 1991, at which time he was employed as a trading manager by the original Bugsae Shop. According to OCN, around 2004, Ri lk was made an employee of OCN Singapore to “assist in the sale of products to the DPRK”. OCN has not provided his full terms of reference as requested by the Panel, stating that they are under the custody of Singapore investigative agencies. OCN did however admit that Ri Ik had remained employed throughout most of 2017, providing a copy of the revocation dated 29 January 2018 of his Singaporean employment pass. Regarding the Panel’s request for salary information, OCN stated: “Mr. Ri Ik did not draw a salary, and the value of his work done was used to off-set the sums that were due and payable to our Clients.” OCN/ T Specialist Singapore stated that it had no control or interests in OCN Pyongyang, despite the fact that it was under the full control of one of its long-term employees and to which it sold a substantial amount of goods. The way in which OCN Pyongyang operated relatively independently of OCN Singapore is common DPRK practice as already seen in the Panel’s investigation of Pan Systems Singapore and Pan Systems Pyongyang.

The Panel notes, however, that Ri Ik would not have been able to set up a foreign currency account in Pyongyang without OCN Singapore’s paperwork and tacit consent. Indeed, OCN Singapore ensured that the daily transactions of the account were fully managed by Ri Ik so that it could ensure plausible deniability. Ri Ik used that account to transfer payments back to OCN Singapore for items sold in the DPRK. Given the difficulty of any DPRK banks to engage in open global transactions, at least eight Hong Kong-based front companies transferred the payments into OCN Singapore’s account in Singapore, including the following: Pan Ocean Investments, Hongdae International, Yun King International, Albion Commercial Ventures, Highweal Trading, Headsoon Trading, Sama Industrial, and Heping Industrial. The Panel notes that the use of multiple front companies to pay for the purchase of its goods and the break-down of payments into several series of smaller transactions, as done in this case, are well-known sanctions evasion tactic.

Annex 73 Information provided to the Panel by Singapore on Wang Zhi Guo (王志国) and Li Ik (aka Ri Ik).

A. Wang Zhi Guo

China Passport Number: E2548653
Date of Birth: 11 July 1962
Date of expiry: 10 September 2023
Place of issue: Tianjin, China

Current Address and Status in Singapore
• Wang Zhiguo is a Singapore Permanent Resident. His address is 500F Marine Parade Road, #04-23, Singapore 449289. He is currently in Singapore.
• Wang Zhiguo is a Chinese national and Singapore Permanent Resident (SPR). Wang was first issued an Employment Pass in 1995 and obtained his SPR on 14 February 2003. His Re-Entry Permit is valid until 19 July 2022.
Dates moved to Singapore
• Wang Zhiguo was first issued a Singapore Employment Pass in 1995.
Travel
• Wang Zhiguo is currently in Singapore.
• Our authorities have impounded Wang Zhiguo’s passport since 6 December 2018

B. Li Ik (aka Ri Ik)

Date of Birth: 11 February 1963
DPRK Passport No. 745420357
Expiry: 11 November 2020

Current Address and Status in Singapore
• Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and has not returned since. Li Ik’s Employment Pass was revoked in January 2018. Li Ik is not a Singapore Permanent Resident.
• Before his pass was revoked, his job title had been “Regional Business Development Manager” for OCN (Singapore) Ltd
• Li Ik first obtained his Singapore Employment Pass on 12 April 2004.
• The Singaporean authorities informed the Panel that they do not have Li Ik’s employment contracts and/or assigned tasks.. His annual salary package from 2012 to 2015 was between S$92,462.75 to S$113,384.19.

Travel
• According to travel records, Li Ik traveled in and out of Singapore frequently over the past five years (in some years averaging one trip per month).
• Li Ik departed Singapore on 8 June 2017 and Singapore has not received any visa application from him to re-enter the country. All DPRK nationals require a visa to enter Singapore. Singapore informed the Panel that it does not have knowledge of Li Ik’s whereabouts since then.

Personal details for Mr. Li Ik provided to obtain his Singapore Employment Pass:

I. Education Certificates at all levels
1) Sep. 1969 -Aug 1973 Pyongyang Sanghung Primary School
2) Sep. 1973 – Aug 1979 Pyongyang Jangsan Senior Middle Schoo
3) Sep 1979-Aug 1981 Serve in the Korean Peoples Army
4) Sep 1981-Nov 1986 Kim 11 Song’s University D.P.R. of Korea

  1. Curriculum Vitae (CV) of working experiences from time after leaving school

1) Dec 1986 -Dec 1990. Manager of Daesong General Corporation D.P.R. of Korea
2) Jan 1991 -Apr 1992 Manager of Korea Asia Trading Company
3) May 1992-Jul 1994 Section Chief Manager of Korea Duty-free Company
4) Aug 1994 – Chief Manager of OCN (Singapore) PTE LTD Pyongyang Office

  1. Home address
    Potonggang-dong 27, 3-2, Potonggang District Pyongyang D.P.R. of Korea
  2. Passport number: S 190220613
    Date of Birth: ll-Feb-1963
    Country of issue: D.P.R. of Korea
    Place of issue: Ministry of Foreign Affairs D.P.R. of Korea
    Date of issue: 28-Apr-2000
    Expiry date: 5 years (28-Apr-2005)
  3. Religion – Atheist

Married to: Ms Ju Myong Suk
Date of Birth: 7 Dec 1963

Source: Member State

Annex 74 Cooperative entities and joint ventures and other companies investigated by the Panel: Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Malta, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia

Argentina

Argentina indicated to the Panel that searches for the firm Sonbong-Promotra JV Co. yielded no positive data in their search of financial databases nor any additional data on any links between the firm and Argentina. Argentina also stated that no nationals of the DPRK have been registered since 2004 as migrant workers.
Source: Member State

Australia

In its reply to the Panel ‘s letter on Sonbong Kost J.V. Company (a.k.a Samhung Kost J.V. Company, Sam Hung KOAST Joint Venture Pyongyang, 선봉코스트합영회사 , Australia cooperated with the Panel by providing detailed information on the company’s operational status, current officers, business activities, bank account information in an Asian country, ownership, and business history. Australia also informed the Panel that it was investigating the matter and provided the Panel with its detailed confidential initial findings. It further stated that it places the highest priority on implementing UNSC resolutions, and takes appropriate action to respond to potential breaches of sanctions. It further clarified that pursuant to UN Security Council sanctions, Australian law prohibits the establishment, maintenance, or operation of a joint venture or cooperative entity (however described) with a DPRK person or entity, a person or entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK person or entity, or an entity owned or controlled by a DPRK person or entity. Australia also indicated that it was assessing whether available information suggests that any of the funds, financial assets and economic resources of Koast Group Pty Ltd are owned or controlled. directly or indirectly, by designated individuals or entities; or the Government of the DPRK or the Workers Party of Korea.

Source: Corporate registry, Member State


Cambodia
Business name (Eng) Location
Pyongyang (Koryo) Restaurant / Pyongyang Traditional Restaurant 400 Preah Monivong Blvd (93), Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Pyongyang Arirang Restaurant 215, 32 Jawaharlal Nehru Blvd (215), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Pyongyang Unhasu Restaurant
#10A, Street 315, Sangkat Beung Kok I,Khan Toulkork, Phnom Penh,Cambodia, Phnom Penh 12000, Cambodia In addition to providing food services, this company is also registered as engaged in “other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding activities,” in addition to various other activities that are unusual for a restaurant to be engaged in.
Source: Open source information
China
English Name City Eng Address
Dae Dong Gang North Korean Cuisine Beijing North Tucheng East Road, Yuan Dadu Heritage Park, No. 6
Pyongyang Hae Dang Hwa – Landao Branch Beijing Chaoyang Menwai Dajie 12, Kunming Mall 2 (Landao Building West)
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong – Yizhuang Branch Beijing Yizhuang Economic and Technological Development Zone, Ronghua Road 10, Yicheng International Center Q102
Pyongyang Rungrado – Baofusi Branch Beijing Zhongguancun Baofusi Bridge 81 (opposite of the Institute of Computing and Technology)
Sin Dae Jong Kim Gang Won Restaurant and Performance Hall Beijing 1st Floor, Xinzhai Hotel, No.58 Maidian Street
Pyongyang Restaurant Changchun Intersection of Liberty Road and Linhe Street
Mo Ran Bong North Korea Performance Hotel Dalian Xinghai Square, Area E, 46
Pyongyang Restaurant Dalian No.94 Xinglin Street, Zhongshan District, Dalian 116001, China
Pyongyang Jindal Chae Restaurant Dandong Building 2 198 Donggang S Rd, Donggang Shi, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118300
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant Dandong Binjiang Middle Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant Dandong 8th Latitude Rd, Zhenxing Qu, Dandong Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 118000
Liujing Hotel Dandong 1-2F, Jiadi Plaza, Binjiang Middle Road
Xin’an Dongge Hotel Dandong No.98 Jinjiang Street
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant Harbin 202 Gogol Street, Harbin, China
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong – Altay Branch Hohhot Xing’an North Road, Caoyuan City
Pyongyang Seol Kyung Restaurant Hohhot Olympic Hotel, Floor 2
Jindal North Korean Restaurant Kunming Luyou Dujia Qu, Xigong Matou 2 Dong
Pyongyang North Korean Restaurant Nanchang 1515 Nanjing East Road, Aixi Lake
Myo Hyang San Restaurant Qinhuangdao Yingbin Road 298, Haigang District, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, China
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant — Gu North Road Shanghai GuBei Road 1088 2 Floor, Shanghai, China
Pyongyang Arirang Shanghai 1050 Wuzhong Rd, Minhang Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 201103
Pyongyang Koryo Restaurant – Tongmao Branch Shanghai First Floor 357 Songlin Rd, Pudong Xinqu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000
Pyongyang Myo Hyang Restaurant – Putuo Branch Shanghai 555 Caoyang Rd, Putuo Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200063
Pyongyang Oak Ryu Restaurant Shanghai 439 Caoxi N Rd, XuJiaHui, Xuhui Qu, Shanghai Shi, China, 200000
Pyongyang Restaurant Shanghai 3rd Floor, Western District, Binggu Cultural Leisure Plaza, 341 Tianshan Road
Chilbosan Hotel Shenyang No.79-81 Shiyiwei Road, Helping District, Shenyang 110003, China
Pyongyang Dong Myo Hyang San Shenyang 85 Tumen Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Friendship Dongmyung Restaurant Shenyang Antu St, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110000
Pyongyang Mo Ran Bong Hotel Shenyang 43 Harbin Road, Shenyang, China
Pyongyang Restaurant Shenyang 106 Shifu Rd, XiTa HanGuo FengQing Jie, Heping Qu, Shenyang Shi, Liaoning Sheng, China, 110002
Moranbong Shenyang 93 Xita Road
You Kyung Kim Dal Chae Shijiazhuang ChangAn District GuangAn Main Street 16, MeiDong International 2 Floor, Shijiazhuang, China
North Korea Pyongyang Eun Ban Restaurant Taiyuan Binhe Donglu and Xuefu Street, Shizi Southwest Corner, Luohe Park, No. 2 Parking Lot
Hongqing Hotel – Hongqiao Branch Wuxi 889 Hongqiao Road (Shenzhou Building)
Liujing Hotel Yanji 124 Xinxing St, Yanji Shi, Yanbian Chaoxianzuzizhizhou, Jilin Sheng, China, 133000
Source: The Panel, Member State, open source research
MINISO
The Panel also investigated a possible joint venture between a Hong Kong company and a DPRK company which operates a commodity chain in Pyongyang. In May 2018, the company stated that Chinese Headquarters of MINISO was in charge of the international business partnership, and that the products sold to the DPRK were made in China. MINISO further stated that the international agency contract to open the Pyongyang branch was agreed between MINISO International Hong Kong Limited and “Korea Jinhwa joint corporation” represented by a DPRK national Nam Song Il , but that contract was terminated on 15 August 2017. Supporting documents were provided. While MINISO claimed that products stopped being supplied in May 2017, the Panel obtained information that as of July 2018, the shop is still open with the original MINISO interior, but with the label “Jinhwa”, and products of several foreign brands have been sold. The Panel requested information but has yet to receive a reply from the companies (figure). The Panel recommends that the relevant Member State comply with paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).
(Figure) MINISO brand displayed in Pyongyang branch in April 2018

Source: NK Pro
Source: The Panel, open source
Japan
Japan replied “So far [the Government of Japan] “could not confirm any information that indicates the joint ventures and cooperative entities pointed out by the Panel exist or currently operate in Japan, or information that shows relationships between the partner companies identified by the Panel and the North Korean joint ventures.” Japan also stated that it went further by prohibiting all exports to and imports from the DPRK and transactions with the DPRK.
Source: Member State


Laos
Business name (Eng.) Owner Manager Business type
Representative Office of Korea Dongyang 5 Trading Corporation Ms. SOWON SOOB Mr. SOWON SOOB Investment Analyst on road, bridge, irrigation construction and trade
Representative Office of SK Architect and Construction Mr. CIIIM CHAE JOON Mr. CIIIM CHAE JOON Investment analyst on hydro power
Pyongyang Friendship Restaurant Ms. WANG ANHULI Ms WANG ANHULI Restaurant
Korea K Choeng Bong Trading Corporation Mr. CHANGSONG KIM Mr. CHANSONG KIM Program design consultant
Western Restaurant Mr. BONGJO YUN M R. BONGJO YUN Restaurant
Better Life Tomorrow Lao Ltd. Co Mr. Jaekook Sin Pharmaceutical
Source: Member State, open source
Malaysia
Business Name Number Address Directors Shareholders Start
MKP BUILDERS SDN. BHD 386207-P 2-3-11 (3rd Floor)Menara Klh Business Centre 2,
Jalan Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shahkuala Lumpurwilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 cheras, selangor Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il
Yong Kok Yeap 6 May 1996
MKP CAPITAL LLC BERHAD 980801-M 24-B Jalan Landakoff Jalan Pudu Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap; Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il 2 March 2012
MKP DYNAMIC ENGINEERING SDN. BHD 735910-W 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay, Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur, wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 Kawasan Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor Karnail Singh Nijhar Tansri Dato’dr Amar Singh;
Fang Chee Peng;
Yong Kok Yeap; Muhammad Danial Bin Osman; Karnail Singh Nijhar Amar Singh, Tansri Dato’dr;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Soh Pui Hoon;
Han Hun Il;
Ramanan Ramakrishnan 31 May 2006

MKP HOLDINGS SDN. BHD 464492-W 2-3-11 (3rd Floor) Menara Klh Business Centre 2 jalan Kasipillay,
Off Jalan Sultan Azlan Shah Kuala Lumpur,
Wilayah Persekutuan
Lot 5, Jalan 1 kaw. Perusahaan Cheras Jayabatu 11 batu 9 Cheras Selangor Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Yong Kok Yeap; Han Hun Il 23 June 1998
Nekad Ziplem SDN. BHD 614359-U 52 a, Jalan Landak
off Jalan Pudu
Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan
C/O Lot 5, Jalan 1 kawasan Perindustrian Cheras Jayabatu 11, Batu 9 Cheras Selangor) Han Hun Il;

Yong Kok Yeap; Jusoh Bin Awang;
Yong Kok Yeap;
Han Hun Il;
Sumairi Bin Hashim 7 May 2003
Source: Corporate registry, open source information
Malta
According to open source information, Kormal Import and Export Company was founded 17 November 2011. “C 54431” is its corporate registration number. Kormal does not appear to have a website or a public profile beyond its appearance in various corporate registry databases. It is an “active” corporation according to Open Corporates and Malta’s Registry of Companies. According to Malta’s Registry of Companies and it has filed documents as recently as 2 March 2018.
• In Malta’s Registry of Companies the Director of the company is Song Hui Song, with the registered address in the DPRK. According to the registry she is the sole shareholder. Kormal’s secretary, Kuk Chol Jo, has the same registered DPRK address as Song Hui Song. The company’s corporate registry documents list its auditor as a non-DPRK foreign national, however it is unclear whether a Maltese auditor’s involvement would qualify this entity as a JV.
• According to documents on Malta’s Registry of Companies, Kormal has been filing documents regularly since its inception in 2011 except for a two-year period directly after its inception until 2013. Its most recent documents are from 2 March 2018.
Source: Corporate registry and open source information

Poland
Business name Name (other languages) Location in DPRK Name of partner company DPRK nationals involved & other info Partner HQ location
Wonye Sp. Z o.o. Ms. Cecylia Kowalska Mr. Jo Chol Yong (DPRK national) is President of the Board, shareholder;
Mr. Kang Hong Gu, Vice President of the Board Ul. Marynarki Polskiej 96,
80-557 Gdańsk, Poland
Redshield Sp. Z o. o. Mr. Pak Jong Ho, President of the Board Ul. Stołczyńska 100 D,
71-869 Szczecin, Poland
Source: Corporate registry, Member State, open source information

Russian Federation
Russian Federation communication of 8 January 2019 stated the following

Source: Member State

English Translation
We wish to inform you of the following in connection with the inquiry made by the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the activity in Russia of joint ventures involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) prohibits the operation of new, or the maintenance of existing, joint ventures or cooperative entities involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is our understanding that under the resolution such organizational entities are legal persons established through the joint contribution of resources by participants from different countries, in this case Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who jointly manage the venture, and share its profits and risks. Legal persons structured in this manner cannot exist under Russian law.
On that basis, we do not view the activities of the representative offices of North Korean companies as being covered by the international sanctions regime for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, since they are independent divisions of legally operating North Korean companies, situated in a different location and representing solely the interests of those legal persons. Under article 55 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, representative offices of foreign companies in Russia do not have the status of legal persons, because they are allocated assets by the legal persons establishing them and engage in activity as directed by those legal persons.
Furthermore, foreign representative offices in Russia are subject to special registration rules with the national Chamber of Commerce, may not engage in commercial activity, earn no revenue and pay no taxes, except on operating expenses, including for real estate. Therefore, they could not be a source of funding for the prohibited nuclear or ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which the Security Council has sought to halt by imposing sanctions against that country.
In view of the foregoing, we do not consider the activity in Russia of officially registered representative offices of North Korean companies that have not been placed on the United Nations Security Council sanctions list by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to be in violation of paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017).
Similarly, in the case of Russian companies having a sole founder who is a citizen of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, such companies are registered strictly as Russian limited liability companies, rather than joint ventures or cooperative entities, making them Russian legal persons with all the legal consequences that follow therefrom. Such companies are not considered subject to the restrictions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Security Council under paragraph 18 of Security Council resolution 2375 (2017) or under current Russian law.
We shall keep the Panel of Experts informed as queries received from the Panel of Experts undergo the interagency review process and additional information becomes available.
In future, the Russian Federation would appreciate it if the Panel could follow established practice by directing its queries to the Russian Permanent Mission, rather than to the private companies. This is particularly important given that, in most cases, the company addresses indicated in the registries are that of their registered offices, rather than their actual physical address, and letters sent to the former address simply do not reach the addressees.

The Russian Federation provided the Panel with a list of companies which, after investigation, it found were closed as of January 2019. Those companies have not been included in the list below regardless of their current status in the corporate registery or whether they were in operation at some point in 2018. The list below does not include entities which corporate registration documents have listed as dissolved in 2018 including those that were in operation at some time in 2018. In the course of 2018, four companies changed their registration to being only Russian-owned.
There are no representative offices of DPRK entities in this list.
Name and Company Tax Id Location Address Names of DPRK Nationals and/or DPRK companies involved Other Nationals Involved Additional info Type of Company
ООО “ПИОНЕР” (LLC “PIONER”)
Tax ID: 2502047408 12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivostok, Russia, 690018 Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон) with tax identification number 254300252564. Director is Russian national Danilyak Elena Nikolaevna (Даниляк Елена Николаевна) with tax identification number 650102300001. Registered to the same address as the DPRK Consulate General in Vladivostok. Renting and operating of real estate; construction;
operation of restaurants and bars in railway cars and on ships
ООО “ПРИМАГРОСОЯ” (LLC “PRIMAGROSOYA”)
Tax ID: 2508110960 Office 3, 38V ulitsa Pogranichnaya, Nakhodka, Russia, 692922 Jointly owned by a Russian company, LLC “KNYAZHEVSKOE” (tax identification number 2506109736) and a DPRK entity, Korea Kumgang General Corporation. Director is Russian national Tyan Irina Feliksovna (Тян Ирина Феликсовна) for it with tax identification number 250600522133
Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds
ООО “САКОРЕНМА” (LLC “SAKORENMA”)
Tax ID: 6501104474 8 ulitsa Polevaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalinskaya oblast, Russia Co-owned by the Korea General Corporation for External Construction (GENCO). Co-owner and director is Russian national Son Chan Din (Сон Чан Дин) with tax identification number 650109976889. Construction
ООО “ПОНХВА” (LLC “PONKHVA”)
Tax ID: 7701356953 Room 10, Structure 3, 14 pl. Spartakovskaya, Moscow, Russia, 105082 Owner is DPRK national Zo Son Sim (Зо Сон Сим), for whom a tax identification number is not specified. Director is Russian national Zelepukin Pavel Vladimirovich (Зелепукин Павел Владимирович) with tax identification number 252692226110. Construction
ООО “КОРУС БИО-МЕД КО.ЛТД” (LLC “KORUS BIO-MED KO. LTD”)
Tax ID: 7720737111 28 ulitsa Moldagulovoi, Moscow, Russia, 111538 This company is engaged in ‘unspecified wholesale trade’ and is co-owned by a DPRK company, Pugang Pharmaceutical Company, and three Russian nationals. o-owners: Bogachev Andrei Yurevich (Russian: Богачев Андрей Юрьевич), Koledenkov Gennadi Vasilevich (Russian: Коледенков Геннадий Васильевич), and Volchkov Pavel Yurevich (Russian: Волчков Павел Юрьевич). Their tax identification numbers are, respectively, 771375193155, 773010690747, and 772705006827. Note: Bogachev is also the company’s director. Non-specialized wholesale trade
ООО “ЗАБАЙКАЛИНВЕСТСТРОЙ” (LLC “ZABAIKALINVESTSTROI”)
Tax ID: 0326028065 32 proezd Energostroitelei, Chita, Russia, 672022 Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575. Director is Russian national Pozdnyakov Sergei Leonidovich (Поздняков Сергей Леонидович) with tax identification number 753610439691. The company was previously named LLC “Cholsan”.

The same director-owner team control LLC “Chkholsan” (ООО “ЧХОЛСАН”; Tax ID 7536112799) and LLC Construction Company “RAI” (ООО СК “РАЙ”; Tax ID 7536132178) Construction
ООО “СК”РАЙ” (LLC Construction Company “RAI”)
Tax ID: 1328002427 43 shosse Aleksandrovskoe, Saransk, Russia, 430006 Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Tkhe En (Ким Тхэ Ен), for whom a tax identification number is not specified. Director is Russian national Vinokurov Vladimir Aleksandrovich (Винокуров Владимир Александрович) with tax identification number is 132606544879. Construction
ООО с иностранными инвестициями СП “ТИСРИМОБ” (LLC JV “TISRIMOB”)
Tax ID: 2539069310 94 ulitsa Russkaya, Vladivostok, Russia This company is a joint venture between the DPRK Ministry of Forestry and a Russian company, LLC “TIS”, whose tax identification number is 2528004046. Director is Russian national Pisarets Sergei Anatolevich (Писарец Сергей Анатольевич) with tax identification number 254000252980. Silviculture
ООО “ОРЮН” (LLC “ORYUN”)
Tax ID: 2540176852 10 ulitsa Krylova, Vladivostok, Russia, 690014 Owner is DPRK national Kim Khe Son (Ким Хе Сон), for whom a tax identification number is not specified. Director is Russian national Danilyak Elena Nikolaevna (Даниляк Елена Николаевна) with tax identification number 650102300001. A DPRK restaurant named Kymgansan (Russian: КымГанСан) operates at the address registered to this company (https://www.vl.ru/kymgynsan).Open source information claims that its workers are DPRK nationals, from the chef to the waitresses to the restaurant owners (https://www.newsvl.ru/vlad/2017/09/22/163230/). Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО “ПХЕНЬЯН-МОРАНБОН” (LLC” PKENYAN-MORANBON”)
Tax ID: 2703086887 Room 1009, 15 prospekt Pervostroitelei, Komsomolsk-Na-Amure, Russia, 681003 This company’s name is a russification of Pyongyang-Moranbong. It is jointly owned by a DPRK company ostensibly called Korean Trading Company “Eighth of March” and a Russian company, LLC “FOLANG”. The Russian company’s tax identification number is 2726008652. Director is Russian national Fedorova Natalya Grigorevna (Фёдорова Наталья Григорьевна), with tax identification number 272600578083. Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО “МЁХЯН” (LLC “MEKHYAN”)
Tax ID: 4101167437 Apt. 58, 2 ulitsa Tushkanova, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, Russia, 683031 Owner is DPRK national Li San Cher (Ли Сан Чер) with the tax identification number 410126524634. Director is Russian national Balakaeva Yuliya Vladimirovna (Балакаева Юлия Владимировна) with tax identification number 410117536778. ‘MEKHYAN’ is the Russian rendering of Myohyang. Restaurants and mobile food service activities
ООО “АК-СТРОЙ” (LLC “AK-STROI”)
Tax ID: 4205255751 Room 6, Structure 6A, ulitsa Krasnoarmeiskaya, Kemerovo, Russia, 650021 Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Sen Bok (Ким Сен Бок) with tax identification number 420555220832.

This construction company is also co-owned by a Russian company, LLC “ELEKTRON-MAGAZIN”, with tax identification number 4205194474. Director is Russian national Tikhomirov Vladimir Ivanovich (Тихомиров Владимир Иванович) with tax identification number 420537229938. Plastering
ООО “КАНСОН-ТЕКСТИЛЬ” (LLC “KANSON-TEKSTIL”)
Tax ID: 5018186644 Office 9, Floor 3, 34 prospekt Zavodskoi, Golitsyno, raion Odintsovski, oblast Moskovskaya, Russia, 143041 Owner is DPRK national Sim Li Khyan (Сим Ли Хян) with tax identification number 502730623502. Director is Kim Son Khi (Ким Сон Хи) of an unspecified nationality with tax identification number 501819568948.

    Manufacture of outerwear

ООО “СК “ДЭСОН” (LLC Construction Company “DESON”)
Tax ID: 5027185855 8 ulitsa Initsiativnaya, Lyubertsy, Russia, 140000 Co-owner is DPRK national Kim Li Sen (Ким Ли Сен). Co-owner and director is Russian national Medova Irina Yurevna (Медова Ирина Юрьевна) with tax identification number 333410110070. Site preparation
ООО “ЭМА” (LLC “EMA”)
Tax ID: 6501196130 57 ulitsa Kryukova D.N., Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, 693020 Jointly owned by a DPRK entity, Korea Aprokgang Technical Development Corporation and a Russian company, LLC Private Security Company “FINEKO-ROSA-2” with the tax identification number 6501160630. Director is Russian national Martynov Oleg Mikhailovich (Мартынов Олег Михайлович) with tax identification number 650100859700. Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment
ООО СП “РОСАЮМА” (LLC “ROSAYUMA”)
Tax ID: 6501253740 104 ulitsa Tikhaya, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, 693005 Jointly owned by the Russian company, LLC “YUVESTA KOMPANI” with the tax identification number 6501151347 and a DPRK entity, Korea Paekma Trading Corporation. Director is Russian national Dyakov Yuri Ilich (Дьяков Юрий Ильич) with tax identification number 650100168968. Sawmilling and planing of wood
ООО СП “ФИТОН” (LLC JV “FITON”)
Tax ID: 7536033674 7 ulitsa Ugdanskaya, Chita, Russia, 672000 This company is formally registered as a joint venture. Its DPRK shareholder’s name, translated from Russian, is roughly ‘Management for the Manufacturing of Cortex Preparations’ (Russian: УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ
КОРЕПРЕПАРАТОВ МИНИСТЕРСТВА
ЗДРАВООХРАНЕНИЯ КНДР). Director is Russian national Galkin Nikolai Anatolevich (Галкин Николай Анатольевич) with tax identification number 753400222389.

The Russian shareholders are the Zabaikalskaya Kraya Department of State Property and Land Issues (tax identification number 7536095984) and Russian national Galkina Elena Yurevna (Галкина Елена Юрьевна) with tax identification number 753400453629. Pharmaceutical company
ООО “ЧХОЛСАН” (LLC “CHKHOLSAN”)
Tax ID: 7536112799 32 proezd Energostroitelei, Chita, Russia, 672022 Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575. Director is Russian national Pozdnyakov Sergei Leonidovich (Поздняков Сергей Леонидович) with tax identification number 753610439691. Construction
ООО СК “РАЙ” (LLC Construction Company “RAI”)
Tax ID: 7536132178 Room 4, 132 ulitsa Chkalova, Chita, Russia, 672039 Owner is DPRK Li Yn Sok (Ли Ын Сок) with tax identification number 753626113575. Director is Russian national Pozdnyakov Sergei Leonidovich (Поздняков Сергей Леонидович) with tax identification number 753610439691. Construction
ООО “РКК ФАРТ” (LLC “RKK FART”
Tax ID: 3808221510 17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ulitsa, Irkutsk, Russia, 664047 Owner is DPRK national Lee Chong Nam (Ли Чен Нам), for whom a tax identification number is not specified. Director is Russian national Konstyunin Gennadi Evgenevich (Костюнин Геннадий Евгеньевич) with tax identification number 381100579022. According to open source reporting, RKK Fart” LLC ” owns Korean restaurant “Pyongyang” at the same address in Irkutsk. Restaurants and mobile food service activities

On 21 January 2019, the Russian Federation requested the Panel not to publish information about companies still being investigated on the basis of the requests from the Panel, as this could violate the confidentiality of the ongoing investigations and adversely affect their outcome.

Name (Eng) Name (Korean and/or original script) Location in DPRK/Russia Name of Partner Company
where applicable Partner HQ /Restaurant location

Koryo Restaurant Ресторан «Корё» Moscow – Ordzhonikidze Ulitsa, 11, bld.-. 9, Moscow, Russia, 115419

Pyongyang Restaurant Ресторан «Пхеньян» Vladivostok – Ulitsa Verkhneportovaya, 68 В, Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690003
Pyongyang Restaurant Ресторан «Пхеньян» Irkutsk ООО «РКК ФАРТ» (LLC “RKK FART”),
Учредитель (owner) – Ли Чен Нам (see Annex 1 and 3) 17 Aleksandra Nevskogo ul.,
Irkutsk, Irkutskaya oblast, Russia, 664047
Rungrado Restaurant Ресторан «Рынрадо» Moscow – 29/1 Lomonosovsky Prospekt, Moscow, Russia, 119192
Koryo Restaurant Ресторан «Корё» Vladivostok – 20 А Prospekt Ocean, District “Center,” Vladivostok, Primorsky kray, Russia, 690091
Rus’-Moran Restaurant Ресторан «Русь-Моран» Blagoveshchensk – Ulitsa Lenina, 108А, Blagoveshchensk, Amurskaya oblast, Russia, 675000

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en;
Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Singapore

Singapore informed the Panel that a Singapore company, Lucky Greenbird Pte. Ltd’s joint venture with Ryugyong Corporation “Taesong BAT” JV, the JV was terminated on 1 January 2018 and provided the termination notice to the Panel. Singapore further stated, “Our checks have not uncovered any evidence that its funds, financial assets, and economic resources are owned or controlled by designated individuals or entities, the DPRK Government, the Worker’s Party of Korea, individuals or entities acting on behalf or at their direction, and/or entities owned or controlled by them. If we find any evidence that Lucky Greenbird Pte Ltd, or any other entity, has contravened the UNSCRs and/or our laws, we will not hesitate to take the necessary action. As stated in our National Implementation Report for UNSCR 2397, there are no DPRK nationals with work passes in Singapore. Singapore has revoked the work passes of all DPRK nationals earning income in Singapore and will not grant new work passes to DPRK nationals.
Source: open source, Member State

Thailand
With regard to Star Joint Venture Company (aka Star JV a.k.a. Northeast Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Co., Ltd. (NEAT &T)) it informed the Panel that Loxley Pacific Co., Ltd. changed its name into Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2013, that it had withdrawn its investment in Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd. in 2015 and that it had connection with NEAT&T. It stated that Loxpac (Thailand) Co., Ltd ceased all of its business in the DPRK, including its operation via NEAT&T, since January 2018.
Source: Member State, open source

Name Name (Korean or in original script) Name of Partner Company
where applicable Partner HQ/Restaurant location
Pyongyang Okryu Restaurant
ร้านเพียงยอง อ็อคริว – Between Sukhumvit Soi 25-27, next to Radisson Blu hotel, Ekkamai Rd., Bangkok, Thailand

Pyongyang Haemaji Restaurant – – 83, Soi 26 Sukumvit, Khlongtoi, Bangkok 10110, Thailand
Mokran Korean Restaurant Magnolias Pattaya Boutique Resort 4/6 M.9 Maprachan Reservoir,
Tambon Pong, Amphoe Banglamung,
20150 Chonburi,
Thailand

Uganda
The Ugandan Government replied on 6 July 2018 to the Panel’s request for further information on MKP’s operations in Uganda. It acknowledged having formed a joint venture between the National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) and MKP Builders SDN BHD, called NH-MKP Builders Limited. As part of one project, the NHCC paid out $3,627,762 as an advanced payment to MKP Builders. Uganda claims this business relationship ceased at the beginning of 2014, when it became clear that MKP Builders SDN BHD was unable to complete the construction contract. The Ugandan Government has since been involved in a series of ongoing lawsuits with MKP and its insurance companies to recover the payment, and insists that it cannot dissolve MKP Builders SDN BHD or MKP Capital Berhad while litigation continues.

Uganda’s reply also included information about Vidas Engineering Services Limited, which it acknowledged having contracted to for several government-funded projects. However, it firmly denied any relationship between the firm and MKP, citing Vidas’ company incorporation documents. Uganda and Vidas did not provide an explanation for the appearance of the firm’s mailing address, registered office address, email address and trading name on the corporate registry documents for MKP Capital and MKP Builders in Uganda. The Panel notes that in order to mask DPRK connections, DPRK companies commonly use foreign national facilitators to avoid putting its own nationals on incorporation paperwork, leverages business contacts to facilitate the establishment of in-country presences, and embeds within foreign firms. Uganda did not respond to the Panel’s inquiries pertaining to its recent promotion of foreign investment opportunities in a high-value MKP Holdings project at the Moroto Marble Mine.

No Business name (Eng.) Other names Name of partner company (where applicable) DPRK & Uganda nationals involved & other info

  1. NH MKP Builders Ltd
    MKP Builders SDN Ugandan National Housing & Construction Company Ltd. Choi Da Hwan (identified as Korean), Ms Jane Bilek Langoya, Mhanmed A. Benomran (likely an alternate spelling of Muhamed A. Banomaran) and Henry Majoh Mukisa.
  2. MKP Builders San BHD
    Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited
    Uganda’s Ministry of Water and Environment ; National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) Yong Kyong Kin, Ms Jane Lukonga Bilan and Mr. Muhamed A. Banomaran, listed as Directors.
  3. MKP Capital Bernard Co. Limited Vidas Engineering Services Co. Limited
    National Housing and Construction Company (NHCC) Yong Kyong and Edward Han are both listed as directors and shareholders, with nationalities as Korean. Henry Mukisa and Asa Mugenyi (both Ugandans), are also listed as directors and shareholders.
    Source: Corporate registry, open source

Vietnam
Koryo restaurant / formerly
Ryu Gyong Restaurant
(Nhà Hàng Ryu Gyong Triều Tiên; 조선 류경 식당)
Ho Chi Minh City
Registered As
CôNg Ty Tnhh ThưƠNg Mại Phan Minh Fmc-V.N.
30 Le Quy Don, Ward 7, District 3, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Koryo restaurant Hanoi
No.61 Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi

Previous Address: No.7, Lot 13b, Trung Hoa City, Trung Yen Urban Area, Phuong Trung Hoa, Cau Giang Paper, Hanoi
Binh Nhuong (Pyongyang) restaurant Hanoi No. 28, Nguyen Thi Dinh Street, Tung Hoa Commune, Cau Giay District, Ha Noi

Source: Member State, Corporate registry and open source

Zambia
See Annex 46 on MKP companies in Zambia. Zambia replied to the Panel that it had undertaken a full investigation into the companies listed by the Panel and that it had confirmed that several DPRK and Malaysian nationals were acting as directors in MKP Holdings, and that one of the recommendations from Zambia’s investigation of the network was that authorities consider repatriating DPRK nationals working in the country, in accordance with resolution 2397 (2017), including a list of 13 DPRK nationals. It is unclear to the Panel whether this covers all of DPRK nationals working in Zambia.

Source : Corporate registry, Member State

Annex 75 Information on economic activities being undertaken by ООО “ПИОНЕР” (LLC “PIONER”), a JV owned by a DPRK national registered to the same address as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, Russian Federation

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en

Name changes

Source: Official State Registration Data according to SPARK system, http://www.spark-interfax.ru/en


Registry document for “ПИОНЕР” (LLC “PIONER”) dated 13 August 2018

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Map data showing LLC PIONER address and DPRK Embassy in Vladivostock address
The below screenshot from the corporate registry document places PIONER’s location as the same as the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok, shown on screenshots from Yandex maps. In all instances, the divide between the consulate and the surrounding buildings is either noted on the map or visible from satellite imagery.

PIONER screenshot with location map from SPARK:

Source: SPARK, http://spark-interfax.ru

Screenshot from Yandex maps for 12A ulitsa Nevskaya, Vladivostok:

Source: Yandex maps, https://yandex.com/maps/

Address of the DPRK consulate in Vladivostok

Source: Representation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vladivostok, https://vladivostok.mid.ru/

Annex 76 : Documents showing GENCO’s partial ownership of LLC “SAKORENMA”

Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Registry documents of LLC “SAKORENMA”, partially owned by DPRK company GENCO (Korea General Company for External Construction)

Source: OKVED / SPARK

Document showing nationality for Director of Sakorenma
Source: Unified State Register of Legal Entities, https://egrul.nalog.ru

Annex 77 : Documents Information on LLC “SAKORENMA” name change

Source: SPARK, https://spark-interfax.ru/

Annex 78 : Government contracts awarded to LLC “SAKORENMA”
Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

Source: Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

2018 Government contracts awarded to Russian JV owned by the DPRK company, GENCO (Google translated into English)

(Each contract has an embedded link to the official procurement website of the Russian Federation on which the contracts are listed)

Source: https://www.rusprofile.ru/gz/2893948

Information on Government contracts from a Russian official business registry aggregator

Source: https://www.kartoteka.ru/card/6503378623b837e00e8ff4b9bc1f9b27/#path_Main_Html

Annex 79 : Bank details for LLC “SAKORENMA”

Source: Municipal Contract No. 027-003-18, accessed via Unified Information System in the Sphere of Procurement, http://zakupki.gov.ru/

Annex 80 : Yongbyon 5MW (e) Reactor and Light Water Reactor


Annex 81 : Yongbyon Steam Plant


Annex 82 : Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site

Annex 83 : Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant


Annex 84 : Ballistic missile infrastructure and parade imagery

  1. The Panel identified a then newly-constructed concrete launch pad used for the 29 August intermediate range Hwasong-12 launch at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see figure I) It was built sometime after the last available Planet Lab image of 12 August 2017 (left). Planet Lab imagery dated 2 September shows vegetation burnt as a result of the 29 August launch (centre).

Figure I

Source: Images courtesy of Planet Labs, Inc

Figure II: Images showing the newly constructed launch pad at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport on 29 August 2017

Source: Korea Cemtral News Agency

  1. A Member State confirmed the imagery analysis of the Panel concerning the partial dismantlement of Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite rocket launch site and of the vertical missile-engine test stand (figure III). Dismantlement may be reversed as only light or moveable parts, such as the metal superstructure, were dismantled.

Figure III

  1. The Panel monitored developments at the Hoejung-ni Missile Operating base and the railway station

Figure IV

  1. A new type of short-range ballistic missile was unveiled at the military parade of 8 February 2018 celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army. Furthermore, the parading of four Hwasong-15 missiles mounted on transporter erector launchers demonstrated the intercontinental strike capability and the mobility of the weapon system (see figure V) as well as the three ICBM Hwasong-14. The 12 ballistic missile systems, consisting of six Pukguksong-2 and six Hwasong-12, were also displayed.

Figure V: New type of short-range ballistic missile (top left and right); Hwasong-15 (bottom)

Source: Korean Central Television screengrab, courtesy of Martyn Williams.

  1. A Member State informed the Panel that the Pukguksong-2 casing is built from a new composite casing which was exhibited during a military parade and during a test launch of Pukguksong-2, as well as during the 23 August 2017 visit of Chairman Kim Jong Un to the Chemical Material Institute (CMI) at Hamhung :

Figure VI

Source: Member State – KCNA

Annex 85 : The Panel’s assessment of humanitarian consequences of UN Security Council sanctions for the civilian population of the DPRK

  1. Impartial humanitarian operations are a critical lifeline for millions of civilians in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Severe humanitarian needs persist including high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, and lack of access to essential health services, clean water and sanitation. More than 40 per cent of the population
    (10.3 million people) is undernourished and one in five children is stunted. Over nine million people have limited access to essential health services. A severe shortage of basic drugs persists. Over one-third of household drinking water is contaminated. One in ten children suffers from diarrhea.
  2. According to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), sanctions measures are “not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK” or “to affect negatively the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK”. To assess the situation, the Panel gathered information from various sources including close to 20 non-governmental organizations and all UN agencies operating in the country on how humanitarian operations have been affected by the process for applying for humanitarian exemptions, the sectoral sanctions and the lack of a viable banking channel (annexes 86 and 87). The Panel notes that the implementation of sectoral sanctions in particular has had an impact on the activities of international humanitarian agencies working to address chronic humanitarian needs in the country.
  3. Pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Committee has broad authority to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis, inter alia, to facilitate humanitarian assistance in the DPRK. To strengthen the mechanism for humanitarian exemptions, in August 2018 the Committee adopted Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN) No. 7: “Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK”, offering recommendations to Member States and international and non-governmental organizations regarding the exemption request procedures. While the Committee received and reviewed exemption requests for humanitarian assistance before the adoption of the IAN No. 7, its adoption was a welcome step towards streamlining and expediting the processing of exemption requests, and raising expectations that this would significantly improve the Committee’s review and approval process for exemption requests.
  4. Based on an initial assessment of the practice for the first five months since the adoption of the IAN No. 7, humanitarian agencies have experienced various challenges. Among others, the process requires a very generous lead time in planning shipments of humanitarian goods, including locating suppliers and financial agents willing to bid or contract for the provision of goods and services before an exemption is obtained. Any changes to planned suppliers, shipping routes, item specifications, or quantities between those indicated in the approved exemption request and at the time of the actual shipment may render the exemption invalid. The long lead time perceived to be necessary for the exemption approval process could also make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to respond effectively to contingencies such as a natural disaster or an outbreak of disease.
  5. The Committee has received 25 humanitarian exemption requests during the reporting period. Two requests were withdrawn, 16 requests were approved, while seven requests remain under consideration by the Committee.
  6. Expediting the review and approval by the Committee of exemption requests for humanitarian programs, starting with requests currently before the Committee, will help to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Furthermore, the Committee should consider ways to allow more flexibility with regard to the requirement of exemption requests being submitted every six months, which causes additional delays and prolongs the already lengthy six to eight months’ lead time required for offshore procurement.
    Sectoral sanctions
  7. The sectoral sanctions imposed pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) include prohibition of the transfer to the DPRK of “all industrial machinery (HS codes 84 and 85), transportation vehicles (HS codes 86 through 89), and iron, steel, and other metals (HS codes 72 through 83)”, also affecting a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see annex 87). This paragraph does not include any direct mention of humanitarian exceptions, other than civilian passenger aircraft spare parts. The Committee must, therefore, consider requests for humanitarian exemptions to these sanctions, based on paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), which allows the Committee to “on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions.”
  8. Paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) covers several goods which are vital to agriculture or public health programs, including a variety of agricultural machinery and medical equipment (annex 87). Prohibited goods include machinery and parts for food processing factories; pumps, filters, pipes, and drilling equipment necessary to address critical humanitarian needs, such as providing clean water to prevent diarrhea, one of the main killers of children in the DPRK, and food security to reduce high malnutrition rates.
  9. It should be noted that obtaining exemption requests from the Committee is but one stage of the process of importing relief items into the DPRK. For example, non-governmental organizations’ submissions can be subject to delays with Member States before they reach the Committee. Non-governmental organizations have little visibility and no control over when the Member State submits their request to the Committee. The continued risk adverse approach taken by suppliers and some transit countries’ authorities also continues to cause delays to the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance.

Breakdown of the Banking Channel

  1. Paragraph 33 of resolution 2270 (2016) prohibits the establishment or maintenance of correspondent accounts with DPRK financial institutions unless approved by the Committee. In August 2016, the Committee approved an exemption for Russia-based Bank Sputnik CJSC to maintain a correspondent relationship with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) in order to facilitate transactions for United Nations agencies in the country. Given that most of the operational transactions occur outside the DPRK when procuring materials and paying expatriate staff salaries, only 10 per cent of program funds are used within the country to cover on-site operational expenses such as fuel and local staff salaries.
  2. The Committee’s action of 11 August 2016 enabled a mechanism whereby the UN Secretariat in New York could transfer U.S. Dollars to Commerzbank AG in Germany, which would convert the Dollars to Euros and remit payment in Rubles to Bank Sputnik in the Russian Federation. Bank Sputnik would then hold the payment in the FTB correspondent account, and – lacking an electronic payment clearing system with the FTB – remit cash to Pyongyang for deposit and use by United Nations agencies. However, since September 2017, when Commerzbank cancelled its participation in DPRK-related transactions no alternative arrangements have been found, effectively closing the humanitarian banking channel. This collapse of the banking channel resulted in a shortage of cash in-country, and will make it difficult for United Nations agencies to implement activities. United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have increasingly had to rely on staff carrying large amounts of cash on their person when traveling to the DPRK.
  3. The challenges to aid agencies posed by UN financial sanctions have been compounded by de-risking – the phenomenon by which financial institutions and other private-sector actors categorically reject all transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. This has been spurred by the threat of secondary sanctions by various Member States. Disaggregating the specific impact of UN financial sanctions on humanitarian organizations operating in the DPRK from that of unilateral sanctions measures and regulations can be difficult.

Annex 86 : Examples of impact of sanctions on the implementation of humanitarian activities in the DPRK
Sector UN agency or NGO or both Items impacted Status Impact of delay/denial
1 Water and Sanitation Both For the WASH sector as a whole, from the planned 367,618 people to receive clean water in 2018, at least 229,235 people, including an estimated 16,000 under-five children will not receive clean drinking water due to delays resulting from need to obtain exemptions and funding shortfalls. This places children at risk of diarrhoea, one of the main killers of children, which is caused by consumption of unsafe drinking water, poor hygiene practices and inadequate health services.

2 Water and Sanitation UN This included some essential supplies required for four gravity-fed water systems (which were part of a larger procurement). Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018. Significant delay in agency being able to complete four gravity-fed water systems, placing 61,284 people, including an estimated 4,300 under-five children, at risk of diarrheal death associated with drinking contaminated water.
3 Water and Sanitation NGO Spare parts for mobile drilling rig, drill bits (6” and 8”), sludge pump, and others. Exemption request submitted to Member State 17 May 2018; still pending.
Unable to complete installation of 35 wells with handpumps, to provide communities with access to safe water. The majority of these wells were due to supply rural kindergartens, schools and health centres with clean water.
4 Health UN Emergency Reproductive Health kits 6A & 12 Exemption request pending submission to the Committee.
Delay in implementation of emergency response project, as a result 150,000 pregnant women who are due to deliver during the project period will not have access to safe delivery, and about 22,000 of the pregnancies who are likely to face complications during delivery will not have access to blood transfusions if required. These may result in a negative impact on the maternal mortality ratio that now stands at 58 per 100,000 live births.
5 Health UN Heaters for immunization clinics Exemption request submitted to the Committee on 24 January 2019. Under consideration. Fast tracking exemptions to facilitate the humanitarian response to DPRK’s harsh winter impact is critical. Delays may inadvertently contribute to children undressing for immunization in temperatures that go as low as minus 20 degrees Celsius. Moreover, vaccines are rendered ineffective when they freeze due to the lack of heaters.

6 Health UN 9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts of vehicles used to distribute TB and malaria supplies, and to conduct monitoring and supervision visits Exemption request approved with significant delay on 18 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on
31 August 2018.

9 units of ambulance vehicles. Spare parts are required to ensure regular maintenance of the five vehicles previously allocated to MoPH for the implementation of the tuberculosis (TB) and malaria programs.

These vehicles have been used exclusively for the distribution by MoPH of TB and malaria program supplies from central to lower level health facilities, and for supervision and monitoring of activities in the field. Without these vehicles there will be serious challenges to implement the programs.

DPRK is one of the 30 TB high burden countries in the world. In 2017, there were a total of 100,553 TB cases (5,211 children under 15, i.e. 5% of all cases).

Only 14 % of TB cases are tested for drug resistance due to lack of diagnostic resources in-country. Multi-drug-resistant (MDR) TB is a very severe type of TB with substantial risk to transform curable TB into incurable (with increased mortality and massive public transmission of the disease by non-cured patients) and the affordable TB treatment into unaffordable in resource-limited settings. The likelihood of ongoing MDR transmission is very high.

7 Health UN Refrigerators

Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018.  The delays caused by the exemption process is resulting in additional financial burdens for agencies.

For example, purchase orders cannot be issued before the Committee’s approval and sometimes grants may expire before such approval is granted.

In May 2018, an agency placed an offshore procurement through its supply division for refrigerators using grants expiring in December 2018. The exemption for these items was received on 19 October 2018. By this time the cost had increased from $2,400 per unit to $2,994 per unit, and the agency had to reduce the number of refrigerators purchased for its health program from 20 to 16.

8 Health UN Medical equipment for maternal and neonatal emergencies

Exemption request approved by the Committee with significant delay on 19 October 2018. The exemption request was submitted to the Committee on 31 August 2018. 

Non-availability of program supplies resulting in delays for the referral of emergency cases to health facilities. This will result in increased mortality.

Because requests for exemptions can only be submitted once every 6 months, offshore procurement can only be initiated then and not before. Considering that lead time for offshore procurement is 6-8 months, it can take up to 9 to fully equip the maternity wards.

9 Health NGO Assistive and mobility devices (wheelchairs, crutches, walking stick, walker, hearing aid and glasses) Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to a Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.
People living with disabilities identified as requiring assistive and mobility devices have been waiting more than 10 months for these items.

10 Food security and agriculture UN Irrigation equipment Exemption request pending submission to the Committee. As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season with impacts on the food security and food diversity of the affected population, raising the risk of increased rates of undernutrition, especially amongst the most vulnerable people.

11 Food security and agriculture UN Agricultural equipment (2-WT, corn thresher, mini rice mill) Exemption request pending submission to the Committee. As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.
12 Food security and agriculture UN Sea buckthorn processing equipment Exemption request pending submission to the Committee. As agricultural activities are time-bound, the implementation will be delayed by at least one cropping season. This will affect the ability to achieve the increase in food production which is needed to address need for food security and food diversity. Without access to suitable amounts and diversity of food, vulnerable people are at increased risk of malnutrition.
13 Food security and agriculture NGO • Plastic round arc type greenhouses

• Potato storage systems

• Ventilation system

• Diesel generator
Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending. This will result in an inability to produce vegetable seeds during the winter period to be used during the 2019 early vegetable production in 2019 season. This will result in farmers being unable to produce thousands of kilograms of vegetables which are vital for people’s food security and dietary diversity to prevent higher rates of malnutrition.

Lack of appropriate storage for seed potatoes, or for vegetable, legume and grass seeds.

Lack of electricity means unable to run the seed machinery that has been installed.

14 Food security and agriculture NGO Six bio-digester sets Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending. Unable to complete energy production project without bio-digester.
The biogas digesters properly treat animal and human waste generated in the facilities. A benefit of the digesters is the production of methane-rich biogas, which is to be used for cooking especially during the winter. They are used to produce food for people and animals; negative impacts on the health of livestock will have serious consequences on the nutritional status of the most vulnerable people, further limiting their dietary intake and diversity.
15 Food security and agriculture NGO Iron bar, Gabion wire (3t), Electrical Welder and others
Exemption request submitted to Member State in May 2018; still pending. Unable to complete project that would protect 2,140 square meters of agricultural land against flooding. During past five years, 95 people died, 4,054 houses were destroyed, 450 buildings demolished, 20.000 ha arable land damaged due to flooding in these areas. Without these activities the lives of thousands of people are at risk, as well as their ability to produce sufficient food due to the negative impacts of floods on agricultural land.
16 Food security and agriculture NGO Veterinarian kits Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.
Due to delays in receiving the kits, veterinarians will lack essential medicine and equipment for spring 2019, which is a particularly sensitive period for goats’ health (parasites, diarrhea…)

Livestock morbidity and mortality has severe impacts on the nutritional status of vulnerable people, especially children. Without this source of essential protein they risk increased levels of malnutrition and other health concerns.

17 Food security and agriculture NGO Distribution and consumption equipment, including bowls, cups, tricycles, stainless steel churns, hygiene tools, water tanks Exemption request approved by Committee on 29 January 2019. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018 and was submitted to the Committee with significant delay on 15 January 2019.
Without this equipment, children will not have access to yoghurt and other milk products that is essential for their dietary diversity. The lack of dietary diversity in DPRK, including lack of protein and essential vitamins and minerals, contributes to high rates of malnutrition. Projects such as this that provide children with supplementary foods are essential to prevent more children becoming malnourished.

18 Food security and agriculture NGO Greenhouses and gardening equipment, including tunnel greenhouses, gardening tools, sprayers, seeds Exemption request submitted to a Member State on 20 October 2018; still pending.

Without these items, kindergartens will not be able to grow and harvest vegetables, which are essential to provide children with an adequate diet during the lean season. Young children rely on food provided at kindergarten; without this they risk not receiving adequate nutrition and face the risk of malnutrition due to lack of adequate, nutritious food. 

19 Food security and agriculture NGO Equipment and tools for the micro-scale project for people living with disabilities. Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.
The activity is delayed by more than nine months.

Self-help group of people living with disabilities are waiting to start their livelihood activities.
20 Nutrition NGO Milk processing equipment including pasteurizer, cream separator, butter machine, storage tank, lactoscan, lab equipment, stainless steel tools and churns, detergent, gloves and clothes. Exemption request approved by the Committee on 24 July 2018. The exemption request was initially submitted to a Member State on 20 April 2018 and submitted to the Committee on 12 June 2018. Materials delivered end of November 2018, a delay of six months.

Milk processing activities will not begin until 2019, with impacts on the nutrition status of affected children who rely on the supplementary milk to increase their dietary diversity and prevent malnutrition.
21 Disaster Risk Reduction NGO Raw material (cement, doors, iron rod, sanitary ware, poly propylene pipe, Hollow iron rod for hand rail, water tap and window etc.) for the refurbishment of community building (safe shelter) Exemption request approved by the Committee on 30 January 2019. The exemption request was submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018 and to the Committee with significant delay on 3 January 2019.
The activity is delayed by more than nine months.

Community is not well equipped to mitigate impacts of future disasters as do not have access to community safe shelter
22 Disaster Risk Reduction NGO Raw material (cement and gabions) for the rehabilitation of canal embankment Request for exemption submitted to Member State on 12 October 2018; application is under review. The proposed canal embankment rehabilitation would mitigate the impact of future natural hazards (flood) and save the life of persons with disabilities and community. Without this project, vulnerable people are at risk of future floods.
Source: Letter from the UN Country team to the Panel of Experts on the Impact of Sanctions on Humanitarian Operations in DPRK, 14 December 2018; updated on 31 January 2019. 

Annex 87 : Humanitarian-sensitive items prohibited under sectoral sanctions in resolution 2397 (2017)
Category HS Code Comment
Hand-tools for agriculture (shovels, hoes, spades, etc…) HS 8201
Blades for agricultural, horticultural or forestry machines HS 820840
Dryers for agricultural products HS 841931
Agricultural spraying machines HS 842449
Irrigation equipment HS 842482
Agricultural machinery for soil preparation (ploughs, seeders, etc…) HS 8432
Harvesting and threshing machinery HS 8433
Presses, crushers for fruit juices etc… HS 8435
Miscellaneous agricultural equipment HS 8436
Machines for cleaning and sorting grains and legumes HS 8437
Misc. machines for industrial processing of food and drink HS 8438, excluding HS 843840 (brewery machinery) This category includes machinery and spare parts for NGO-supported food processing factories.
Tractors & spare tractor parts HS 8701 for tractors, multiple categories for spare parts Tractors and spare parts are not only needed for general agricultural support activities, but also for food security efforts at medical clinics and schools.
Agricultural trailers, farm wagons, and carts HS 8716, multiple subheadings
Prefabricated greenhouses, animal sheds HS 940690 Several NGOs have supported the use of greenhouses in the DPRK for private crop cultivation and for food security/nutritional enhancement at medical facilities and schools serving vulnerable populations.

Category HS Code Comment
Nail clippers HS 821420 A U.S. NGO shipment of hygiene kits to DPRK medical facilities was seized at customs in transit due to the presence of nail clippers in the kits; it was released after six weeks.
Sterilizers for medical use HS 841920
Portable sprayers HS 842441 Used for malaria control.
UV lamps for disinfection HS 853939 Used for infection control.
Ambulances HS 8703, not separately categorized from other vehicles Needed by many medical care centers due to very poor transportation networks and infrastructure.
Carriages for disabled persons HS 8713 Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
Medical appliances, including ultrasound and cardiograph machines, syringes, needles, catheters, dental and ophthalmic equipment, etc… HS 9018 Essential to the delivery of medical care.
Mechano-therapy appliances, such as artificial respiration machines HS 9019
Orthopedic appliances for persons with disabilities HS 9021 Several NGOs have worked to provide support for persons with disabilities in the DPRK.
X-ray machines HS 9022 Essential for TB diagnosis and general medical support. Accessories supporting digitization of images is essential to affordability/sustainability.
Medical, surgical, dental, or veterinary furniture (ie operating tables, hospital beds) HS 9402 Critical to providing basic care for patients.

Category HS Code Comment
Metal water tanks HS 7309, HS 7310, HS 7611
Pumps for liquids, including pumps for household water systems HS 8413 Necessary for providing clean water to households, clinics, etc…, as well as for agricultural purposes.
Water heaters HS 841911 (gas), 841919 (solar), HS 851610 (electric)
Machinery for filtering or purifying water HS 842121, HS 842199 (for parts) Lack of clean water is a major contributing factor to persistent high rates of diarrhea and malnutrition among vulnerable populations.
Machinery for water well drilling HS 843049 Critical to long-term sustainable clean-water interventions.

Category HS Code Comment
Metal tubes, pipes, pipe fittings, etc… HS 7303-7307 (iron and steel); separate HS codes for copper, aluminum, lead etc… Used for the provision of clean water.
Roofing, siding, flooring, roof drainage equipment Included in HS 730890 (sheet metal) and HS 761090 (aluminum) After Typhoon Lionrock hit the DPRK in 2016, several NGOs responded by providing roofing materials to help rebuild schools, clinics, etc…
Screws, bolts, nails, staples, etc… HS 7317-7318 These are common items which are often components of humanitarian-sensitive goods, or part of the packaging thereof
Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers, barbecues, etc… HS 7321, HS 851660 Clean cook stoves provide significant health and environmental benefits, compared to cooking over open fires.
Iron, steel, or aluminum wire HS 732620, HS 7605 Has numerous agricultural applications.
Aluminum foil HS 7607 Has medical/laboratory uses.
Refrigerating and Freezing Equipment HS 8418, as well as other categories for refrigerated trucks. Refrigeration and refrigerated trucks are essential for the storage and transportation of certain health-related goods such as vaccines, diagnostic reagents, etc….
Generators HS 8502 Generators are important as a primary or back-up power supply to medical clinics, etc… which require a steady energy supply.
Electric transformers and inductors HS 8504 Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment, as well as for agricultural functions.
Electric storage batteries HS 8507 Necessary component to storing energy from solar panels and other off-grid energy sources, and used in many humanitarian applications.
Centrifuges and centrifugal dryers HS 8421 Items in this category are used for medical laboratory diagnostics (including for TB and MDR-TB) as well as water purification. This category also includes biosafety cabinets and HEPA filters, which have important medical applications.
Electrical apparatus (ie switches, relays, fuses, surge protectors) HS 8536 Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Solar panels HS 854140 Important source for off-grid or backup energy supply, including in medical clinics etc…
Insulated wires, cables HS 8544 Necessary for the steady supply of electricity to medical and laboratory equipment.
Microscopes HS 9011-9012 Important for medical laboratory diagnostics.
Miscellaneous office supplies (printers and print cartridges, flash drives, barcode scanners, staplers, scissors, binders, paper clips, etc…) Multiple HS categories Humanitarian agencies have previously supplied local partners with basic office supplies and equipment to assist with administration, data collection, and patient record-keeping.
Sources: Humanitarian organizations
Note on methodology: The above tables identify humanitarian goods which are prohibited for export to the DPRK under paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) including those strictly humanitarian in nature, as well as those serving a broader array of purposes including humanitarian (such as electrical equipment necessary for hospitals and clinics). The tables are not intended to be comprehensive.
While these items align with certain categories of goods with the Harmonized System (HS) codes administered by the World Customs Organization, which are referenced in Resolution 2397, there is not always a straightforward correlation between the lay categorization of certain goods and the HS code system. In some cases, even the most specific (six digit) HS codes may still be so broad as to lump humanitarian-sensitive goods together with other types of goods. For example, machinery for water well drilling is included in the same general category as all “boring and sinking machinery.” In other cases, a certain category of humanitarian-sensitive good – spare parts for tractors, for example – may be spread across multiple HS categories.
Additionally, although resolution 2397 (2017) only refers to goods categorized under HS chapters 72-89, a number of humanitarian-sensitive goods that are categorized outside of this range nonetheless contain prohibited components. For example, X-ray machines are categorized under HS 9022, but also incorporate various types of metal and electronic components which could be categorized under HS chapters 72-89. In October 2018, the Committee provided an exemption allowing UNICEF to ship X-ray machines into the DPRK, implying that the Committee would otherwise consider shipment of such devices as prohibited.
Finally, it is noteworthy that some of the IT and communications equipment prohibited for export to the DPRK by paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) may also have humanitarian uses, including such as USB flash drives, portable media players, mobile phones, radios, etc.

Annex 88 : Member States yet to submit implementation reports pursuant to paragraph
17 of resolution 2397 (2017

Africa

  1. Algeria
  2. Angola
  3. Benin
  4. Botswana
  5. Burkina Faso
  6. Burundi
  7. Cabo Verde
  8. Cameroon
  9. Central African Republic
  10. Chad
  11. Comoros
  12. Congo
  13. Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019)
  14. Democratic Republic of the Congo
  15. Djibouti
  16. Kingdom of Eswatini
  17. Ethiopia (UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018)
  18. Gabon
  19. Gambia
  20. Ghana
  21. Guinea
  22. Guinea-Bissau
  23. Kenya
  24. Lesotho
  25. Liberia
  26. Libya
  27. Madagascar
  28. Malawi
  29. Mali
  30. Mauritania
  31. Mauritius
  32. Morocco
  33. Mozambique
  34. Namibia
  35. Niger
  36. Nigeria
  37. Rwanda
  38. Sao Tome and Principe
  39. Senegal
  40. Seychelles
  41. Sierra Leone
  42. Somalia
  43. South Africa (UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020)
  44. South ‎Sudan
  45. Tanzania
  46. Tunisia
  47. Uganda
  48. Zambia
  49. Zimbabwe Americas
  50. Antigua and Barbuda
  51. Bahamas
  52. Barbados
  53. Belize
  54. Bolivia (UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018)
  55. Brazil
  56. Costa Rica
  57. Cuba
  58. Dominica
  59. Ecuador
  60. El Salvador
  61. Grenada
  62. Guyana
  63. Haiti
  64. Honduras
  65. Jamaica
  66. Nicaragua
  67. Paraguay
  68. Peru (UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019)
  69. Saint Kitts and Nevis
  70. Saint Lucia
  71. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
  72. Suriname
  73. Trinidad and Tobago
  74. Uruguay
  75. Venezuela

Asia

  1. Afghanistan
  2. Bahrain
  3. Bangladesh
  4. Bhutan
  5. Brunei Darussalam
  6. Cambodia
  7. Indonesia (UNSC non-permanent member 2019-2020)
  8. Iran
  9. Jordan
  10. Kazakhstan (UNSC non-permanent member 2017-2018)
  11. Kuwait (UNSC non-permanent member 2018-2019)
  12. Kyrgyzstan
  13. Lebanon
  14. Malaysia
  15. Maldives
  16. Myanmar
  17. Nepal
  18. Oman 94. Saudi Arabia
  19. Syria
  20. Timor-Leste
  21. Turkmenistan
  22. Uzbekistan
  23. Yemen

Europe

  1. Andorra
  2. Azerbaijan
  3. Bosnia and Herzegovina
  4. Croatia
  5. Iceland
  6. Ireland
  7. Luxembourg
  8. Republic of Moldova
  9. San Marino
  10. Slovenia
  11. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Oceania

  1. Australia
  2. Fiji
  3. Kiribati
  4. Marshall Islands
  5. Micronesia
  6. Nauru
  7. Palau
  8. Papua New Guinea
  9. Samoa
  10. Solomon Islands
  11. Tonga
  12. Tuvalu
  13. Vanuatu
    Source: The Panel

    Annex 89 : Recommendations

To the Security Council:

  1. The Panel recommends that future Security Council resolutions stipulate the unit of measurement to be used by Member States in their reporting to the Committee.
  2. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, when drafting future financial sanctions measures, take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.
  3. The United Nations Secretary-General should request the Secretariat to carry out an assessment of the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the DPRK.

To the 1718 Committee:

  1. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following vessels for illicit transfers of petroleum products in violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):

Myong Ryu 1 (IMO number: 8532413), DPRK flag
Song Won (IMO number: 8613360), DPRK flag
Jin Yang 36 (金洋 36), flag unknown
Xing Ming Yang 888 (IMO number 8410847), Sierra Leone

  1. The Panel reiterates its recommendation for the designation of Han Hun Il (Edward Han) and also recommends the designation of Yong Kok Yeap and Yazid Merzouk of MKP Malaysia and MKP Zambia.
  2. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations for the designation of Pan Systems to be accompanied by the names of all of its front companies (including Glocom, International Golden Services, International Global System) as aliases, for involvement in the financing and sales of arms and related materiel.
  3. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to designate: Ri Ik (Li Ik), Wang Zhi Guo and Ri Ho Nam
  4. Information about cyberattacks conducted by RGB as a means to evade financial sanctions and to gain foreign currency should be added to the RGB’s entry on the 1718 Sanctions List.
  5. The Panel recommends tha the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities contained within paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).
  6. The Panel recommends that the Committee include the provision in paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) to the vessel designation criteria and incorporate it into the existing lists of designated vessels as appropriate.
  7. The Panel recommends that the Committee amend the delisting procedure to allow Member States to request delisting on behalf of a vessel owner (for the Panel’s proposal for amended procedure for delisting for vessels, see annex 20).
  8. In order to allow more effective due diligence by flag States, other Member States and the maritime-related industries, the Committee should consider consolidating the designated vessels in one document. Information provided on the vessels should include the measures obligated under the relevant resolutions such as asset freeze, denial of port entry, and cancellation of registration or vessel services. Incidents of deregistration reported to the Committee should also be reflected to prevent inadvertent re-registration.
  9. The Panel recommends that discussions in the Committee on humanitarian exemption requests be time-bound and that focus groups within the Committee meet on a regular basis to examine humanitarian issues with a view to expediting the processing of such requests.
  10. In order to alleviate unnecessary burdens on Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Committee should publish a whitelist of certain non-sensitive items used in humanitarian operations that fall under the broad categories of items subject to the sectoral sanctions in paragraph 7 of resolution 2397 (2017) requiring an exemption for humanitarian shipment into the DPRK.
  11. The Committee should continue to seek feedback from Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations applying for exemptions under the terms of the IAN No. 7 guidelines and work to streamline and simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved, and the frequency of requests/submissions.

To Member States:

  1. Flag States should inform the Committee and the Panel of vessels that they deregister.
  2. Flag States should monitor the AIS of their vessels and those illegally sailing under their flag to better ensure implementation of the resolutions.
  3. Members States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for P&I insurance and re-insurance companies to include AIS screening and an “AIS switch off” clause in their contracts for at-risk vessels operating in the relevant regions.
  4. Member States should consider introducing a regulatory requirement for petroleum product trading, refining and producing companies to include end-use delivery verification measures and AIS screening clause as well as an “AIS switch-off” clause in their contracts.
  5. Member States of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) should consider measures to improve information-sharing and maritime regulation enforcement by flag States and other interested parties.
  6. Member States should consider introducing legislation to ensure that global and regional banks operating in their jurisdiction introduce AIS screening and vessel due diligence risk assessment clauses into letters of credit, loans and other financial instruments for global and regional commodity traders and brokers trading in oil and petroleum products in higher risk Free on Board (FoB) markets in the affected areas.
  7. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and in those at-risk segments of the Free on Board (FoB) market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfer in the affected international waters adopt contractual language that includes an effective end use delivery verification mechanism.
  8. Member States and relevant international organizations should ensure that the global and regional commodity trading companies and tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions and those segments of the affected Free on Board (FoB) markets assess the AIS history of all vessels they intend to supply with products banned under the resolutions.
  9. Member States should ensure that the provisions on financial sanctions in the resolutions take account of DPRK cyberattacks to circumvent the resolutions by illegally generating revenue for the DPRK.
  10. Member States should enhance their ability to facilitate robust information exchange on the DPRK’s cyberattacks with other governments and with their own financial institutions, to detect and prevent attempts by the DPRK to employ its cyber capabilities for sanctions evasion.
  11. Given the pervasive use of accounts in the names of family members to evade sanctions, the Panel recommends that governments provide their financial institutions with a list not only of accredited diplomats, but of their family members to ensure that diplomats do not establish additional bank accounts in their names.
  12. The Panel recommends that Member States issue guidance for a single bank to be identified as the only bank that can hold accounts for the DPRK embassy and diplomats and that all others are advised not to hold accounts for DPRK diplomats or their family members.
  13. The Panel recommends that Member States advise their financial institutions not to open accounts for DPRK diplomats not accredited to their country and to share information on the financial activities of DPRK diplomats with other Member States where records show there has been financial activity to avoid cross-border circumvention of sanctions.
  14. Member States should advise their financial institutions that only closing bank accounts (as opposed to freezing) does not meet the requirements of the resolutions, which stipulate that they must freeze all assets controlled by designated individuals or entities, those operating on their behalf, as well as of any members of the DPRK Government that are engaged in violating or evading of any of the provisions of the resolutions.
  15. Member States should offer technical assistance to other Member States to help them strengthen their legal frameworks and related mechanisms to implement the financial provisions in the resolutions, as appropriate and in line with Article 49 of the UN Charter.
  16. As part of their implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), Member States should request their corporate registries to extract the details of all companies with DPRK national director or shareholders (which de facto violates the ban).
  17. Given that joint ventures have violated other provisions of the resolution in addition to paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017), the names of those directors and shareholders should be shared with investigation agencies, financial intelligence units and financial institutions.
  18. The Panel recommends that Member States clarify with their national agencies that insurance providers are financial institutions and therefore subject to all of the relevant financial provisions in the resolutions, including the need to freeze assets under the resolutions.

 

    Tags: DPRK, Kim Jong-Un, Panel of Experts, PofE, sanctions, UN